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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECT OF UTILIZATION CONTROLS ON HMO ENROLLEES' HEALTH, 
SATISFACTION WITH CARE, AND DISENROLLMENT 
Barbara Stewart Brown, Ph.D. 
Medical College of Virginia, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1987 
Major Director: Louis F. Rossiter, Ph.D. 
The purpose of this prospective study is to examine the effects 
of differences in utilization controls on HMO enrollees' health, 
satisfaction with quality of care and access, and disenrollment. 
Previous studies of alternative care systems have shown that they 
are able to decrease costs (Luft, 1981; Anderson, Herald, Butler, 
Kohrman, & Morrison, 1985), but have not examined the organizational 
structure within the organization that oversees utilization. No 
prior studies have examined the effects of different types and 
degrees of utilization controls on the health, satisfaction, and 
access of enrollees. 
For this investigation, Williamson's (1975) theory of 
organizations, transaction costs economics, is used as the analytic 
framework. It is applicable to a study of utilization controls 
because it explains the organizational design or "governance 
structure" adopted to promote economic efficiency. 
Data for this study comes from the National Medicare 
Competition Evaluation's (NMCE) initial and follow-up beneficiary 
surveys and was merged with data about the plans. Data on the 
x 
utilization controls to which the enrollees were exposed comes from 
the NMCE case studies prepared about six months after the plans 
started enrolling Medicare patients. Data on health, satisfaction, 
and access measures comes from the beneficiary surveys. The surveys 
were conducted about a year apart; the first one occurring upon 
enrollment in the HMOs. 
Separate analyses using ordinary least squares and logit 
regression techniques were performed for 1,175 continuous enrollees 
and 376 disenrollees using the merged data. The disenrollees were 
treated as a distinct group because their leaving the HMO may have 
been motivated by dissatisfaction with utilization control. 
The analysis found that exposure to different types and 
stringency of utilization controls was not associated with changes 
in enrollees' health. They did affect satisfaction with quality of 
care and appointment convenience. 
Disenrollment was significant; 18% of the enrollees left the 
plans during the study. Utilization controls accounted for 49.2% of 
the variance in disenrollment from the plans. 
CHAPTER 1 
.. ~ 
'SCOPE; AND PuRPoSE OF TIlE STUDY 
... ~. ~,/ 
The primary health care issue in the 1960s was to make health 
care accessible to everyone in the United States. In the seventies 
the issues focused on the quality of care and using high tech 
modalities for diagnosis ~nd treatment. For the eighties the issue 
has become cost. Now the challenge is to develop health care 
systems that are cost efficient as well as being accessible and high 
quality. 
To this end, alternative health care systems have been promoted 
to circumvent costs stemming from incentives underlying fee-for-
service payment and widespread indemnity health care insurance. One 
of these alternatives is prepaid health plans such as health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and similar kinds of comprehensive 
health care providers called competitive medical plans (CMPs). 
Health maintenance organizations and CMPs differ from traditional 
fee-for-service: Providers are under contract to deliver specific 
heal th services to enrolled members for a prepaid fixed payment. 
Thus, in an HMO or eMP, the insuring organization and the provider 
organization are merged so that they become a single entity. 
1 
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The merging of the two organizations provides opportunities not 
found when they are separate. First, by eliminating fee-for-
service reimbursement, provider incentives to prescribe and/or 
patient incentives to seek more services than are justified given a 
person's medical problem are eliminated. At the same time, the 
single organization has the ability to stipulate the conditions 
under which certain types of services will be prescribed and for how 
long. 
Health maintenance organizations and CMPs are built on the idea 
of "managed care" (Schlag & Piktalis, 1987). Under managed care, 
patient access to services is channeled via procedures called 
utilization controls. Utilization controls stipulate conditions for 
access to care and provider payments as well as serving as 
monitoring mechanisms for the organization. They form an 
infrastructure for the organization that contains costs by reducing 
unnecessary and costly duplication of services. Commonly used 
utilization controls are: (a) financial risk sharing arrangements 
with providers, (b) preauthorizing hospital care and specialists' 
services or having primary care physicians act as gatekeepers to 
other services, and (c) reviewing hospital and ambulatory care 
records. Utilization controls are the governance structure that 
oversees the exchange of services between the physician and patients 
for which the HMO/CMP is financially liable. 
Applying a control structure to the production of health care 
is intended to standardize the product and eliminate unnecessary 
costs arising from inefficient production or opportunism. However, 
health care is a dynamic product, not a widget. An illness may 
3 
present itself in many ways. Uncontrollable factors such as time 
and concomitant conditions influence its urgency and treatment. To 
confine it to decision tree sequences with bureaucratic rules as 
decision points may not be without hazard. 
Too many rules or too many limits on service use may prevent 
timely interventions and increase health care costs in the long run. 
As the financial incentives found in HMOs and CMPs operate to limit 
service use, concerns about providing too little service arise. If 
a utilization control structure to safeguard costs is specified to a 
point where the well-being of a patient population is compromised, 
then the structure has control beyond which is optimal because of 
the social costs imposed. 
Among the many possible outcomes, four that may occur when 
utilization controls are employed are listed here. The ~ is 
that health may improve because services are coordinated. The 
second consequence is no change in health occurs as a result of 
exposure to utilization controls. Either of these alternatives is 
acceptable; the governance structure decreases costs to the firm but 
does not decrease patient welfare. The ~!rd possibility is that 
health indicators decline when enrollees are in a channelled access 
system. A four~h possibility is that the patient disenrolls from 
-----_ ...... ", 
the HMO/CMP because of dissatisfaction with the control structure. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of 
differences in utilization controls on enrollee health and 
satisfaction with quality of care and access. It considers the 
4 
specific organizational component, the governance structure, that 
differentiates HMOs and CMPs. Previous studies of alternative care 
systems have shown that they are able to decrease costs (Luft, 1981; 
Anderson, Herald, Butler, Kohrman, & Morrison, 1985), but have not 
examined the organizational structure within the organization that 
oversees utilization. No studies exist on the effects of different 
types and degrees of utilization controls on the health, 
satisfaction and access of enrollees. Since utilization controls 
influence entry and exit from the health care system, a prospective 
approach that compares health, satisfaction and access prior to or 
at enrollment and at some subsequent point after joining an HMO is 
proposed. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions being investigated by this study are: 
1. Are differences in utilization controls 
associated with decreased enrollee health after 
enrollment? 
2. Are differences in utilization controls 
associated with decreased enrollee satisfaction 
with the quality of care over their previous 
source of care? 
3. Are differences in utilization controls 
associated with decreased enrollee access to 
care over their previous source of care? 
4. Are differences in utilization 
associated with disenrollment from 
CMPs? 
The following hypotheses will be tested: 
controls 
HMOs and 
1. Utilization controls do not produce a decrease 
in enrollee health . 
5 
2. Utilization controls do not produce a decrease 
in enrollee satisfaction with care. 
3. Utilization controls do not produce a decrease 
in enrollee access to care. 
4. Utilization controls do not influence 
disenrollment from HMOs and CMPs. 
Definition of Terms 
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) 
An HMO is a health plan that employs physicians or contracts 
with a physician group who agrees to provide in exchange for fixed 
fee a wide and contractually specified range of medical service to 
an enrolled population. Regardless of the contractual arrangements 
with providers, the essential characteristic of an HMO is it 
vertically integrates the service delivery and insurance functions 
that are separated in the fee-for-service sector. The HMO rather 
than a separate insurer, assumes the risk of providing needed care 
for the premium paid. The health plan loses money if the cost of 
care exceeds the premium, it gains if the cost of care is less than 
the premium. HMOs have, therefore, an incentive to deliver care in 
a cost-effective manner, providing no more than professional 
standards require and the least intensive service which will manage 
the health condition while minimizing future expenditures (Luft, 
1981). 
Utilization Controls 
Utilization controls form an internal governance structure used 
by health plans to channel access to care so that the cost of care 
6 
stays wi thin the fixed prepayment. They are procedures or rules 
that set the conditions under which patients receive different types 
of care, from whom that care is received, in what setting, and for 
how long. Contractual arrangements between the providers and health 
plan act as utilization controls to the degree that they hold 
providers financially liable for health care costs incurred by plan 
members. 
Health 
For this study, health is defined to encompass the individual's 
ability to function, the presence or absence of symptoms, and his or 
her feelings about his or her health (Binstock & Shanas, 1977). It 
includes the ability to do instrumental activities of daily living 
(shopping, fixing meals, showering, toileting, etc.), self-
perceived health (excellent to poor rating), and number and type of 
symptoms such as sight, coughing, fainting, joint pain and so forth 
that are related to maj or organ system functioning as well as 
measures of disability such as number of restricted activity days. 
Satisfaction 
Like health, satisfaction with health care is multifaceted. It 
represents the degree of fit between the patient and the health 
system with regard to the individual's perceived satisfaction with 
the quality and access of services (Thomas & Penchansky, 1984; 
Zapka, Stanek, & Raitt, 1986). 
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Access 
Access to care represents the ease with which patients are able 
to get care and is a component of patient satisfaction. It most 
often is measured by availability of caretakers when symptoms are 
reported. It is examined separate from satisfaction because 
utilization controls influence access. 
Disenrollment 
Disenrollment occurs when an enrollee chooses to leave the HMO. 
The association between disenrollment and exposure to different 
types of utilization controls found in HMOs/CMPs will be examined. 
Significance of the Study 
In the health care delivery and finance arena, there is general 
agreement that the current system functions in suboptimal ways 
because of the lack of incentives and mechanisms to constrain costs 
and utilization (Schramm, 1986). 
One way to realign incentives in fee-for-service care and slow 
the rising costs of health care is to change the way providers are 
organized and the conditions under which patients get health care 
(Evans, 1981; Enthoven, 1980; Feldstein, 1981). However, 
reorganizing the system I s structure may also affect health care 
quality, satisfaction, and access (Luft, 1982; Mechanic, 1985; 
Hammons, Brook, & Newhouse, 1986). Such changes cannot be promoted 
if they erode access and appropriate care in exchange for reduced 
costs. For example, critics of HMOs are quick to point out that the 
8 
HMOs have an incentive to underserve enrollees because of the need 
to stay within the premium paid. 
To study the effects of a governance structure on a 
nonstandardized process such as health care, one can apply 
organization theory. Crganization theory and transaction cost 
economics , in particular, can be used to investigate what kind of 
HMO utilization control structure is most likely to produce the 
optimal outcome of healthy and satisfied enrollees. 
Limitations 
The limitations of this investigation are related to sample and 
data collection. The population used is a self-selected group of 
enrollees in 17 HMOs throughout the United States. The information 
from the enrollees about their health, i.e., perceived health 
status, ability to do activities of daily living and numbers and 
types of symptoms is extracted from interview data rather than 
medical chart reviews. This eliminates considering clinical 
mismanagement as contributing to negative changes in health at 
follow-up. 
Another limitation is that the time span between the baseline 
interview and the follow-up interview is only one year. This time 
frame may be too short for changes in health to occur . Thus, the 
findings of the study may underestimate the effect of utilization 
controls on health. 
A third limitation is that the number of HMOs included in the 
study is small as well as being self selected . Thus, they do not 
represent the entire HMO/eMP industry in the United States. 
CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW' 
For this inves tigation, Williamson's (1975) theory of 
organizations, transaction costs economics, is used as the analytic 
framework. Williamson's theory is applicable to a study of 
utilization controls because it explains why utilization controls 
are adopted and how they promote economic efficiency. It does not 
theorize about the impact of such controls on health, satisfaction , 
or access. These hypotheses must be derived from the relevant 
health services research. 
The chapter is arranged in three parts. First, Williamson's 
theory of transaction costs economics is described and 
differentiated from other theories on organizational structure and 
design. Second, it relates the theory to HMO utilization control 
structures. Third, three categories of utilization controls are 
described along with the research findings on the positive and 
negative effects of utilization controls on health, satisfaction and 
access . 
Transaction Costs Economics 
Derived from institutional economics, the transaction costs or 
market failures approach adopts an efficiency-seeking view of 
9 
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organization design and presence. Organizations emerge as an 
alternative to buyers and sellers conducting transactions solely 
through markets (Pfeffer, 1982). "Markets" are supplanted by 
"hierarchies" when markets cease to function properly because of 
"information impactedness." That is, the buyers cannot get a good 
or service at a fair price because environmental and human factors 
limit (a) their having full knowledge of their options, (b) their 
being able to get the service from many sellers, or (3) their being 
able to control the outcome of the exchange. 
Unlike other organizational theorists, Williamson (1973) bases 
his theory on observations that occur at micro level of analysis. 
Transactions are the basic unit of analysis. A transaction occurs 
when a good or service is exchanged between a buyer or seller. 
There are two mechanisms for mediating transactions: markets and 
bureaucracies. The mechanism preferred by parties to the exchange 
depends on which is more efficient. 
Transaction costs occur when it is difficult to determine the 
value of goods or services. That is, the buyer must contend with 
factors that limit his ability to get enough information about the 
exchange so that he can determine if he is getting a "fair" price. 
Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in 
physical systems. 
In mechanical systems we look for frictions: Do 
the gears mesh, are the parts lubricated, is there 
needless slippage or other loss of energy ... [In 
economics] Do the parties to the exchange operate 
harmonious ly, or are there frequent 
misunderstandings and conflicts that lead to 
delays, breakdowns, and other malfunctions? 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 2). 
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In a market economy, prices are supposed to convey all the 
information that is necessary for the efficient allocation of goods 
and services. If transaction costs are negligible, the organization 
of economic activity is irrelevant because there are no advantages 
of one mode of organizing over another. 
If one focuses on the exchange or transaction as the issue 
around which organizations are developed, it follows that 
bureaucracies arise because they allow the exchange to occur in a 
more efficient manner than can be done by individuals' haggling in 
the marketplace. 
Under some conditions, known as market failures, prices fail to 
accurately convey the necessary information. When this occurs a 
hierarchy or internal organization may be a superior mode of 
resource allocation (Williamson, 1985). Thus, markets and formal 
organizations are alternate methods of achieving efficient exchange. 
Market failures are failures only in the limited sense that they 
involve transaction costs that can be attenuated by substituting 
internal organization for market exchange (Williamson, 1975). An 
organization's superior monitoring and control capabilities overcome 
the market failure problem: 
restore efficiency. 
From this viewpoint, 
They reduce "transaction costs" and 
informational efficiency rather than 
technology is central to the development of firms. This is contrary 
to traditional organization theories (Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 
1970; Child, 1973) that state formal organizations exist because 
technology demands integration or because of large size. According 
to Williamson (1971) the influence of technology and size are causal 
12 
only in so far as they influence the informational demands which 
must be met by a market or an organization. "Transaction costs 
analysis supplants the usual preoccupation with technology and 
steady-state production (or distribution) expenses with an 
examination of the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and 
monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures" 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 2). 
Behavioral Assumptions of Transaction Cost Economics 
Organizations are a means of achieving the benefits of 
collective action when the price system fails (Arrow, 1974). The 
price system fails when confronted with a great complexity of 
interrelations of personnel and resources to production tasks or 
with uncertainty concerning future conditions. As complexity and 
uncertainty increases, a greater need for information arises: More 
information needs to be processed in order for contracts to be 
negotiated and transactions conducted. Both Arrow (1974) and 
specific way in which Williamson (1981) conclude that the 
organizations are superior to markets in managing complex and 
uncertain economic transaction is that organizations reduce the 
costs of such transactions. 
Williamson (1975) elaborates the argument by developing a simple 
model to identify the conditions under which markets tend to give 
way to organizations. The basic elements of the model appear in 
Figure 1. Williamson uses the concept of bounded rationality simply 
to refer to the limitations of individuals as information 
processors. Parties are unable to foresee all the contingencies 
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Human Factors Environmental Factors 
Bounded Rationality .... t-----~.~ Uncertainty/Complexity 
Opportun ism .... I------__ -I.~ Small Numbers Bargaining 
Figure 1. Market Failures Framework 
N.Q1a.. From Scott (1981), p. 145. 
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that affect the price of a good or service. As environments become 
more complex or uncertain, these limitations are quickly reached. 
Hence it is only when individuals are confronted with excessive 
environmental demands that their own information-processing 
capacities become insufficient and alternative arrangements are 
required. 
permits 
Firms replace market transactions because organization 
problem subdivision, simplifies choices, channels 
information and restricts alternatives. Goal specificity and 
formalization function to overcome the cognitive limitations of 
individual actors. 
Williamson's second pair of concepts opportunism and small 
numbers - - are used to develop a different argument regarding the 
relative advantages of markets and organizations. The concept of 
opportunism is used to note that individual actors are capable of 
"self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1975, p. 96). 
Opportunism on the part of human agents involves subtle forms of 
deceit. People lie and cheat. A buyer may be unable to avoid 
deceitful transactions if t.here are few available sellers. This is 
the "small numbers" problem. Creating an organization helps solve 
the problem of opportunism among exchange partners. By bringing 
economic transactions under a hierarchial structure, better auditing 
and surveillance systems can be constructed. Also incentive systems 
within an organization can be arranged so that individual 
participants are discouraged from behaving opportunistically. 
Williamson (1979) considers opportunism the more important 
variable than bounded rationality because it is amenable to 
manipulation. Bounded rationality is not. It is a constant. Firms 
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may be able to reduce the effects of uncertainty and complexity 
surrounding the exchange but they cannot remove them. 
Dimensions of an Exchange 
Another difference between the ability of markets and 
organizations to conduct transactions is related to the nature of 
transactions. Transactions differ with respect to asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency. Of the three, asset 
specificity is more critical because it hinders the ability of 
competition to operate because the seller has more information than 
the buyer or is the only source of the good. Asset specificity 
occurs when one party has more control over the exchange and allows 
small numbers bargaining (Pfeffer, 1982; Williamson, 1985). That 
is, the seller is not easily replaced making the buyer unable to 
shop for a better price. Opportunism reins in the presence of asset 
specificity. If such exchanges are frequent then the buyer will 
quickly look for alternatives to market exchange to control the 
effects of his having limited influence over the transactions. 
The influence of uncertainty on economic organization is 
conditional. It is of little consequence for transactions not 
limited by small numbers or asset specificity because new trading 
relations are easily arranged. Continuity between the buyer and 
seller has little value because either party is easily replaced. 
Organizations provide improved efficiencies over markets in terms of 
information processing and transaction costs, under conditions of 
complexity and uncertainty. 
16 
When parties are constrained by bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and asset specificity, contract execution problems for 
the buyer occur because not all possible outcomes to the exchange 
can be specified or a market-generated price set for the service or 
good. Removing transactions from the market and placing them under 
the canopy of organizational control is a means of reducing 
uncertainty and increasing the buyers' security because governance 
over the exchange can occur. 
Governance structures or rules to govern the transaction arise 
to attenuate opportunism, infuse confidence and supplant costly 
haggling. 
safeguards 
They bring transaction costs under 
are imposed by the buyer. First, 
control. These 
the safeguard can 
realign incentives so that opportunism is not supported. The 
safeguard can also set the standards to which rights in the exchange 
or disputes over price are referred and resolved. 
Organizational Responses to Uncontrolled Transaction Costs 
As human and physical assets involved in the transaction become 
more specialized to a single use, it can be more efficient for the 
buyer to produce the good or service than to purchase it in the 
marketplace (Williamson, 1975). 
integration is likely to occur . 
Under such conditions, vertical 
Within Williamson's framework, 
vertical integration occurs when organizations engaged in related 
functions, but at different stages in the production process, merge 
with one another (Scott, 1981). Vertical integration involves the 
merging of exchange partners of organizations that are symbiotically 
related. In the health care market this occurs when a company 
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underwriting health insurance merges with physician groups selling 
medical services and produces an HMO or CMP. However, unlike when 
the term is used in strictly an economic sense, such organizational 
mergers do not produce intermediate products. 
takes control over the other. 
Instead, one partner 
Benefits of Vertical Integration 
The advantage of vertical integration is that adaptations can be 
made in a sequential way without the need to consult , complete, or 
revise interfirm agreements among buyers and sellers. Sequential 
adaptations become an occasion for cooperative adjustment rather 
than opportunistic bargaining and time consuming haggling; risks may 
be attenuated. Differences among the parties at successive stages 
of the exchange can be more easily resolved by the internal control 
machinery when it spans both sides of the exchange (Jones, 1983; 
Coase, 1960). 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Governance Structure 
Governance structures come at great cost and their cost must be 
justified (Williamson, 1985). The benefits of specialized 
governance structures are greatest for transactions supported by 
noncompetitive market influences because they offset the hazards of 
opportunism. The cost of organizational governance is more easily 
recovered when transactions are frequent and of a significant price 
to the buyer, and occur under uncertain conditions. 
The governance structure that is placed as a consequence of 
vertical integration, however, is part of the optimization problem 
18 
for the firm. A shift from one structure to another may permit a 
simultaneous reduction in both the expense of writing a complex 
contract (which economizes on bounded rationality) and the expense 
of executing it effectively in an adaptive sequential way (which 
attenuates opportunism). 
The specification of rules for the exchange beyond some optimum 
point, however, is subj ect to diminishing marginal returns, i. e. , 
more is not always increasingly better. The development of a 
governance structure will proceed to the point at which the marginal 
benefits from increased specificity equal the marginal costs (Jones, 
1983; Demsetz, 1967; Coase, 1960). 
HMOs: An Organizational Response to Health Care Market Failure 
Williamson's schema applies to a wide variety of contracting 
issues operating in the health care market as well as other markets. 
Williamson's approach can be used to explain the emergence of 
alternative delivery systems because its concepts capture the 
conditions surrounding the actual exchange between a patient and a 
physician but paid for by an insurer after the fact. The major 
selective force driving the rapid growth of this type of 
organization is efficiency rather than coordination of or adaptation 
to technology (Maitland, Bryson, & Van de Ven, 1985). 
Health care services are not available from many suppliers who 
are easily replaced by the patient. They are purchased from 
licensed physicians who are more knowledgeable about a medical care 
option than the patient. The physician acts as the patient's agent 
and directs the consumption of services. Because of the widespread 
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presence of health insurcmce, the care is usually paid for by the 
insurer not the patient. The buyer, in fact, is largely the insurer 
although the patient may pay a portion of the bill. But, under 
traditional indemnity insurance, the cost of the transaction between 
the patient and provider becomes uncontrollable because the insurer 
is removed from the exchanged. The insurer has no way to mitigate 
the effects: (a) of opportunism on part of the patient and/or 
provider to consume more services than necessary, (b) of uncertainty 
as to the types of services to be prescribed or frequency of the 
services, and (c) of small numbers because the patient cannot get 
care from nonphysicians and has no incentive to seek care from 
physicians and hospitals that are less expensive. 
Health maintenance organizations realign incentives in the 
health care market that increase transaction costs for the insurer. 
Efficient consumption of health services is achieved by applying a 
governance structure to oversee the exchange between providers and 
patients. The organizational procedures that provide this oversight 
are utilization controls. Efficiency through utilization controls 
is achieved primarily in two ways. 
First, risk-sharing contracts with providers decrease 
opportunism stemming from physician-initiated demand or patients' 
overinsurance. Opportunism, uncertainty and frequency cannot 
increase insurers' costs for physician services because the total 
amount to be paid for all patient services is stipulated upfront. 
While HMOs are frequently differentiated in the literature as to 
their model type such as staff, group, or independent practice 
association (IPA) , this differentiation represents only one 
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dimension of the control structure when Williamson's framework is 
applied. 
The contract also provides agreement by providers and enrollees 
prior to an episode of care that access will be channelled from 
generalist to specialist care under the dictates of organizational 
procedures. Costly services such as hospital and specialist 
physician care are prescribed and covered only under specific 
conditions. Thus, by combining the provision and insuring of 
services, one contract gives the HMO control over pricing practices 
and the demand for costly services. 
Second, the organization's formalized rules and standardized 
procedures also mitigate opportunism, uncertainty, and asset 
specificity by reducing lack of knowledge about the circumstances 
leading to the service. Unlike the fee-for-service sector, in HMOs, 
all patient records, both ambulatory and hospital, are available for 
review. Not only can the insurer review the conditions under which 
care is received, it can stipulate standards of behavior based on 
the reviews that reduce the effect of small numbers bargaining, and 
bounded rationality on costs and types of care prescribed for 
enrollees. 
Thus, the utilization controls found in HMOs promise to 
introduce predictability, rationality, and control into an otherwise 
fragmented, decentralized and economically nonresponsive 
(opportunistic) process. 
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Utilization Controls' Effectiveness as Governance Structures 
Research on utilization control demonstrates that outside a 
prepaid plan, the procedures do not significantly reduce unnecessary 
utilization (and consequently costs), because the payer has little 
direct control over physicians and staff providing the oversight 
(Stuart & Stockdon , 1973). Utilization review guidelines under 
Medicare were found to be largely ignored by a number of sampled 
hospitals in the early 1970s (Grimes, 1970; Stuart & Stockton, 
1973) . When utilization control procedures are not within an HMO 
system , the payer has no mechanism for settling disputes stemming 
from physicians' inability to agree on appropriate treatments, and 
getting necessary records or controlling the quality of information 
in them. Within the HMO structure, utilization controls do reduce 
costs (Luft, 1981), but at the expense of what is largely conjecture 
(Harkins & Brown, 1986). 
No studies exist on the effects of different types and degrees 
of utilization controls on health, satisfaction, and access of 
enrollees. Their influence on these variables is usually inferred 
from studies on HMOs in general. For example, a common source of 
dissatisfaction in HMOs is having to wait longer to get an 
appointment, yet several different utilization control procedures 
can affect organizational performance on access measures. In 
addition, the comparisons tend to be between enrollees in an HMO and 
fee-for-service patients rather than multi-plan studies. 
The effect of utilization control on health is usually inferred 
from studies reporting no differences in treatment patterns for 
specific diseases once the disease is diagnosed, and morbidity and 
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mortality statistics consistent with the fee-for-service sector 
(Lubeck, Brown, & Holman, 1986; Yelin, Shern, & Epstein, 1986; 
Francis, Polissar, & Lorenz, 1984; McFarland, Freeborn, Mullooly, & 
Pope, 1986). A recent study by Sloss, Keeler, Brook, Operskalski, 
Goldberg and Newhouse (1987) found no difference in health status 
measures between persons in a large HMO in the Northwest and fee-
for-service system. The same study found enrollees in the HMO to be 
less satisfied with care than those in the fee-for-service sector. 
Satisfaction with HMOs is usually measured by disenrollment 
rates. People disenroll from HMOs for reasons of access, technical 
quality of the care and other service satisfactions such as location 
of the facilities (Zapka, Stanek, & Rait, 1986). Mechanic, Weiss, 
and Cleary (1983) found disenrollment associated with: difficulty 
getting appointments, inconvenience in getting to the facility, 
inability to see physician of their choice, and physician 
unwillingness to make referrals. Wrightson, Genuardi , and Stephens' 
(1987) study supports these findings. In their study, disenrollment 
was also associated with low outpatient use. 
The interpersonal aspects of quality such as patient physician 
communication in HMOs have been more widely studied than patients' 
perceptions of technical aspects of quality in HMOs. Mechanic, 
Weiss, and Cleary (198~) indicated that physicians' concern and 
interest and the amount of information given to members were 
possible predictors of voluntary disenrollment. Difficul ty in 
establishing a relationship with a plan doctor, along with the 
perceived importance of such a relationship, were also cited as 
important satisfaction variables that influence disenrollment. 
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However, Pope (1978) did not find these factors to predict 
disenro1lment although they did predict satisfaction. 
Sorensen and Wersinger (1981) found disenrollees indicated 
dissatisfaction with various aspects of medical service, such as 
perceived "quality of care" (thoroughness of treatment, as one 
example), was a reported reason for leaving the HMO. Hennelly and 
Boxerman (1983) found the perception of overall quality, as well as 
quality of paraprofessional care and pediatric services influenced 
disenrollment . 
Only one study (Wrightson, Genuardi, & Stephens, 1987) of HMO 
disenrollment was a multi-plan study that included IPAs. All other 
citations come from studies of federally qualified group or staff 
model HMOs. None of the studies relate disenrollment to utilization 
controls, yet different model types vary greatly in the number and 
types of controls used (Brown, 1987) . Staff model HMOs tend to have 
the fewest utilization controls while group HMOs tend to have the 
most stringent utilization control programs (Brown, 1987). 
Thus, the impact of different types of utilization control 
remains unclear, because no studies have focused on these 
organizational variables. 
Utilization Controls 
The utilization control structure within an HMO serves several 
functions. It stipulates patients' "rights" as to the physician 
from whom they may seek caIe and the types of care they will receive 
given their presenting symptoms. It provides ex ante and ex post 
access to relevant data about the episode of care so that nonprice 
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controls in the form of authorizations and sanctions can be imposed 
to control service use. Through the contract with physicians, it 
realigns the incentives in the exchange so that physicians share 
varying degrees of the financial burden of providing care for 
enrollees. Together these functions reduce the transaction costs 
associated with health care delivery because they reduce the effects 
of opportunism and lack of information about the exchange. 
These three functions translate into three types of utilization 
controls found in HMOs: authorization procedures, review 
mechanisms, and financial incentives. Their characteristics are 
summarized in Table 1. Each of these is discussed below. 
Authorization Requirements 
Authorization is a controversial control because it limits 
access to services (antecedent control). Access to care in an HMO 
is channeled along a hierarchy of specialization. A plan that 
insists on using ambulatory, generalist care unless need for more 
specialized care is established expects to service its members with 
lower costs than a fee-for-service system that permits unlimited 
access to specialists and allows hospitalization for minor as well 
as for major procedures (Brown, 1983). 
Early studies of the effect of authorization in managed care 
systems were done on the Medi-Cal programs in the early 1970s. 
Despite a 23% increase in eligibility, the Medi-Cal program paid for 
only 3.5 million patient days in 1970 as opposed to 3.6 million in 
1969 (Brian, 1971; Gordon, 1972). 
Table 1 
Utilization Control Categories Found in HMOs!CMPs 
Category of 
Control 
Authorization 
Requirements 
Review 
Mechanisms 
Financial 
Incentives 
Type of Control 
- Prior authorization 
of hospital or 
specialist services 
- Gatekeepers 
- Claims review 
Medical audit 
- Utilization review 
- Risk-sharing 
Time 
Applied 
Antecedent 
to care 
given 
Retro-
spective 
to care 
given 
Antecedent 
to care 
given 
Designed 
To 
Regulate 
Provider 
Patients 
Patient! 
Provider 
Provider 
Provider 
Provider 
Regulated 
By 
Provider 
or Insurer 
Provider 
or Insurer 
Insurer 
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Health maintenance organizations use several authorization 
procedures to control access. Perhaps the surest way to guarantee 
that a particular medical service will not be over used is to limit 
the physical availability of the service. Health maintenance 
organizations limit supply by a "lock-in" provision in the contract 
with the patient that refuses to cover out-of-plan services or 
physician charges. The enrollee must limit his choice of physician 
and hospital to those affiliated with the HMO if he wants their 
services to be covered by the HMO. 
If restrictions on choice of physician create shortages, the 
increased waiting times and difficulty in making appointments, in 
effect, rations health services. But, queues and waiting lists do 
not necessarily represent a superior approach to utilization control 
because they introduce distortions which may curtail appropriate as 
well as inappropriate use. 
The plan may also require each enrollee to select a plan-
approved physician to be primary provider. This doctor becomes a 
managing physician or "gatekeeper" through whom all treatment is 
then channeled. Not only does the managing physician make and/or 
approve all specialist referrals, but each specialist is expected to 
report on any treatment provided and to consult with the gatekeeper 
regarding treatment regimens. Care provided by nonaffiliated 
physicians or specialists customarily requires the written approval 
of the gatekeeper. In some HMOs, the medical director rather than 
the primary physician is the only physician authorized to approve 
non-HMO physician services. Requiring that all services be 
channeled through a designated primary physician is referred to as 
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case management because it systematizes delivery and prevents 
duplicative services by physicians unaware they are treating the 
same patient (Schlag & Piktialis, 1987). 
One problem with the case management approach is how the primary 
physician adopts the gatekeeper role. Once a patient is referred , 
primary physician may not be comfortable monitoring specialists' 
diagnostic and treatment methods . A gatekeeper's reticence in 
assuming the role can have cost consequences to the health plan. 
Specialists' outpatient services are typically more expensive . More 
importantly, 
specialists . 
control, the 
inpatient services are primarily controlled by 
In a study of the effect of gatekeeping versus no 
plan with gatekeepers had significantly lower 
outpatient costs but inpatient costs in the two plans were similar 
(Martin, Ehreth, & Geving,1985) . 
Case management requires input from the patient and careful 
communication from the provider (Beatrice, 1981; Marcus & Stone, 
1984). Doctor-patient communication is perhaps the single aspect of 
the care delivery process that HMOs perform most poorly, relative to 
the fee-for-service sector (Luft, 1981). In a prepaid setting, 
there are few incentives for the provider to maintain contact with 
patients. 
Common authorization procedures in HMOs include certifying 
hospital admission, and less frequently, referral services (usually 
for those specialists outside the HMO's panel of physicians). A 
problem with physicians' certifying these services is that it 
violates an intrinsic rule of regulation: the physician providing 
the treatment is also responsible for attesting to its necessity. 
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To circumvent physician biases in authorizing care, an HMO may 
have an administrative body (review panel) that decides before 
treatment is given whether the attending physician's regimen is both 
medically sound and economically efficient. Such panels usually 
review preadmittance screening for hospital admissions and all 
elective hospital admissions as well as set hospital length of stay 
(LOS). 
At least theoretically, such mechanisms can eliminate both 
unnecessary treatments and instances in which expensive care (such 
as hospitalization) is given when less costly alternatives 
(outpatient or home car.e) are in keeping with sound medical 
practice. There are, however, practical impediments to this 
approach to utilization control. The effectiveness of the control 
may depend on the composition of the authorizing body. Domination 
by anyone body -- the plan or medical staff could conceivably 
produce results quite different in terms of extent and type of 
reduced utilization (Martin, Ehreth, & Geving, 1985; Stuart & 
Stockton, 1973). 
The concept of prior authorization for treatment is most 
appropriate to nonemergency institutional care (Mackie & Decker, 
1981). Unnecessary hospital days are the single highest expense in 
HMOs (Donahue, 1986). Not only are the costs of overutilization 
highest in the institutional setting, but for surgical procedures in 
particular, expenditures might well be reduced if the attending 
physician had to seek authorization from a panel of doctors or a 
doctor (the plan's medical director) commi tted to avoiding 
29 
unnecessary use of surgical facilities (Martin, Ehreth, & Geving, 
1985). 
As antecedent controls, HMOs' authorization procedures reduce 
use by (a) limiting the conditions under which enrollees receive 
hospital services, (b) increasing waiting time to see a physician or 
receive a service, and (c) setting the conditions under which 
enrollees can seek more costly referral services. Because they 
reduce costs by keeping people out of the system, too stringent 
control over access can theoretically adversely affect health and 
satisfaction. 
Review Mechanisms 
Utilization control through the review of medical treatment is 
an obvious complement to authorization requirements in the sense 
that the one typically provides the standards of "appropriateness" 
of care which the other applies (Stuart & Stockton, 1973). Review 
mechanisms may occur concurrently with medical treatment or 
retrospective to the t~e~tment. Both are monitoring devices. 
Record reviews offer few direct challenges to physicians not 
affiliated with an HMO because the payer has no direct control over 
the physician. The reviews may focus on patients' service use or 
physicians' prescribing practices. 
Most HMOs consider concurrent hospital review a cornerstone of 
their utilization control system (Donahue, 1986; Chu, 1986). It 
monitors the timeliness with which care is provided and the adequacy 
of discharge planning. Concurrent review attempts to insure that, 
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when a choice of care is involved, the patient may be provided with 
less expensive but equally beneficial treatment. 
As efforts continue to reduce hospital use further, additional 
savings can come only from reducing ambulatory care costs (Foldes, 
Boller, & Jacobson, 1986). Ambulatory care records assume an 
importance not found outside the HMO where the patient record is the 
property of the attending physician and not open for review. 
Approximately 20 percent of an HMO's budget is spent on ancillary 
(laboratory and radiographic) services obtained for ambulatory 
patients (Mackie & Decker, 1981). Moni toring the use of these 
resources provides a significant means for controlling costs, in 
addition to minimizing or preventing repetitive office-based 
services where these might: be provided to compensate for discounted 
fees. Ambulatory record review is also a primary means of checking 
for underutilization (Brown, 1987; Komrad, Sanders, Stone, & Pummer, 
1986). 
Physician profiles are another type of review that provide a 
means of monitoring over or underutilization (Brown, 1987). 
Profiles are automated or ~anually tabulated records of physician 
productivity. They can be based on claims submitted to the health 
plan or services prescribed by the physician. The profiles are used 
to track numbers and types of patients seen, treatments prescribed, 
and referrals made by physicians. Some plans profile only their 
primary providers. Others profile both primary care and specialist 
physicians (Brown, 1987). 
Review mechanisms may be carried out by the HMO medical 
director, a utilization review committee, and/or a quality assurance 
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committee (Brown, 1987). The utilization review committee focuses 
on utilization statistics, trends and goals rather than quality of 
care issues (Brown, 1987). 
The specificity of utilization review varies from plan to plan 
(Brown, 1987). The traditional approach is for a responsible party 
(for example, the medical director) or committee to examine 
individual cases, sometimes sampled randomly, . without using any 
uniform methods of evaluation and often without having any 
predetermined criteria at hand (Stuart & Stockton, 1973) . However, 
improved management information systems have enabled some HMOs to 
develop computerized screens to flag providers and subscribers for 
unusual patterns of care that might indicate over or 
underutilization (Brown, 1987; Komrad, et al., 1986; Foles, Boller, 
& Jacobson, 1986). 
Those procedures that deal with the issue of appropriateness of 
care, hospital record reviews and physician profiles, in which 
physicians' prescribing patterns are profiled and compared to their 
peers are more likely to uncover practices that are detrimental to 
enrollee health. The procedures can be expanded to monitor 
organizational performance in addition to physician performance 
regarding patient satisfaction and access. The HMO can evaluate 
quantifiable standards for quality of care such as number of days to 
get appointments, length of time to receive laboratory test results 
and time spent waiting to see physicians (Bischoff, 1986). 
The ability of the organization to correct problems, however, 
depends on how well feedback procedures are integrated into the 
system and its ability to reinforce corrective actions (Gertman & 
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Restuccia, 1981; Restuccia, 1982). For these reasons, too few 
review mechanisms or review mechanisms without links back to 
providers or administrators may adversely influence enrollee health, 
satisfaction, and access. 
Financial Incentives 
Financial incentives used by HMOs to deter utilization are 
geared to the physicians and their role in determining demand for 
care. Because the HMO provides full coverage with minimal 
copayments and service limitations, nonprice controls rather than 
financial incentives are used to limit patient demand for services. 
A key difference between HMOs and other insurers is that the 
physician reimbursement method is changed so that providers bear 
some financial risk for their resource decisions. Capitation is 
seen by health economists as the strongest approach to eliminating 
much of the inherent inefficiency in the current system (Gabel & 
Monheit, 1983; Enthoven, 1980). Physician prepayment promotes 
efficiency by (a) providing the HMO with an organization-wide 
incentive to integrate services and (b) eliminating the incentive 
for providers to retain patients to maintain revenues, thus 
increasing timely transfers of patients between primary care 
providers and specialists (Schlesinger, 1986). The benefits of 
these incentives, however, are somewhat offset by other incentives 
and constraints facing HMO administrators and providers. 
It is difficult to categorize the degree of risk sharing by HMO 
model type or other organizational characteristics because so many 
variations in risk-sharing arrangements exist (Brown, 1987). The 
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degree of risk sharing can vary from essentially none to most of the 
risk of profit or loss being transferred from the plan to the 
physician. 
The effect of the financial risk on physicians' prescribing 
patterns appears to be linked to the percentage of a physician's 
practice that are HMO enrollees as well as physician payment method. 
Physicians in IPAs typically have around 10% of their patients 
belong to the HMO (Brown, 1983). Such 
small numbers are probably not adequate to change prescribing habits 
especially when the physician is paid on a fee-for-service basis 
(Brown, 1983). Overutilization may continue to be a problem 
(Martin, Ehreth, & Geving, 1985). 
Capitation is not always rewarding of physician's economical 
practice patterns if the number of enrollees he follows is too small 
to absorb a high user of care. Incentives for underservice ensue 
when the number (panel) of enrollees is too small to balance the 
effect of a few heavy users (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986). 
With very small panels a discounted fee-for-service may be a fairer 
option (Martin, Ehreth, & Geving, 1985). 
Contractually transferring most of financial risk for enrollee 
health care to affiliated providers, who are not subject to quality-
of-care safeguards by the plan has been associated with enrollee 
dissatisfaction with quality of care and access of services (U. S. 
General Accounting Office, 1986). 
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Summary 
An integrated system of health care as demonstrated by HMOs can 
provide full-scale surveillance of patient utilization and provider 
performance, and provide the policing necessary to address the 
transaction costs recognized by Williamson's theory. As experience 
with HMOs demonstrates, the structure is transaction cost 
economizing because it does provide a "machinery to work things out" 
as well as to reduce opportunism found in the fee-for-service 
sector. Some HMOs have more stringent controls than others, as the 
previous discussion makes clear. Thus, a natural departure for 
applying Williamson's theory of organizations is to see whether the 
stringency of control and type of control are related to higher or 
lower transaction costs contained in key measures of HMO success. 
Key measures of success include enrollees' health status, enrollees' 
satisfaction with quality of care and access and continuous 
enrollment in the plan. 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODS AND DESIGN 
The research proposed is a one-year panel study of the effect of 
differences in utilization controls on enrollees' health, 
satisfaction with quality of care and access, and disenrollment. 
Because utilization controls influence entry and exit from the 
health care system, their effects can best be assessed by a 
.E!0spective approach that compares health, satisfaction and access 
._-, . ...... -.... ..- ,,,.'. .. ~ . -.~ -.~ ............ 
prior to or at enrollment and at some subsequent point after joining 
a capitated health plan. Disenrollment is also considered because 
it may occur as a result of dissatisfaction with the control 
structures. The controls are not efficient if after entering the 
HMO, enrollees are more likely to be in poor health, dissatisfied 
and/or disenrolled. 
Quasi-Experimental Design 
The tg).;i..9~~ feature , c:>~ " p:ros.pect.ive , s_tudi.es·. is that they begin 
before individuals have been exposed to a "treatment" and follow 
them forward in time to determine who subsequently demonstrates an 
effect from the treatment. In this case, the enrollees are followed 
forward in time from their enrollment to see if changes in health, 
satisfaction with quality of care and access and disenrollment are 
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explained by the presence of different types and stringency, or 
levels, of utilization control. 
The research design is a quasi-experimental, pretest/post- test 
____ "_"_ • ___ •• _______ '. _ _ ' •.• ~_ •• .••••• , ____ • ___ , •. _~ _~ ••• __ .• __ •••••••• _M" _ •• _.' _ __ ~ _ _ _ ••• ,~, •• ,, ~ __ .-< .. _ .... ,.._ ..... _ .... 
desig!l_ (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). ~Q control group is used. 
Because of this design, ~~~_.!~._ ~ __ ~~~~~.t to the internal 
validity of the study. Changes in health may be a function of being 
one year older rather than e xposure to utilization control. 
Model Testing 
This study considers the organizational component that allows 
HMOs to decrease the transaction costs found in fee-for-service 
heal th care . However, the analysis does not focus on the cost 
savings achieved as this has been already established. Instead, the 
and _ac_c_es_s _,~and _ disenro11ment. The effects of differences in 
utilization control on these outcomes have not been previously 
studied. Disenro11ment is considered because retention of enrollees 
is necessary for the HMO to remain viable. Also, disenro11ment may 
reflect the HMO's ability to ensure member satisfaction. If a 
utiliza tion - cont-rol - structure to safeguard costs is so stringent 
~~--"'"~"'-"-----""'--" ".' , •• ~.-. ~, .... -..-...<.- ., • ~...... • - - -........ • .. -_._._-
that the ~ell-being_QLp'atj_e!lts __ i~ __ ~_<?E!I.>rOIIlt s_ed, or it is associated 
- .. - . 
with a ~~gh-l~y~.l _~L~i~.3.at.!.~:fc.w.t.:ion and ._dise1)roJ.J~ent, then the 
~----- - -
structure has control beyond whicg. :!os optilJla1. By looking at these 
- - -- . ,- " ... ' " -~ -_. -
variables, a picture of what kind of HMO utilization control system 
is most likely to be associated with the optimal outcome of healthy, 
satisfied, and continuous enrollees can be drawn. 
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A model of Williamson's framework as applied to utilization 
control is depicted in Figure 2. Utilization control acts as a 
governance structure to control opportunism by patients and 
physicians that increase transaction costs. The structure 
influences enrollee health, satisfaction with the quality of care 
and access, and disenrollment through its control over patients and 
physicians. Not all controls operate on all players. Authorization 
procedures can control opportunism found in patients and physicians. 
The other controls focus on physicians because they direct the 
consumption of services oy patients. The overall effects of 
._-- ---- ----.. _---
health, satisfaction, access, and disenrollment. 
- Pb,[tt. 
From this model, l first 
----.., 
three ) research questions are derived. 
.~--:::::::;>' - _._- - ... _--._----------_._-_. 
The 
research question asks, "Are differences in utilization 
controls associated with decreased health after enrollment?" It is 
hypothesized that enrollees' health at follow-up (T2) is not 
associated with exposure to utilization controls. To test this 
hypothesis, the following equation is derived from the model: 
H2 (1) 
where 
H2 health at follow-up (T2) 
HI health at enrollment (Tl) 
AP authorization procedures 
PP physician profiles 
Utilization Controls : 
(Governance Structure) 
Authorization 
Procedures 
Retrospective 
Record Reviews 
Physician Profiles 
Risk-sharing by 
Physicians 
Reduced Transaction 
~ Cost by Controlling 
Opportunism Used By: 
Patients 
Physicians 
Figure 2. Williamson's Framework Applied to HMO Utilization 
Control and Its Affect on Enrollee Outcomes 
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Affects Enrollee ~ Outcomes of: 
Health 
Satisfaction 
Access 
Disenrollment 
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RR retrospective record review 
PRS physician risk sharing 
Health at enrollment (Tl) is included in this equation because it 
has been found to be the strongest predictor of health at follow-up 
(Binstock & Shanas, 1977; McCall, 1984). 
Z-
A secondary hypothesis is that the net change in health between 
enrollment and follow-up is not associated with differences in 
utilization control. The equation testing this hypothesis is: 
H2-Hl (2) 
3 A third hypothesis isolates those who report less health at 
follow-up to see if the decreased status or function is associated 
with differences in utilization controls . The equation is: 
YO (3) 
where 
YO 1 if H2-Hl is > 0, and is o otherwise 
Given the theoretic basis for the study and previous research, 
it is expected that exposure to different types and levels of 
utilization control procedures will result in: 
1. no increase in the number of symptoms reported by 
enrollees 
2. no decrease in enrollees' ratings of self-perceived 
health 
3. no increase in the number of limited activity days 
in the last two weeks reported by enrollees 
4. no decrease in enrollees' ability to perform 
instrumental activities of daily living 
5. no increase in the number of bed days in the last 
two weeks reported by enrollees 
6. no increase in the number of sick days per year by 
enrollees. 
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The effect of each utilization control on each health indicator 
will be estimated. Using this approach, the he~,,!-!~_"_~pd.~cato:r:~L.m.Q.~t ._ 
example, if authorization procedures are too stringent, one might 
find an increase in bed days but no change in other measures of 
health. 
III t-,})(J~ /T/he ~ s.e.co.nd_. research question asks, "Are differences in 
utiliza~~on con~rols associated with decreased enrollee satisfaction 
with quality of care and access?" It is hypothesized that 
'---. 
satisfaction with .qu~lity Qt ... care .~nd access at follow-~p . (T~D ___ .:i,s 
not associated with different types and levels of utiliz~tion 
c...Qntrol. To test this hypothesis, the following equation will be 
used . 
S2 (4) 
where 
S2 satisfaction at T2 
AP authorization procedures 
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PP physician profiles 
RR retrospective record reviews 
PRS physician risk sharing 
Satisfaction at baseline (Tl) is not considered a predictor of 
satisfaction at follow-up (T2) because the respondents changed from 
fee-for-service care to the HMO. 
The effect of each utilization control on the satisfaction with 
quality of care and access will be examined in the same manner as 
described for health. Evidence of an association between 
differences in utilization controls and (a) net changes in 
satisfaction between enrollment and follow-up as well as (b) 
decreased satisfaction at follow-up will be sought using the 
following equations: 
(5) 
where 
Yl (Sl-S2) 
Y2 (6) 
where 
Y2 1 if (S2-Sl) is > 0 and is 0 otherwise 
It is expected that exposure to different types and levels of 
utilization control produces: 
1. no decrease in enrollees' ratings of professional 
skill 
2. no decrease in enrollees' ratings of providers' 
willingness to discuss health problems 
3. no decrease in enrollees' ratings of satisfaction 
with regular source of care after enrolling in the 
HMO 
4. no decrease in enrollees' rating of appointment 
arrangements as "convenient" 
5. no decrease in enrollees' ratings of waiting time 
as "reasonable." 
J }>vL-tj {t,~ ,..Ir--
The third research question asks, "Are utilization 
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controls 
associated with disenrollment?" It is hypothesized that utilization 
controls are not associated with disenrollment. To test this 
hypothesis, the following equation will be used: 
DIS (7) 
where 
DIS disenrollment 
AP authorization procedures 
PP physician profiles 
RR retrospective record review 
PRS physician risk sharing 
Should disenrollment be found to be associated with utilization 
controls then additional analyses will examine differences between 
the continuously enrolled and disenrollee groups concerning their 
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health, satisfaction with quality of care and access and exposure to 
different types and levels of utilization controls. 
Regression analysis will determine the probability that changes 
in enrollees' health, satisfaction with quality of care and access 
and disenrollment are related to differences in types and stringency 
of utilization control structures. ReJP~ession an~~x~_!s of J)~_n~:t 
dat~ has been chosen for the following reasons. The study attempts 
(a) to model the relationship between the variables of utilization 
control, health, satisfaction with quality of care and access, and 
disenrollment; and (b) to ~~ the effects of utilization 
controls over a time on one group of subj ects rather than to 
identify a difference between groups exposed to utilization 
controls. In addition, the response is considered to be a function 
of several predictor variables: authorization procedures, physician 
risk sharing, physician profiles, and record reviews. Logit 
regression will be used for the equations that require a dichotomous 
dependent variable. These equations look for the probability that 
an enrollee has reduced health, is unsatisfied with quality of care 
and access, and/or disenrolls after being in an HMO. A logit model 
is preferred when using a dichotomous dependent variable because 
while the regression coefficients derived from the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model are unbiased, they are not efficient because of 
the error disturbances are heteroscedastic (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 
1981). Ordinary least square regression, in the case of a 
dichotomous dependent variable, often predicts values outside of the 
o to 1 range whereas maximum likelihood logit regression does not. 
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The pseudo coefficient of determination (R2) and the correlation 
coefficient (r) will be used to measure the strength of the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variables. 
A one-tailed test of significance will be used because 
directional hypotheses are proposed. That is, utilization controls 
are hypothesized not to decrease health, satisfaction with quality 
of care and access, and continuous enrollment. 
level is used. 
A 95% confidence 
l}ata. S_ourc~ 
Secondary data from the National Medicare Competition Evaluation 
(NMCE) is used for this analysis. Sponsored by the Heal th Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA), the NMCE currently involves 17 HMOs 
in 6 demonstration sites throughout the United States where all 
health service are provided to Medicare beneficiaries for a 
prospectively determined and fixed annual payment per beneficiary. 
The ~~§im will as::;ess the i~PClcts of risk-based financing for 
Medicare services and examine the experiences of HMOs and CMPs 
enrolling Medicare beneficiaries. 
Data from the NMCE being used are: (a) site vis_it ca~e . studies 
of 17 HMOs participating in the NMCE; and (b) baselill~ and .foll.<>.:V-up 
telephone interviews of enrollees in the 17 HMOs. 
Data on the utilization controls used by the HMOs come from the 
case studies. The case studies are reports of site visits made by 
the NMCE evaluation team to the plans six months after they became 
operational, that is, after they started enrolling Medicare 
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beneficiaries. The case studies were done between January 1984 and 
February 1986. 
Inte~~~.ws were conducted during the site visits with various 
HMO staff, including the executive director, the medical director, 
the person in charge of the quality assurance activities, and the 
chief financial officer. Some specific areas of questioning 
included: 
1. age of the plan 
2 . federal qualification status 
3. organizational form of the HMO 
4. physician financial mechanism, incentives, structures 
5. components of the quality assurance programs 
6. components of utilization control structures 
Three primary site visit interviewers conducted site visits and 
prepared case study reports of the 17 plans included in this 
analysis. All three participated in the first site visits to the 
four plans in South Florida. The other site visits were done by one 
or two members of the team. All three extensively reviewed each 
other's final case study reports to maximize reliability among the 
interviewers. 
Data on enrollees' health and satisfaction with quality of care 
and access are drawn fro_~ . ba~el~ne Cl,n~_ follow-up benefici.ary surveys 
conducted by telephone between the spring of 1984 and December of 
1986. The ~_r~m8:.EY ~u:rP.~_s.~ , of the baseline survey was to measure 
enrollees' health and satisfaction with the enrollees' previous 
source of care at enrollment. The second data collection occurred 
one year later and included the same questions, thereby allowing an 
assessment of changed in enrollees' health and satisfaction with 
quality of care and access after exposure to utilization controls. 
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The follow-up survey also tracked disenrollees so that information 
about how they differed from continuous enrollees can be examined. 
The interview protocols from the baseline and follow-up surveys are 
in Appendices A and B. 
While the sample is not representative of all people, it is 
available and does not limit the study design from testing the 
hypotheses, because units of comparison are within group rather than 
across groups. 
Health Maintenance Organizations 
The ~~!U~ of HMOs represent 17 HMOs nationwide selected 
out of 52 HMOs having risk-based contracts to provide care for 
.... -_.--- .-- ~-"-~--- --- ""-' .-~ .. -... ~-"" 
Medicare beneficiaries by HCFA participating in the quality of care 
component of the NMCE by HCFA. 
The ~~~c:_ char ac t~ri,s tJ~s. ~ of the 17 HMOs are shown in Tab Ie 2. 
The plans are classified according to how the primary provider 
physicians were organized and contracted for services with the plans 
because this factor represents the core of the HMO/provider 
arrangements. Contract physicians, who practice alone or in groups, 
are used by some HMOs to supplement their core physician staff. Of 
the 17 plans, there are five IPA-model HMOs, four group-model HMOs 
and eight are staff-model HMOs. 
The majority of the plans (80%) are federally qualified; only 
two are not. The percentage is much higher than the 59% of all 
HMOs. Additionally most programs (80%) are not-for-profit 
organizations. 
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Table 2 
National Medicare Competition Evaluation HMOs!CMPs: Federal 
Qualification. Age. Model Type 1984-1985 
Size of Federal Model 
Plan Plan* Qualification Age* Type** 
Plan A 68,148 YES 7 IPA 
Plan B 10,300 NO 2 Group 
Plan C 38,882 YES 12 Staff 
Plan D 14,775 YES 5 Staff 
Plan E 160,846 YES 9 Staff 
Plan F 30,890 YES 5 Group 
Plan G 13,111 YES 3 Staff 
Plan H 42,269 NO 7 IPA 
Plan I 49,789 YES 8 Group 
Plan J 53,C86 YES 7 Staff 
Plan K 75,708 YES 25 Staff 
Plan L 51,399 YES 18 Staff 
Plan M 45 , 841 YES 4 IPA 
Plan N 67,379 YES 11 Staff 
Plan 0 73,111 YES 6 IPA 
Plan P 34,357 YES 12 Group 
Plan Q 36,712 NO 7 IPA 
*As of 12/31/84. 
**In other reports from the NMCE a fourth model is identified --
network IPAs. Plans in the fourth category were reassigned in this 
report according to how the majority of their physicians were paid 
at the time of the HMO sit~ visit. 
48 
A distinctive characteristic of these HMOs is their age. They 
are primarily young organizations, with ages ranging from two years 
to 25 years. The median age is seven years. Ten plans have 
operated for seven years or less , and seven plans have operated for 
eight years or more. 
The siz e of the plans varies from 10,300 enrollees to 160 , 000 
enrollees. The median number of enrollees is 45,841 . Three plans 
have under 16,000 members and five plans have over 60 , 000 members. 
Utilization controls used by the plans vary. Tables 3 to 5 list 
the antecedent (Table 3), concurrent (Table 4), and retrospective 
controls (Table 5) used by each plan. 
Enrollees 
The sample is 2,U98 enrollees from the 17 HMOs in the base-
line (80% completion rate) and includes 1,175 (70% completion rate) 
in the follow - up (second wave) of interviewing . Attri tion from 
baseline to follow-up occurs because of voluntary disenrollment from 
the HMOs , death, or item-nonresponse to interview questions . 
Enrollees self-selected the HMO in which they enrolled but were 
randomly selected to receive the telephone interview. The number of 
enrollees from each plan making up the sample varies little. Each 
HMO's enrollees make up between 5.3% and 6.6% of the total sample of 
enrollees. 
All enrollees are 65 years or older. To assure the 
representativeness of the enrollees , baseline information was also 
collected from a comparison group . The comparison group is made up 
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Table 3 
National Medicare Competition Evaluation HMOs!CMPs: Prospective 
Utilization Review Activities, Six Months After Operational, 1984-1985 
Pre-
authorize 
Gatekeeper Pre-authorize Pre-authorize Urgency LOS 
Plan MD Hospitalization Specialist MD Care Set 
Plan A YES NO NO* YES YES 
Plan B NO YES NO YES YES 
Plan C YES YES YES YES YES 
Plan D YES YES YES YES NO 
Plan E YES YES YES YES NO 
Plan F YES YES NO** YES NO 
Plan G NO NO NO YES NO 
Plan H YES YES NO NO YES 
Plan I YES YES YES YES NO 
Plan J NO NO NO YES NO 
Plan K YES NO NO*** YES YES 
Plan L NO YES NO*** YES YES 
Plan M YES YES NO YES YES 
Plan N NO YES YES YES NO 
Plan 0 YES YES NO*** YES YES 
Plan P YES YES NO*** YES NO 
Plan Q NO YES NO YES YES 
*Referral log maintained for r etrospective review. 
**Will require preauthorization if problem occurs. 
***Must have authorization if specialist is outside plan. 
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Table 4 
National Medicare Competition Evaluation HMOs/CMPs: Concurrent 
Utilization Review Activities. Six Months After Operational. 1984-1985 
Concurrent 
Plan Hospital Review Discharge Planning 
Plan A YES NO 
Plan B YES YES 
Plan C YES NO 
Plan D YES YES 
Plan E YES NO 
Plan F YES NO 
Plan G YES YES 
Plan H YES NO 
Plan I YES YES 
Plan J YES NO 
Plan K YES NO 
Plan L YES YES 
Plan M YES NO 
Plan N YES YES 
Plan 0 YES YES 
Plan P YES YES 
Plan Q YES YES 
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Table 5 
National Medicare Competition Evalution HHOs/CMPs: Retrospective 
Utilization Review Activities, Six Months After Operational 1984-1985 
Retrospective Retrospective 
Retrospective Review of Review 
Primary Care Specialist Review of Emergency Room of Ambulatory 
Plan MD Profiles MD Profiles Hospital Records Records Care Records 
Plan A YES YES YES NO NO 
Plan B YES YES YES YES YES 
Plan C NO NO YES NO YES 
Plan D YES YES YES YES NO 
Plan E YES NO NO NO NO 
Plan F YES YES YES YES YES 
Plan G NO NO NO NO NO 
Plan H NO NO NO YES NO 
Plan YES NO YES YES NO 
Plan J NO NO NO NO NO** 
Plan K YES YES YES NO YES 
Plan L YES* YES* NO NO NO 
Plan M YES NO NO NO NO** 
Plan N YES YES NO NO NO 
Plan 0 YES YES YES NO NO 
Plan P YES YES NO YES NO*** 
Plan Q YES NO** YES YES YES 
*Encounter log . 
**Referrals tracked through patient profiles used to determine high cost patients. 
***Could be done on a special study through QA Committee. 
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of Medicare beneficiaries outside the market area, but residing in 
comparable communities. 
Tables 6 and 7 show the demographic and health characteristics 
of the two groups. From Table 6 it can be seen that the samples are 
predominantly white, married, have at least a grade school 
education, are not emplvyed, own their home and have an income 
between $5, 000 and $24,999. The variables showing a significant 
difference between groups are race, education, income and residing 
in a private home. When compared to the enrollees, the comparison 
group is more likely to be white, educated, have a higher income, 
own a home, but also more likely to reside in a nursing home. 
Table 7 shows that the health characteristics of the two groups 
are similar but there is a trend for enrollees to rate themselves as 
healthier, to have fewer symptoms, fewer bed days, fewer limited 
activity days, fewer sick days and higher Instrumental Activity of 
Daily Living (IADL) scores. 
Table 8 arrays the ~_ndicators of satisfaction with a regular 
source of health care for the enrollee and comparison groups. 
Enrollees were less likely to be very satisfied with their regular 
source of care or to rate the professional competence of their 
providers as "excellent." They were less satisfied with the 
courtesy of health care providers as well as providers' willingness 
to discuss medical problems with the patient. 
Prior experiences with medical care are shown in Table 9. The 
enrollee group was significantly less likely to have a regular 
source of care or to be concerned about seeing the same physician. 
Table 6 
Personal Characteristics of Enrollee and Comparison Groups 
Participating in the NMCE 
Characteristic 
Age 
Mean 
Median 
Range 
Percent Female 
Percent White 
Percent Married 
Percent Unmarried, 
Living Alone 
Percent Employed 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Years of Education 
Percent Residing in 
Private Home 
Nursing Home 
Percent Owning their Home 
Income 
less than $5,000 
$5,000 to $9,999 
$10,000 to $24,999 
$25,000 and over 
Enrollee 
Group 
N=2,098 
74.5 years 
73.0 years 
65-100 years 
57.0 
93.2 
57.7 
29.6 
11.3 
3 . 4 
7.9 
10.9 
98 . 4 
0.3 
8.5 
10.9 
42.6 
41.1 
5 . 1 
Comparison 
Group 
N=1,059 
74.9 years 
75.0 years 
65-101 years 
59.6 
90.7* 
58.1 
31. 3 
10.7 
3.7 
6.9 
11.3** 
97.1 
2.0** 
75.1** 
14.6 
29.5** 
42.3 
13.6** 
*Significant1y different frurr. enrollees at .05 level, using 
two-tailed test. 
**Significant1y different from enrollees at .01 level, using 
two-tailed test. 
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Table 7 
Health Characteristics of Enrollee and Comparison Groups 
Participating in the NMCE 
Characteristic 
Percent Reporting Health: 
Excellent 
Poor 
Percent Reporting 1 or 
More Symptoms 
Percent Reporting 1 or 
More Bed Days in 
Last 2 Weeks 
Percent Reporting 1 or 
More Limited Activity 
Days in Last 2 Weeks 
Average Number of Bed 
Days in Past Year 
Percent with Ability 
to Perform Instrumental 
Activities of Daily 
Livinga 
Percent Reporting Having 
a Physical Exam in 
Past Year 
Enrollee 
Group 
N=2,098 
28.6 
3.8 
60.4 
3.5 
8.7 
2.9 days 
88.8 
37.3 
Comparison 
Group 
N=1,059 
27.7 
6.8 
6l.4 
8.4** 
11.4* 
6.3 days** 
83.2** 
62.9** 
a"Instrumental Activities of Daily Living" are meal preparation, 
housework, money management, shopping, taking medicine, and 
ability to travel outside the horne. Sample members were asked 
whether they could do each of these tasks without help. 
*Significantly different from enrollees at .05 level, using 
two-tailed test. 
**Significantly different front enrollees at .01 level, using 
two-tailed test. 
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Table 8 
Satisfaction with Regular Source of Care as Reported by 
Enrollee and Comparison Groups Participating in the NMCE 
Characteristic 
Satisfaction with Regular 
Source of Care 
Percent Rating Professional 
Competence "Excellent" 
Percent Rating Willingness 
to Discuss "Excellent" 
Percent Rating Courtesy 
"Excellent" 
Percent Rating Travel as 
"Convenient" 
Percent Rating Appointment 
Arrangements "Convenient" 
Percent "Very Satisfied" with 
Regular Source of Care 
Enrollee 
Group 
N=2,098 
56.7 
55 . 4 
58.1 
89.0 
94.1 
69.4 
Comparison 
Group 
N=1,059 
65.3* 
67.5* 
68.3* 
89.9 
94.2 
84.3* 
*Significantly different from enrollees at .01 level, using 
two-tailed test . 
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Table 9 
Previous Medical Care Experience as Reported by 
Enrollee and Comparison Groups Participating in the NMCE 
Characteristic 
Previous Medical Carea 
Percent with Regular Place 
of Care 
Doctor's Office 
Clinic 
Emergency Room 
HMO 
Other 
Percent with Regular 
Physician 
Percent Indicating Seeing 
Same Physician was Very 
Important 
Travel Time to Regular 
Source of Care 
Days Wait for Appointment 
with Regular Source 
of Care 
Minutes Waiting in Office 
Before Seeing Doctor 
Enrollee 
Group 
N=2,098 
76.9 
87.4 
10.7 
l.2 
0.4 
0.4 
70.6 
68.2 
17.8 
6.1 
26.2 
Comparison 
Group 
N=l,059 
86.9** 
84.7 
12.8 
l.0 
l.3* 
80.9* 
77.7** 
19.6** 
5.6 
24.5 
aExcept for the variable "percent with regular place of care," 
all means under this category are computed only for those 
beneficiaries who have a regular place of care. 
*Significantly different from enrollees at .05 level, using 
two-tailed test. 
**Significantly different from enrollees at .01 level, using 
two-tailed test. 
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Thus, Medicare beneficiaries enrolling in the HMOs tended to 
have fewer health problems, to have fewer ties to a regular source 
of care, and to be less satisfied with their previous experiences 
with medical care than the comparison group. 
Variable Measurement 
Four groups of variable.s are of interest: u_tilization contro_~_s, 
health, satisfaction with quality of care and access, and 
disenrollmE;!nt. Ut_il;iz.ation controls were measured one time and 
represent the treatment or independent variables. 
satisfaci'ion with quality of care and access variables were measured 
at enrollment (Tl) and one year following enrollment (T2). 
Disenrollment was tabulated at follow-up. Table 10 lists the 
specific data elements to be included. 
._\ 
Utilization Controls 
Principal component factor analysis was used to validate the 
separation of the procedural controls into the categories discussed 
in the literature and to assure that the combinations of utilization 
control procedures listed in Tables 3 to 5 were actually linear 
combinations of the same factor. The specific controls separated 
out into factors that represented authorization procedures, 
physician profiles, and retrospective record reviews with the 
exception of two antecedent controls, setting LOS and preauthorizing 
urgency care. These two procedures did load on the same factor 
(authorization procedures) as did the other antecedent controls 
(gatekeeper, preauthorizing hospital care, and preauthorizing 
Table 10 
List of Variables. Time Measured. and Scale 
Variable 
Utilization Controls 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Authorization Procedures 
Physician Profiles 
Retrospective Record 
Reviews 
Physician Risk-Sharing 
Health 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Number of Symptoms 
Self-rated Health 
Number of Limited 
Activity Days in the 
Last Two Weeks 
Number of Bed Days in the 
Last Two Weeks 
Ability to Perform 
Instrumental Activities 
of Daily Living 
Number of Sick Days in 
the Last Year 
Satisfaction with Care 
1. 
2 . 
Rating of Professional 
Skill 
Rating of Provider's 
Willingness to Discuss 
a Health Problem 
3. Satisfaction with 
4. 
5. 
Regular Source of Care 
Rating of Convenience of 
Appointment Arrangements 
Rating of Reasonableness 
of Waiting to See 
Physicians 
Time Measured 
Tl 
Tl 
Tl 
Tl 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
Tl, T2 
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Scale 
o to 3 
o to 2 
o to 3 
-10 to +10 
o to 10 
1 to 4 
o to 14 
o to 14 
o to 6 
o to 365 
1 to 4 
1 to 4 
1 to 4 
1 to 4 
1 to 4 
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specialist care). Preauthorizing urgency care loaded on a second 
factor and in the opposite direction of the others. Setting LOS did 
not load strongly on either factor. In addition, when setting LOS 
and preauthorizing urgency care were included in the factor 
analysis, Kaiser's measure of sampling adequacy was below the 
acceptable limit of 0.57. For these reasons, these two controls 
were not included in the authorization procedures that were folded 
into a Guttman scale . 
A decision was made to delete the concurrent review controls 
because of lack of strength in controlling service use (Boaz, 1979; 
Ruchlin, Finkel & McCarthy, 1982), lack of variability among the 
plans with regard to concurrent hospital review, and lack of 
consensus between intervi3wers and plans and among plans as to what 
constituted discharge planning. Discharge planning ranged from 
setting hospital length of stay prior to admission by a clerk in the 
admissions office (an antecedent control) to involvement by a 
discharge planning nurse with the patient or family or both, 
hospital departments and physicians. 
Each factored group of organizational controls, i.e . , 
authorization procedures, physician profiles and retrospective 
record reviews, was examined as to its ability to be classified by 
Guttman scaling technique . Earlier research on the HMOs' 
utilization controls indicated that the authorization and review 
procedures were adopted in a sequential manner (Brown, 1987). Each 
group of controls for authorization procedures, physician profiles 
and record reviews met the standard criteria for existence of a 
Guttman scale (Kaluzny & Veney, 1980). 
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Plan ratings on the stringency of authorization procedures 
ranged from 0 to 3 depending on the presence of one or more of the 
following controls: gatekeeper, prior authorization of hospital 
admission, prior authorization of specialist care. The ratings of 
stringency of physician profiles ranged from 0 to 2 depending on the 
presence or absence of primary care physician profiles and/or 
specialist physician profiles. Ratings for retrospective record 
review ranged from 0 to 3 depending on the presence or absence of a 
utilization review committee, retrospective review of ambulatory 
care records and retrospective review of hospital records. 
To measure the level of physician risk sharing in the plans a 
scale was developed from a list of risk sharing arrangements found 
in this sample of HMOs. A modified Delphi technique was used to 
construct the scale (Kaluzny & Veney, 1980). A questionnaire was 
sent to three health economists asking each one to rate the 
different risk-sharing arrangements found in the 17 HMOs (Table 11). 
Specified constraints on the rating were: 
1. A risk-sharing arrangement that does not link 
physician income to services prescribed for 
patients (straight salary) has a value of O. 
2. A risk- sharing arrangement that increases 
physician income if more services are prescribed 
(fee-for-service payment) has a value of less than 
o. 
3. A risk-sharing arrangement that reduces physician 
income if more services are prescribed (capitated 
payment) has a value of greater than O. 
4. The scale's range is to be limited to -10 to +10. 
A composite score for the degree of financial risk for patient 
services shared by physicians based on the HMO's contract with its 
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Table 11 
Summary: Financial Risk Fac i ng Physicians in 17 Medicare Demonstration HMOs 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan 0 
Plan E 
Plan G 
Plan H 
Plan 
Plan J 
Plan K 
Plan l 
Plan M 
Plan N 
Plan 0 
Plan P 
Plan Q 
At Risk 
for In-Office 
Services 
Yes 
Yes 
No, salary 
No, salary 
Yes 
No, salary 
a FFS 
Yes 
No, salary 
No, salary 
No, salary 
Yes 
No, salary 
FFS 
No, salary 
FFS 
aFee-for-service. 
At Risk 
for Referral 
Physician 
Services 
Withhold 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes, 50% 
No 
Withhold 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Withhold 
and Bonus 
No 
Withhold 
At Risk for 
for Hospital 
Services 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes, 60% 
No 
Withhold 
Bonus 
No 
No 
No 
Yes, 50% 
No 
Withhold 
and Bonus 
No 
Withhold 
Limi ts to 
Risk/Other 
Arrangements 
10% withhold for referral 
services bonus based on 
overall HMO profit 
on Medicare 
Withhold 
Maximum negotiated 
ceiling set on Medicare 
group's losses 
Share loss or surplus 
on hospital and inpatient 
specialists equaly 
Negotiated maximum 
risk on referral 
and hospital costs 
Withhold 
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primary physician group was assigned to each HMO was derived by 
averaging the ratings given to each plan. Those plans that 
capitated providers for all services including hospitalizations had 
the highest positive numerical scores. Those plans paying a 
modified fee-for-service scale and having no capitation received the 
highest negative numerical scores. 
Two plans in this sample are actually mixed models. The primary 
providers have a different level of risk-sharing than specialist 
physicians. The plan I s degree of risk- sharing was decided by the 
types of arrangements established for the primary providers as they 
make up the core physician group. This may, however, increase the 
error associated with the beta coefficients in the regression 
analysis. 
, ....... ,,r ...... .---,-'_ .. __ ... ----~ 
Enrollees I Health' 
Health is a multidimensional concept. A definition of health 
may focus on the individual, his disease state and/or his ability to 
function (Binstock & Shanas, 1977). For this study, health is 
defined to encompass the individual's ability to function, the 
presence or absence of symptoms, and his feelings about his health. 
Data from the baseline telephone interviews provide the values for 
initial health. Data from the follow-up telephone interviews 
provide the values for health after enrollment in an HMO. Initial 
and outcome health are measured for each enrollee by the following 
indicators: 
1. number of symptoms reported out of a list of ten 
symptoms 
2. self - rated health using a scale of 1 to 4 with 4 
representing excellent health 
3. number of limited activity days in the last two 
weeks 
4 . number of bed days in the last two weeks 
5. ability to perform instrumental activities of 
daily living using a scale of 1 to 6 derived from 
summing responses to questionnaire items 
6. number of sick days in the last year. 
Enrollee Satisfaction with Quality of Care and Access 
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Like health, satisfaction with care is multifaceted. 
Satisfaction represents the degree of fit between a patient and a 
health system and describes perceived access to care (Thomas & 
Penchansky, 1984). Enrollees' satisfaction with quality of care and 
access is measured by their responses to a battery of questions 
asking them to rate on a scale of 1 to 4 (with 4 being the highest 
rating) specific components of care described in the literature as 
satisfiers : 
1. professional competence 
2. provider's willingness to discuss a health problem 
with a patient 
3. satisfaction with the HMO as a regular source of 
care 
4. convenience of appointment arrangements 
5. reasonableness of waiting time to see a physician. 
These items have been chosen from the satisfaction battery of 
questions in the survey because they represent those components of 
64 
satisfaction that could be influenced by utilization controls as 
discussed in Chapter 2. A single index was not calculated by 
summing all the items on the battery because satisfaction is a 
multi-dimensional construct. Rossiter, Wan, Langwell, Tucker, 
Rivnyak, Sullivan and Norcross (1987) found satisfaction in this 
enrollee group to the composed of two related concepts: (a) 
satisfaction with quality of care and (b) accessibility or the 
convenience of care. Items one through three reflect satisfaction 
with quality of care. Items four and five reflect satisfaction with 
access to care. 
Disenrollment 
Any living enrollee not enrolled at follow-up in the HMO to 
which he or she belonged at enrollment is classified as disenrolled. 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Separate analyses were performed for continuous enrollees and 
disenro11ees using the merged data. The disenro11ees were treated 
as a distinct group because their leaving the HMO may have been 
primarily motivated by dissatisfaction with utilization control. 
Thus, the effect of utilization controls may be disenro11ment rather 
than continuous enrollment with changes in health and/or 
satisfaction with quality of care and access. T-tests were 
performed to see if significant changes in health and satisfaction 
with quality of care and access measures had occurred since 
enrollment for continuing enrollees and disenro11ees . Each group 
was also examined for the type and stringency of utilization control 
to which it was exposed. 
Using regression techniques the effects of utilization controls 
on changes between enrollment (T1) and follow-up (T2) for the 
continuously enrolled group were studied . Logit regression analysis 
was then used to see if the negative changes since enrollment were 
associated with utilization controls. 
The continuous enrollees were then compared wi th the 
disenro11ees. For each of these comparisons, differences between 
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the mean value of characteristics of each group were calculated and 
a t-test performed to identify significant differences. 
The last analysis studies the effect of utilization controls on 
disenrollment using logit regression. 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
Sample sizes by plan are shown in Table 12 along with the 
completion rate at follow-up for ' the beneficiary survey by plan. 
Surveys may not have been completed at baseline or follow-up or 
both. Follow-up surveys were conducted only if the respondent had 
had at least one HMO physician encounter. Thus, the column listed 
completions, still enrolled and no visit are excluded from the 
analysis. Of the 2,098 baseline respondents, 1,175 (56.0%) had at 
least one HMO physician encounter. The analysis of the effects of 
utilization controls on continuous enrollees was done on this group. 
The 336 (16.0%) enrollees not having an HMO visit are not included 
in the study because (a) they have no evidence belonging to the HMO 
is unsatisfactory as they are still enrolled and (b) without an 
expressed need to see a physician there is no evidence that exposure 
to utilization controls has an effect on their health. 
The completion rates reflect completion of the two surveys 
conducted about one year apart. The overall completion rate at 
follow-up was 93.3%. Variation in completion occurred by plan, but 
it is not considered substantial except for Plan C, which has only a 
79.5% completion rate. The nonresponse category (6.7%) is really a 
collection of reasons including refusal, could not locate, and moved 
from area. As reported elsewhere from the NMCE (Brown, Langwell, 
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Table 12 
National Medicare Competition Evaluation: Distribution of Sample Survey 
Beneficiairies by Market Area and Plan According to Completion 
Status at Follow-up. 1986 (NMCE Beneficiary Survey 1985-86) 
PERCENT 
CO!!!pletions 
Basel ine Still Enrolled 
Plan Respondents Visit No Visit Disenrolled Deceased Nonresponse 
Enrollees 2098 1175 336 376 70 141 
Plan A 124 46.8 14.5 25.8 2.4 10.5 
Plan B 138 76.8 11.6 5.1 4.4 2.2 
Plan C 112 66.1 6.3 22.3 2.7 2.7 
Plan D 122 26.2 28.7 23.0 1.6 20.5 
Plan E 116 55.2 7.8 21.6 4.3 11.2 
Plan F 123 71.5 16.3 5.7 1.6 4.9 
Plan G 123 78.1 3.3 8.1 4.9 5.7 
Plan H 125 31.2 60.8 4.0 0.8 3.2 
Plan 124 72.6 12.9 4.8 4.0 5.7 
Plan J 124 74.2 7.3 5.7 4.0 8.9 
Plan K 126 46.0 19.1 26.2 5.6 3.2 
Plan L 115 39.1 13.0 32.2 3.5 12.2 
Plan M 125 46.4 27.2 15.2 4.0 7.2 
Plan N 125 4.8 6.4 1.6 4.8 
Plan 0 123 58.5 27.6 3.3 6.5 4.1 
Plan P 127 78.7 8.7 4.7 3.9 3.9 
a Plan Q 126 0.0 0.8 92.9 1.6 4.8 
a Plan Q ended its risk-based contract before the follow-up survey was fielded. 
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Berman, Ciemenecki, Nelson, Schreier, & Tucker, 1986; Brown, 
Ciemencki, & Langwell, 1987) disenrollment was substantial among 
enrollees in the period between the baseline and the follow-up 
survey. Interviewed disenrollees numbered 376 and accounted for 
about 18% of the sample. The analysis of the effects of utilization 
controls on disenrollment was carried out on this group. 
Some of the 141 (6.7%) enrollees in the nonresponse category and 
others not contacted for either one or both surveys could also be 
disenrollees, but the number of disenrollees in this group is 
unknown given the available data. The number of deceased 
beneficiaries was 70, about 3.4% of the enrollee sample. 
Effect of Utilization Controls on Enrollees' Health 
The distribution of enrollee exposure to utilization control by 
type and level was not found to be centered in anyone category or 
level as shown in Table 13. The group is split about in half 
between lower levels of control, that is, to one or less procedures 
in each of the three categories of authorization procedures, 
physician profiles and retrospective record reviews, and more 
stringent application of these activities. The maj ori ty of the 
enrollees (75%) were not exposed to risk-sharing arrangements that 
would directly affect the prescribing practices of their physicians. 
When the indices of health at Tl and T2 were compared and t-
tests performed, changes were identified for the number of reported 
symptoms, number of restricted activity days in the last two weeks 
and number of sick days per year (Table 14). Each had significantly 
increased. No significant differences were found for self-rated 
Table 13 
Percentages of Enrollees Exposed to Each Category 
of Utilization Control and Level within the Category 
Category 
Authorization 
Procedures 
Physician 
Profiles 
Retrospective 
Record Review 
Physic~anbRisk­
Shar1ng 
!i=1,175 
All 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Level of Control 
0 
19.8 16.6 
24.5 20.6 
53.3 33.6 
< 0 o 
16.5 58.8 
a 
2 3 
41.5 26.1 
54.9 N/A 
8.2 4.9 
> 0 
24.7 
a Level is established by Guttman scale ranging from no procedure to using 
aLL procedures within a category consecutiveLy. Authorization procedures 
and retrospective review category scaLes range from 0 to 3. Physician 
profile category scaLe is 0 to 2. 
bphysician risk-sharing scale is based on contractual arrangements with 
physicians and ranges from -10 to +10. Physician with positive 
risk-sharing receive capitated payments rather than fee-for-service «0) 
or salary (0). 
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Table 14 
Results of T-Tests Performed on Differences in Continuous 
Enrollees' Health. Satisfaction. and Access Measures Between 
Baseline and Follow-up (T2-Tl) 
Patient Variables 
Health Measures 
Number of Symptoms 
Self-Rated Health 
Number of Restricted Activity 
Days in Last 2 Weeks 
IADL Score 
Number of Bed Days in Last 
2 Weeks 
Number of Sick Days Per Year 
Satisfaction with Quality 
of Care and Access 
Professional Skill 
Willingness of Provider to 
Discuss Problems 
Care at the HMO 
Convenient Appointment Times 
Reasonable Waits 
* I! < .05. 
** I! < .Ol. 
T-statistic 
2.06* 
0.06 
8.20** 
l. 35 
0.05 
6.25** 
l. 74 
4.01** 
10.35** 
2.21* 
6.24** 
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health, IADL score and number of bed days reported in the two weeks 
prior to the interviews. When the frequencies are grouped according 
to the categories of "no change or improved" and "worse," it appears 
that the majority of enrollees fared well during their first year in 
the HMOs (Table 15). 
The indices were then fit to Equation 1 using health at follow-
up as the dependent variable, and health at baseline and the 
utilization controls as the independent variables. 
As expected, prior health predicted health at follow-up for the 
enrollees for all measures except one (Table 16). Prior limited 
activity days did not influence limited activity days at follow-up. 
None of the utilization controls were found to influence health at 
follow-up. The lack of effect on restricted activity days was 
surprising given the significant t-test and theoretical expectations 
that limiting access to care via organizational controls may 
increase disability. 
The effect of utilization controls on changes in health from 
baseline (Tl) to follow-up (T2) was then examined. For this 
analysis, the value of each health variable at Tl was subtracted 
from its value at T2 (T2 Tl) producing a net value that 
represented the change in health since enrollment. The net value of 
the health variable then became the dependent variable in Equation 
2. The utilization controls were found not to contribute to 
changes in health between Tl and T2 (Table 17). 
The relationship between decreased health and utilization 
controls was then studied using logit regression (Equation 3). In 
the logit regression equations, the dependent variables for health 
Table 15 
Difference in Enrollees' Health, Satisfaction with Quality 
of Care and Access After Enrolling in HMO (T2-Tl) 
Patient Variables 
Health Measures 
Number of Symptoms 
Self-Rated Health 
Number of Restricted Activity 
Days in Last 2 Weeksa 
IADL Score 
Number ofbBed Days in Last 
2 Weeks 
Number of Sick Days Per Year 
Satisfaction with Quality 
c 
of Care and Access 
Professional Skill 
Willingness of Provider to 
Discuss Problems 
General Satisfaction 
Convenient Appointment Times 
Reasonable Waits 
N=1,175 
Percentage 
Reporting No 
Change or Improved 
74 . 5 
79.5 
93.6 
90.9 
95.3 
77 .6 
79.1 
80.1 
90.8 
86.4 
90.2 
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Percentage 
Reporting 
Worse Off 
25.5 
20.5 
6.4 
9.1 
4 . 7 
22.4 
20.9 
19.9 
9.2 
13.6 
9.8 
aDerived from those reporting limited activity days in last 2 weeks 
at Tl. 
bDerived from those reporting bed days in last 2 weeks at Tl. 
CSatisfaction measured at baseline for enrollees' prior source of 
care. 
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Table 16 
Health at Base line and Utilization Controls Effect on 
Enrollees' Health at Follow-up 
HEALTH 
Beta Coefficients 
Bed Days Limited 
No. of Self-Rated in Prior Activity Days No. of Sick 
Control S~toms Health 
a 2 Weeks in Prior 2 Wks . IADL Days/Year 
Health ~T12 
No. of S~toms 0.519* 
(5.74) 
Self-Rated 
Health -0.536* 
(21.260) 
Bed Days in 
Prior 2 
Weeks 0.206* 
(6.047) 
Limited Activity 
Days in Prior 
2 Weeks 0.050 
( 1.896) 
IADL 0.301* 
(13.458) 
No. of Sick Days 
Per Year 0.383* 
(5.000) 
Control 
Authorization 0.005 0.005 -0.079 0.006 0.018 -1.075 
Procedures (0.032) (0.200) (-1.694) (0.082) (1.068) (-1.370) 
Physician Profiles -0.314 0.035 0.060 -0.180 0.019 -0.700 
(-2.003) ( 1.430) (1.223) (-2.316) (1.073) (-0.820) 
Retrospective -0.233 -0.019 0.018 0.041 -0.015 -0.023 
Record Review (-1.33) (-0.683) (0.309) (0.470) (-0.739) (-0.024) 
Physician Risk- -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.055 
Sharing ( -0.323) ( 1.140) (-1.002) (-0.616) (-0.686) (-0.668) 
F value 8.252* 91.676* 8.49* 2.041 36.489* 5.995* 
2 0.034 0.286 0.035 0.009 0.152 0.026 R 
Note. Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
* p < 0.01. 
Table 17 
Effect of Utilization Controls on Changes in Enrollees' Health (T2-T1) 
Control 
Authorization 
Procedures 
Physician Profiles 
Retrospective 
Record Review 
Physician Risk-
Sharing 
F value 
2 
R 
No. of Self-Rated 
Symptoms Health 
0.061 -0.011 
(0.419) 
-0.291 0.018 
(-1.837) 
-0.204 -0.03(, 
(-1.136) 
-0.008 0.004 
(-0.523) 
1.30 0.965 
0.004 0.003 
Note. Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
Bed Days Limited 
in Prior Activity Days 
2 Weeks in Prior 2 Wks. 
-0.097 -0.006 
(-1.721) (0.617) 
0.051 -0.001 
(0.839) (-0.008) 
0.028 0.055 
(0.414) (0.434) 
-0.009 -0.002 
(-1.578) (-0.171) 
2.06 0.06 
0.007 0.000 
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No. of Sick 
IADL Days/Year 
0.028 -1.082 
(1.183) (-1.341) 
0.015 -0.376 
(0.608) (-0.430) 
-0.018 -0.298 
(-0.652) (-0.304) 
-0.000 -0.029 
(-0.023) (-0.343) 
0.0460 0.900 
0.002 0.003 
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were coded so that increased severity or morbidity at follow-up was 
represented by 1 and improved health by O. 
The effect of utilization controls on decreased health at T2 was 
also negligible (Table 18). None of the independent variables has a 
significant effect on any health indicator. 
The Effect of Utilization Controls on Enrollees' 
Satisfaction with Quality of Care and Access 
When the indices for satisfaction with quality of care and 
access were compared and t-tests performed, they were significantly 
improved over the enrollees' previous source of care. Professional 
skill was not rated higher than prior to enrollment. 
However, when the effect of utilization controls on satisfaction 
with quality of care and access were tested a slightly different 
picture emerges (Equation 4) than was found for the effect of 
utilization controls on health. While the effect of risk sharing 
was not significant for any of the satisfaction measures, procedural 
controls did have significant effects on satisfaction (Table 19). 
Enrollees were more satisfied with the care they received in plans 
with less authorization procedures. Enrollees were also more 
satisfied with appointments in those plans having fewer 
authorization procedures and doing less physician profiling. 
Retrospective review, however, was associated with higher 
satisfaction with appointment convenience. Plans with more 
extensive record review procedures perhaps are able to monitor this 
access concern and quickly implement actions to resolve patient 
problems with appointment availability. 
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Table 18 
Results of Logit Regression: Effect of Utilization Controls 
on Decreases in Enrollees' in Health at Follow-up (T2) 
HEALTH 
Beta Coefficients 
Bed Days Limi ted 
No. of Self-Rated in Prior Activity Days No. of Sick 
a 
Control Symptoms Health 2 IJeeks in Prior 2 IJks. IADL Days/Year 
Authorization 
Procedures 0.116 -0.072 0.249 0.089 0.148 0.120 
(2.43) (0.86) (2.89) (0.49) (3.53) (0.02) 
Physician Profiles -0.097 -0 . 032 -0.218 0.266 0.115 0.089 
(1.49) (0.14) ( 1.68) (3.96) (1.83) (1. 12) 
Retrospective 
Record Review -0.074 -0.151 0.068 -0.093 -0.007 -0.081 
(0.68) (2.68) (0.10) (0.37) (0.00) (0.74) 
Physician Risk -
Sharing -0.003 0.134 0.018 0.014 0.002 0.007 
(0.20) (2.83) (0.89) (0.93) (0.03) (0.63) 
(N=1175) 
Chi square with 
4 degrees of freedom 4.00 6.70 7.10 6.38 6.92 2.44 
2 0.00 0.00 R 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note. Figures in parentheses are chi-square values. 
aDecreased health; all decreases coded 1; improvement or no change coded o. 
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Table 19 
Effect of Utilization Controls on Enrollees' Satisfaction 
and Access at Follow-up 
SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF CARE AND ACCESS 
Control Skill Talk Care Appointment Wait 
Authorization 
Procedures -0.046 -0.039 -0.056* -0.072* -0.039* 
(-2.325) (-1.872) (-3.717) (-4.508) ( - 2.112) 
Physician Profiles -0.011 0.001 -0.019 -0.036** - 0.005 
(-0.518) (0 . 034) (-1.169) (-2.038) (-0.223) 
Retrospective 
Record Review 0.051 0.033 0.019 0.047** -0.003 
(2.l33) (1.257) (1. 407) (2.389) (-0.148) 
Physician Risk-
Sharing 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 
(0.718) (1. 719) (0.500) (1.816) (1. 304) 
F value 1. 974 1. 582 3.840* 6.594* 1.482 
0.007 0.006 0.0l3 0.023 0.005 
Note. Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
* p. < 0.01. 
** p. < 0.05. 
78 
The effect of utilization controls on the changes in 
satisfaction with quality of care and access between T2 and Tl was 
examined in the same manner as the health variables. That is, a net 
value for the measures was determined and used as the dependent 
variable regression Equation 4. 
The results of the analysis is shown in Table 20 . The effects 
of utilization controls on changes in satisfaction with quality of 
care and access after enrollment were not significant for any of the 
measures . 
A logit analysis was then performed on the effect of utilization 
control on decreased satisfaction in the same manner as the health 
variables, that is, reduced satisfaction with quality of care and 
access at T2 were coded 1 and no change or improved satisfaction 
were coded 0 in Equation 5. 
The results of the regression are reported in Table 21 and show 
that the utilization controls were not significant contributors to 
dissatisfaction with professional skill, willingness to talk, 
satisfaction with care, convenience of appointments or wai ting time 
to see the physicians. 
Disenrollee Changes in Health and Satisfaction with 
Quality of Care and Access 
T-tests performed on the health indicators found disenrollees to 
have fewer statistically significant changes in health within their 
group than the enrollees (Table 22). Like enrollees the number of 
symptoms increased but their reported number of restricted activity 
days and sick days per year were not significantly different at 
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Table 20 
Effect of Utilization Controls on Net Changes in Enrollees' 
Satisfaction with Quality of Care and Access CT2-Tl) 
NET CHANGES IN 
SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF CARE AND ACCESS 
Control Skill Talk Care Appointment Wait 
Authorization 
Procedures -0.040 -0.067 -0.025 -0.065 -0.016 
(-l.370) (-2.021) ( - 0.807) (-2.688) (0.530) 
Physician Profiles -0.001 0.047 0.024 -0.026 0.029 
(0.025) (l. 293) (0.696) (0.959) (0.871) 
Retrospective 
Record Review -0.017 0.004 -0.021 0.046 -0.025 
(-0.425) (0.093) (-0.529) (l.473) (-0.631) 
Physician Risk-
Sharing -0.001 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 
(-0.365) (l. 047) (-l.259) (-0.266) (-l.162) 
F value 0.934 1 . 540 l. 202 2.325 l. 035 
0 . 004 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.011 
Note . Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
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Table 2l 
Results of Logit Regression: Effect of Utilization Controls 
on Decreases in Enrollees' Satisfaction with Quality of 
Care and Access from Previous Source of Care 
SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF CARE AND ACCESS (T2)* 
Beta Coefficients 
Control 
Authorization 
Procedures 
Physician Profiles 
Retrospective 
Record Review 
Physician Risk-
Sharing 
N=1,175 
Chi square wi th 
4 degrees of 
freedom 
Skill* 
-0.089 
(1. 15) 
0.12l 
(1.71) 
-0.137 
(1. 48) 
-0.005 
(0.28) 
6.71 
0.00 
Talk* 
-0.082 
(1. 06) 
0.079 
(0.83) 
0.021 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
1. 96 
0.00 
Care* 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.067 
(0.62) 
-0.235 
(5.22) 
-0.008 
(0.78) 
8.60 
0.03 
Appointment* 
-0.145 
(2.20) 
-0.039 
(0.13) 
-0.014 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.20) 
3.90 
0.00 
Note. Figures in parentheses are chi-square values. 
*Decreased satisfaction; all decreases coded 1; improvement or 
no change coded O. 
Wait* 
0.019 
(0.06) 
0.104 
(1. 39) 
-0.121 
(1.35) 
-0.011 
(1. 60) 
5.17 
0.00 
Table 22 
Comparison of T-Tests Performed on Continous Enrollees' 
and Disenrollees' Health, Satisfaction, and Access 
Measures Between Baseline and Follow-up (T2-Tl) 
T Statistic 
Patient Variables 
Health Measures 
Number of Symptoms 
Self-Rated Health 
Number of Restricted Activity 
Days in Last 2 Weeks 
IADL Score 
Number of Bed Days in Last 
2 Weeks 
Number of Sick Days Per Year 
Satisfaction with Quality 
of Care and Access 
Professional Skill 
Willingness of Provider to 
Discuss Problems 
General Satisfaction 
Convenient Appointment Times 
Reasonable Waits 
* Q < 0.05. 
** Q < 0.01. 
Enrollees 
(N=1,175) 
2,06* 
0.06 
8.20** 
1. 35 
0.05 
6.25** 
1. 74 
4.01** 
10.35** 
2.21* 
6.24** 
Disenrollees 
(N=376) 
3,14** 
-0.81 
0.09 
-0.91 
-3.97** 
0.55 
-4.65** 
-3.88** 
-3.43** 
-3.22** 
-1. 69 
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follow-up. Bed days were significantly less at follow-up. When 
compared to the enrollees, the only significant differences between 
the two groups' health are that disenrollees are significantly more 
likely to have lower self-rated health and lower IADL scores (Table 
23). When the data for baseline values were compared, no 
significant differences between the continuous enrollees and 
disenrolles were found. 
However, at the follow-up, the t-statistics for disenrollees' 
satisfaction with quality of care and access are direct opposites of 
those for the enrollees. There are significant differences between 
enrollees and disenrollees reporting less satisfaction for all the 
satisfaction indicators associated with quality of care and access 
(Table 23). Unlike the continuous enrollees who expressed 
satisfaction with HMO system providers and care, disenrollees were 
significantly more likely to perceive HMO providers to be less 
skilled, less willing to discuss problems with them, felt the HMO 
did not provide good care and had greater inconvenience with 
appointment times and longer waits to see a provider than they 
experienced prior to enrollment. 
From the significant negative t-statistics (Table 22) found for 
all the satisfaction findings when the means for both groups are 
compared, it appears that dissatisfaction and disenrollment go hand 
in hand. A dissatisfied enrollee leaves the HMO. 
Rossiter et al.'s recent study (1987) of this group found them 
to be more likely to have characteristics that may be associated 
with a higher propensity to use health services -- for instance, 
bearing a greater worry about health, having a health problem 
Table 23 
Percentage of Enrollees and Disenrollees Reporting Less 
Health, Satisfaction and Access After Enrolling in an HMO (T2-Tl) 
Patient Variables 
Health Measures 
Number of Symptoms 
Self-Rated Health 
Number of Restricted Activity 
Days in Last 2 Weeks 
IADL Score 
Number of Bed Days in Last 
2 Weeks 
Number of Sick Days Per Year 
Satisfaction with Quality 
of Care and Access 
Professional Skill 
Willingness of Provider to 
Discuss Problems 
General Satisfaction 
Convenient Appointment Times 
Reasonable Waits 
* p < ,05, 
** p < ,01. 
Percentage of 
Enrollees 
25,0 
20,5 
6,4 
9,1 
4,7 
22,4 
20,9 
19,9 
9,2 
13,6 
9,8 
Percentage of 
Disenrollees 
28,5 
20,1* 
7,3 
12,2** 
7,1 
21. 8 
41,5** 
35,6** 
33,1** 
22,0** 
32,6** 
83 
84 
requiring hospitalization, and having a more limited ability to 
perform IADL. The authors suggest that these findings, combined 
with those showing that disenrollees are more concerned about seeing 
the same physician each visit, suggest that disenrollees may be 
those who make greater demands on the HMO system, perhaps from 
ongoing or unmet need, and may be concerned about the ability of the 
HMO system to respond to their needs in a satisfactory matter. 
Disenrollees' Exposure to Utilization Controls 
One situation that might increase disenrollees' concerns about 
the timely responsiveness of an HMO to their needs is exposure to 
high level of control over access. However, when exposure to 
controls is arrayed (Table 24) the greatest percentage of 
disenrollees are found in the lower levels of utilization procedures 
and risk sharing. When compared to the distribution for the 
continuous enrollees, greater percentage of enrollees rather than 
disenrollees are found in all the highest levels of controls except 
retrospective review. This implies that it is not the numbers of 
controls that are applied but perhaps specific controls that are 
offensive to some enrollees. 
Utilization Control and Disenrollment 
When the effect of utilization controls on disenrollment was 
examined using logit regression as specified in Equation 6, it was 
found that the procedures account for 40% of the variance in 
disenrollment, and all the independent variables are significant 
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Table 24 
Percentages of Enrollees and Disenrollees Exposed to Each 
Category of Utilization Control and Level Within the Category 
Category Enrol 
Authorization 
Procedures 19.8 
Physician 
Profiles 24.5 
Retrospective 
Record 
Review 53.5 
Physician Risk-
Sharing** 
0 
Level 
1 
Disen Enrol Disen 
5.0 16.6 47.9 
13.8 20.6 4l. 5 
2l. 5 33.6 36.2 
< 0 
Enrol Disen 
16.5 34.9 
of Control* 
2 3 
Enrol Disen Enrol Disen 
4l. 5 2l. 8 26.1 25.3 
54.9 44.7 NjA NjA 
8.2 2.7 4.9 39.6 
o > 0 
Enrol Disen Enrol Disen 
58.8 45.0 24.7 19.2 
*Level is established by Guttman scale ranging from no procedure 
to using all procedures within a category consecutively. 
Authorization procedures and retrospective review category scales 
range from 0 to 3. Physician profile category scale is 0 to 2. 
**Physician risk-sharing scale is based on contractual arrangement 
with physicians and ranges from -10 to +10. Physicians with 
positive risk-sharing receive capitated payments rather than 
fee-for-service «0) or salary (0). 
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contributors to the effect except authorization procedures (Table 
25). 
Interaction terms were then introduced into the logit model so 
that the effects of combinations of utilization controls on 
dis enrollment could be examined. Regressing the main and 
interactive effects of the utilization controls on disenrollment 
increased the amount of explained variance in disenrollment to 49.2% 
with the interaction terms alone accounting for 22.1% of the 
variance (Table 25). Authorization procedures and physician 
profiling were not significant contributors to disenrollment ; more 
stringent levels of retrospective review and lower levels of 
physician risk sharing continued to influence disenrollment. 
Significant interactive eifects were (a) authorization procedures by 
physician profiling, (b) authorization procedures by physician risk 
sharing, (c) physician profiles by physician risk sharing, and (d) 
retrospective review by physician risk sharing. 
Summary 
Utilization controls did not influence health. For this group 
of HMO enrollees, health at enrollment predicted health at follow-
up. Although there was a significant increase in limited activity 
days between enrollment and follow-up within the enrollee group and 
theoretic speculation that authorization procedures could increase 
limited activity days be.::ause they limit access to services, this 
association was not found to occur. 
Utilization controls did affect satisfaction with access. At 
follow-up, enrollees were more satisfied (a) with care in those 
Table 25 
Res ults o f Logit Regression ' Effec t of Utilization Controls 
on Dls enro llment fr om HM Os 
Controls 
Authorization Procedures 
Physician Profiles 
Retrospective Record Review 
Physician Risk Sharing 
(tl.-l,551) 
Chi -Square with 4 Degrees 
of Freedom 
Authorization Procedures 
Physician Profiles 
Retrospective Record Review 
Physician Risk Sharing 
Authori zation Procedures 
by Physician Profiles 
Authorization Procedure 
by Retrospective Record Review 
Authorization Procedures 
by Physician Risk Sharing 
Physician Profile by 
Retrospective Record Review 
Phys ieian Profiles by 
Physician Risk Sharing 
Retrospective Review by 
Physician Risk Sharing 
(N-l,551) 
Chi-Square with 10 Degrees 
of Freedom 
Beta Coefficients 
Disenrollees-l 
Enrollees-O Chi-Square 
Main Effects 
-0 . 095 1. 65 
0 . 378 15 . 56* 
0.998 194.35* 
-0 . 039 21. 80* 
294 . 43* 
0 . 40 
Main and Interactive Effects 
-0 . 080 0.19 
- 0.270 0 . 92 
2.100 6.78** 
-0.504 7.02** 
0 . 440 7.17** 
-0.451 2 . 91 
0.177 5.10** 
-0,332 1. 99 
0 . 139 12.42* 
-0 . 114 6 . 39* 
458 . 16* 
0.492 
8 7 
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plans having fewer authorization procedures and (b) with appointment 
convenience in those plans having fewer authorization procedures and 
physician profiles. Retrospective review, however, was associated 
with increased satisfaction with appointment convenience. Plans 
with more extensive record review procedures perhaps are able to 
monitor this concern and quickly implement actions to resolve 
patient problems with it. 
When enrollees were compared wi th disenrollees several 
differences were found. Although the enrollees and disenrollees 
were not significantly different at baseline, compared to the 
enrollees / health, disenrollees were significantly more likely to 
have lower self-rated health and less abili ty to perform 
instrumental activities of daily living at follow-up. Disenrollees' 
satisfaction with quality of care and access was directly opposite 
that expressed by the continuous enrollees . Disenrollees perceived 
HMO providers to be less skilled, less willing to discuss health 
concerns with them, felt the HMO did not provide good care, had 
inconvenient appointment times and had longer waits than their prior 
source of health care . 
Although utilization controls did not adversely affect health, 
they did influence disenrollment. The fact that the greatest 
percentage of disenrollees were found in plans with fewer 
authorization procedures and less physician risk sharing but more 
review mechanisms suggests that certain combinations of controls 
rather than stringency of utilization control influence 
disenrollment more than others. 
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The association between disenrollment and exposure to 
utilization controls was found to be significant for retrospective 
record review, and physician risk sharing and some combinations of 
controls. 
CHAPTER 5 
SUHHARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this prospective study has been to examine the 
effects of differences in utilization control on the health, 
satisfaction with quality of care and access, and disenro11ment of 
HMO enrollees . Previous studies of alternative care systems have 
shown that they are able to decrease costs (Luft, 1981; Anderson, et 
a1., 1985), but have not examined the organizational structure 
within the organization that oversees utilization. No prior studies 
have examined the effects of different types and degrees of 
utilization control on the health, satisfaction and access of 
enrollees. 
For this investigation, Williamson's (1975) theory of 
organizations, transaction costs economics, was used as the analytic 
framework . Williamson's approach is able to describe the emergence 
of alternative delivery systems because it speaks to the conditions 
surrounding the actual exchange between a patient and a physician 
but largely paid for by an insurer after the fact . It is applicable 
to a study of utilization controls because it explains the 
organizational design or "governance structure" adopted to promote 
economic efficiency. 
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The research questions investigated by this study were: 
1. Are differences in utilization control 
associated with decreased enrollee health after 
enrollment? 
2. Are differences in utilization control 
associated with decreased enrollee satisfaction 
with the quality of care over their previous 
source of care? 
3. Are differences in utilization controls 
associated with decreased enrollee access to 
care over their previous source of care? 
4. Are differences 
associated with 
CMPs? 
in utilization 
disenrollment from 
controls 
HMOs and 
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The analysis found that exposure to different types and 
stringency of utilization controls was not associated with changes 
in enrollees' health at follow-up. Some utilization controls did 
influence enrollees' satisfaction with the quality of care and 
access. They did affect satisfaction with care and access related 
to appointment convenience. Enrollees in plans with fewer 
authorization procedures rated satisfaction with care higher than 
enrollees in plans with more authorization procedures . Enrollees in 
those plans with fewer authorization procedures but more extensive 
retrospective record reviews were more satisfied with appointment 
convenience. 
Disenrollment from the plans was significant as 18% of the 
enrollees left the plans during the study. Two categories of 
utilization control retrospective record review, and physician 
risk sharing -- were associated with disenrollment. Combinations of 
utilization controls, specifically authorization procedures and 
physician profiles, authorization procedures and physician risk 
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sharing, physician profiles by physician risk sharing and 
retrospective review by physician risk sharing were also associated 
with disenrollment. These utilization controls and combinations of 
controls accounted for 49 . 2% of the variance in disenrollment. 
Discussion 
The fact that the greatest percentage of disenrollees were 
found in plans with fewer authorization procedures and physician 
risk sharing but more review mechanisms suggests that certain 
combinations of controls rather than stringency of utilization 
control influences disenrollment. 
Plans with fewer authorization procedures were less likely to 
use gatekeepers so that disenrollees may have been unable to 
establish a relationship with a physician because they did not have 
a consistent provider. Previous studies have found doctor-patient 
communication to be perhaps the single aspect of the care delivery 
process that HMOs perform most poorly and inability to establish a 
relationship with a physician a source of dissatisfaction (Luft, 
1981; Zapka, Stanek, & Raitt, 1986; Wrightsen, Genuardi, & Stephens, 
1987) . 
Plans without physician risk sharing were staff plans, which 
were also least likely to use gatekeepers. In a staff plan without 
a gatekeeper, there are few incentives for the provider to maintain 
contact with patients. Patient loyalty is to the plan not to the 
physician. 
practice. 
The physician is not working to build or maintain a 
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Those physicians in plans with a high degree of risk sharing 
were part of large physician groups. In these instances, an 
identity with the physician group as well as the risk associated 
with patient health costs may influence providers' style of 
communication with patients. They may perceive their role to 
include ensuring patient satisfaction with the group practice. 
Plans with less risk sharing were more likely to require 
preauthorization of specialist care so that patients may have 
perceived that timely referrals to specialists were not made. This 
could explain some of the dissatisfaction with physician competency, 
and quality of care. 
The influence of too many review mechanisms on satisfaction may 
be that their effect is to limit or slow the physician's actions 
with regard to tests, hospitalization, or referrals because of 
physicians' concerns about accountability. To avoid displeasing HMO 
administrators and medical peers as well as increasing costs, 
physicians may not have provided care in what the enrollee deemed a 
timely manner. A utilization control strategy for plans with little 
or no physician risk sharing may be to increase the number of review 
mechanisms to provide greater oversight of physicians as a means of 
keeping utilization down. The proposition is further supported by 
the significant interaction effects between (a) physician risk 
sharing and physician profiles, and (b) physician risk sharing and 
retrospective review on disenrollment. 
The issue with increasing retrospective review may lie with the 
intent of the monitoring, whether it focuses on physician 
performance or system performance. For those who stayed in the HMO, 
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more stringent record reviews but less physician profiling were 
associated with greater satisfaction with appointments over their 
prior source of care. 
Limitations of the Analysis 
This research is a descriptive analysis of the effect of 
utilization controls on enrollees' health, satisfaction with quality 
of care and access, and disenrollment . 
limit the application of its findings. 
Several factors , however, 
The analytic framework applied here has focused on the 
beneficiary reponse rather than organizational domain. Thus the 
effects of factors such as competition and rate of growth cannot be 
included but may affect application of control structures to monitor 
access to care. Applying a macro theory such as contingency theory 
may attribute different consequences to utilization controls. 
The number of organizations represented in this sample is small 
and self-selected . In addition, the majority of the organizations 
are young . The manner in which they apply the controls may differ 
from older more established HMOs and thus effect the milieu in which 
patients receive care . 
A cumulative effect of the different types of utilization 
controls cannot be specified because the scaling of the variables is 
based on the specific type of utilization control rather than the 
total group. 
The time frame for this study considering the age of 
respondents is short. The illnesses the elderly experience are 
largely chronic so that increases in ill health may have been 
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unlikely due to the natural history of these diseases. 
The analyses are descriptive only, but provide a basis for more 
definitive analyses of the research questions. Developing 
measurement models that allow for correlations between individual 
responses and organizational factors by using linear structural 
relations modeling could provide more rigorous analyses. 
Future Research 
Replicating this study would be helpful if more time could be 
allowed between the baseline interview and the follow-up interview 
so that the effects of utilization control over a longer time could 
be studied and associated with subsequent changes in health, 
satisfaction and access. The findings of the study may 
underestimate the effect of utilization controls on health in this 
population because the majority of health problems faced by the age 
group making up the enrollees are chronic . In addition, there was 
no medical evaluation of enrollees' health to substantiated claims 
as to functional ability, sick days and so forth. 
Future research in this area should also focus on the effect of 
timeliness and ease of referral care as a source of dissatisfaction 
that leads to disenrollment. 
Finally, the HMOs participating in this evaluation were self-
selected. Thus, they may differ systematically from the general 
population of HMOs in the United States. Future analysis could 
control for structural variables that might affect the management of 
the controls such as rate of organizational growth or competition 
with other HMOs or age of the HMO. 
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Summary 
The utilization controls found in HMOs promise to introduce 
predictability, rationality, 
fragmented, decentralized 
and 
and 
control into an otherwise 
economically nonresponsible 
(opportunistic) process. As Williamson has pointed out, the control 
structure is not placed without some cost. In the case of HMOs and 
CMPs, the savings accrued from controlling access may be offset by 
high disenrollment. Disenrollment appears, however, to be related 
to combinations of controls rather than their stringency. This 
provides HMO managers some options in choosing among the types and 
levels of controls they impose to achieve efficient and effective 
organizations. 
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APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX A 
~!EDICARE COHPETITlON DE~!ONSTRATION: 
ENROLLEE VERS ION 
SM VERSION-INTRODUCTION: 
Hello, this is and I'm calling from Mathematica Policy Research, a 
research firm in Princeton. New Jersey. Several days ago we sent you a letter 
about a study we are doing for the federal government concerning Medicare health 
benefits. We are now calling some of the people who enrolled in (AHP Nfu~) to do 
the interview over the telephone. 
The federal government is looking at different ways of providing health care 
benefits under Medicare, and the questions I'll be asking will be about (AHP 
NAME) as well as your experiences with other health care providers. 
IF NECESSARY, EXPLAIN: Your name was selected at random from a list of enrollees 
at (AHP NAME). 
Before we begin, let me remind you that participation in this survey is volunt-
ary and all responses will be held in confidence. May we begin the interview 
now? 
*** GO TO 1 *** 
PROXY VEKSION - INTRODUCTION: 
This is and I'm calling from Mathematica Policy Research in Princeton, 
New Jersey. \Ie are doing a study for the federal government concerning Medicare 
he;Jlth benefits. A letter describing the study was sent to (SAHPLE !{E~IBER) at 
this address. I'm calling now to do the interview over the telephone. 
TO LOCATE PROXY, SAY: Perhaps there is someone else who can answer the ques-
tions on behalf of (SAMPLE ~IEMBER). 
Is there someone I can speak to who helps care for 
(SAMPLE MEMBER) and i~ knowledgeable about the health 
care (she/he) receives? 
IF SPC:AKING WITH PROXY, SAY: I understand that you help care for (her/him) and 
would be knowledgeable about the health care 
(she/hc) rec"ives. Hay we begin the interview 
now? 
~"fore We begin, let me remind you that participation ill this surv"y is vo lun-
t a ry and all responses will be held in confid"nce. Most of the questions ask 
for i.nformat ion about (SAMPLE HE~IBER/ you), so you should pst answer t o th" 
best of your knowledge. If you don't know the al1sw"r or don't feel qualified to 
re spu nd to an item, j.Jst let me know. 
*** GO TO 1 ••• 
105 
>1< INTE:W IEWER: CHECK CONTACT SIIEET FOR AHP NAME. 
Our records show that (SM/you) had enrolled in 
(AHP NAME) on (ENROLLMENT DATE). (Are you/Is he/sh e) still 
enrolled at (AHP NAME)? 
<1> YES [goto 7] 
<0> NO 
<3> NEVER ENROLLED [goto mhmo] 
>2mo< When did (SM/you) cancel (his/her/your) membership? 
/ / / / 
""""'i1M DO yy-
<98> DON'T [(NOW (goto 3] 
>2a< IF CANCELLATION DATE IS AFTER ElJROLMENT DATE, READ: 
You said (SM/you) cancelled (his/her/your) AHP membership on 
(DATE FROM 2mo). (SM/you) Fined (AHP NAME) on (ENROLLMENT 
DATE). Is that correct? 
<1> YE S [goto 3] 
<2> NO, CANCELLATION DATE INCORRECT (CORRECT 2mo AND goto 3) 
<3> NO, ENROLLMENT DATE INCORRECT 
>2bmo< Can you tell me what date (SH/you) enrolled in (AHP NAl1E) 
/_/_1_1 CORRECT ON CONTACT SHEET 
HM DO YY 
>3< Now I'd like you co chink of ALL the reasons why (SM/you) 
ca ncelled (his/her/your) membership in (AlIP NANE). 
First t e ll me che main reason why (hehhe/you) cancelled 
(his/h"r/your) membership in (NIP NAME). 
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)Jaa< Were ther" any other reasons why (S~I/you) cancelled 
(his/he r /you r) memb" r sh i p? 
(0) NO OTllER REASONS [go t o 4 ) 
(1) OTHER REASONS [specify ) :. ______ _________ _ 
)4( ( Has SM/Ha v e you) enrolled in ano th e r HMO o r othe r prepaid health 
plan? 
)5< 
)t5it< 
EXPLAIN IF NECESSARY : These are health plans t h a t gua r antee 
med ical services to t he i r members in exchang" for fixed premium 
paymen t s. 
<1> YES 
<0) NO [go t o 7 ) 
(S) DON'T KNOW [go t o 7 ) 
Which prepaid health plan d i d (SM/you ) pin? 
<1> VIEW OPTIONS 
<S) DON 'T KNOW [goto 6 ) 
INTERVIEWER: CHECK CONTACT SHEET : 
if site is 01. gotO opOl if site is 09. go t o opOY 
if site is 02. goto op02 if site is 12. goto op12 
if site is 10, got o o plO if site is 04 , go t o op04 
if 5 it e is 07. goto op07 if sit c is U , goto oplJ 
if site is 06. goto op06 if site is OS , goto opOS 
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)o pOl ( 
( 1) THE SEN lOR PLAN AT FlIP 
(2) THE GOLDEN AGE PLAN AT UNITED HEALTII PLAN OR WATTS FOUNDATlON 
( 0) OTHER [5 pecify I : _______________________ _ 
*** goto 6 *** 
)op02( 
(1) THE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAN AT AV-HED HEALTH PLAN, INC. 
<2> MEDICARE PLUS AT COMPREHENSIVE AMERICAN CARE OR CAC 
0 ) TilE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAM AT HEALTH AMERICA 
( 4) TilE GOLD PLUS PLAN AT INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OR IMC 
( 5 ) SOUTII FLORIDA GROUP HEALTH 
<0 ) OTHER [specify I : _________________________ _ 
*** goto 6 *** 
)o pl O< 
( 1) GROUP llEALTH PLAN OF SE HICIIIGAN 
(2) HEALTH CARE NETWORK'S HEDICARE PLUS PROGRAM 
0 ) SENIOR PLVS OFFERED THROUGH PREFERRED HEALTH PLAN, 
A SUBSIDIARY OF HENRY FORD HEALTH CARE CORPORATION 
(0) OTHER [5 pecify J : __________________________ _ 
*** goto 6 *** 
) op07 < 
<1> CENTRAL MASS HEALTH CARE, INC. 'S STAY WELL PLUS PROGRA11 
(2) FALLON COMMUN 1 TY HEALTH PLAN'S SEN lOR CARE 
<0) OTHER [ 5 p ec if y J : __________________________ _ 
.** go to 6 .** 
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>ap06( 
<1> HEALTHWAY'S SENIOR PLAN 
<2> THE MEDICAL EAST COMMUNITY HEALTH PLAN SENIOR PLAN 
(0) OTHER [spec ify] : __________________________ _ 
••• goto 6 ••• 
)ap09< 
(1) MEDICARE PLUS AT HEALTH PLUS OF MIClIlGAN OR GENESSEE HEALTH CARE, INC. 
(0) OTHER [spccify] : _______________________________________________ _ 
••• gata 6 ••• 
>ap12< 
(I) SENIOR CARE AT GENESSEE VALLEY GROUP HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (GROUP HEALTH) 
<0) OTHER [specify]: __________________________ _ 
••• goto 6 ••• 
>ap04 ( 
<1> METROCARE, A METRO HEALTH PROGRAM 
<0> OTHER [s p ec ify] : __________________________ _ 
••• gata 6 ••• 
>a p13 ( 
0> CHOICE HEDICARE AT CllOICE CARE 
<0> OTHER [s pec Uy] : __________________________ _ 
••• gata 6 ••• 
>ap08( 
<l) TilE r'1EDlCAL Wr: ST cmU1UN ITY HEALTH PLAN SEN LOR PLAN 
<0) OTl IEK l s pee ify 1: __________________________ _ 
>b< Now I'd like you to th ink of all the reasons (SM/you) conside r ed 
wh en dec id ing to enroll in (PLAN SAMPLE HEl1BER JOINED). 
Of all the reasons (he/she/you) considered. what was th e most 
important reason why (he/she/you) decided to enroll in 
(PLNI SAMPLE MEMBER JOINED)? 
<1> MENTION OF LOWER COST [goto Ga] 
<2> MENTION OF MORE OR BETTER BENEFITS, SERVICES OR COVERAGE [goto bb] 
<3> OTHER [spectiy): ____________________________________ __ 
[goto 6c] 
<8> DON'T KNOW [goto 7] 
>6a< Could you please tell me spectiically what «he/she) was/you were) 
getting for less cost at (PLAN SAMPLE MEMBER JOINED). 
>6b< Could you please tell me spectiically what (benefits/services/ 
coverages) were better at (PLAN SAMPLE M.E~IBER JOINED)? 
>bc< Were there any other reasons why (he/she/you) decided to enr o ll in 
(PLAN SAMPLE HEMBER JOINED)? 
<1> MENTION OF LOWER COST [goto bd) 
<2> MENTION OF MORE OR BETTER BENEFITS, SERVICES OR COVERAGE [goto be] 
(3 > OTHER [s p ec if y ] : _______________________________________ _ 
_______________________________________ [goto 6f] 
<0) NO [goto 7] 
)bd ( Cou 1d you please cell me specifically W:lat .({he/she was/you were) 
getting for less cost at (PLAN SAHPLE MEHBER JOINED)? 
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)6e< Could you please tell me specifically whHt benefits/services / 
cov erages were better at (PLAN SN1PLE MEMBER JOINED)? 
)6f< Were there any other reasons why (he/she/you) decided to enroll in 
(PLAN SNfPLE MEMBER JOINED)? 
<1> HENTION OF LOWER COST [goto 6g) 
(2) MEtlTION OF MORE OR BETTER BENEFITS, SERV ICES OR COVERAGE [goto 6h J 
<3) OTHER [specify): __________________________________________________ _ 
[got07) 
<0) NO [goto 7) 
>6g< Could you please tell me specifically what «he/she) was/you were) 
getting for less cost at (PLAN SNfPLE MEl1BER JOINED)? 
)6h( Cou ld you please tell me specifically what benefits/services/ 
coverages were better at (PLAN SAMPLE MEMBER JOINED)? 
) 7 ( The next questions are about (SM's/your) living situation. What 
was (SH's/your) marital status at the time «he/she) was/you 
were) enrolled in (AHP NAME)? (Was SM/Were you) married, widowed, 
di vorced, separated or had (he/she/you) never been married? 
(1) HARRIED[goto 8 J 
(2) WIDOWED 
1 
(3) DIVORCED [goto 0J 
<4) SEPARATED 
0) tlEV ER MARRI ED 
ill 
)8( Did (he/she/you) and (his/her/you) (husband/wife) enro ll in (NiP 
tlM1E) at the same time? 
( l ) YES (goto 9) 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
)8 a ( Was (his/her/your) (husband/wife) already enrolled at (AHP NAME) 
at the time (SM/you) enrolled? 
(D YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
) 9 ( The next question is about the place where (SM/you) live(s). 
At the time (SM/you) enrolled in (AMP NANE) in (ENROLLMENT DATE) 
did (he/she/you) live in a private home or apartment, a nursing 
home or other long term care institution, or some other facility 
for the elderly? 
( D A PRIVATE IIOME OR APARTMENT 
(2) A NURS ING KOME OR OTHER LONG-TERN CARE INSTITUTION 
(J) SOMEWHERE ELSE 
(8) DON 'T KNOW 
>lO ( How long (has (he/she)/have you) lived in this area? 
) 10.,( 
(0) LESS THAN 1 YEAR (goto 11] 
YEARS (IF LESS THAN 7S YEARS, GOTO Q.12. IF MORE, ASK lOa) 
(98) DO N 'T KNOW (goto 12] 
(SM h as/You hav e) lived in this area (/I YEARS FROl1 Q.I0) y ea rs. 
Is that correct ? 
(D YES (goto 12] 
(0) NO (CORRECT Q.I0) 
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>11 ( Where did (he/she/you) live be fore (he /she/you) moved to (his/ 
h e r /you r) present address? 
CITY STATE 
(98) DON'T KNOW 
>12( (Does (he/she)/Do you) live in this area year-round? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
(NO 13 THIS VERSION) 
)14( INTERVIEWER: CHECK Q.7 FOR MARITAL STATUS. IF SAMPLE MEMBER 
IS ~~IED, GO TO l4a. 
At the time (SM/you) joined (A1IP NAME) in (ENROLLMENT DATE) did 
(he/she/you) live alone or did (he/she/you) live with other peop le ? 
(1) ALONE [goto 15] 
(2) OTHERS 
(8) DON 'T KNOW [goto 15] 
) 14a( ltlTERVIEWER CHECK Q.8 OR 8a: IF SPOUSE ENROLLED WITH SNIPLE MEMllER OR 
WAS ALREADY ENROLLED, GO TO 15. 
Did anyone who (SH/yC'·. ) lived with enroll in (A11P NAME) 
at the same time as (he/she/you) enrolled? 
( I) YES [goto 15] 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW [goto 15] 
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) 14 b< At the time (S:1/you) enrolled in (AHP NAME) did anyone who lived 
with (he/she/you) then already belong to (AliP NAHE), or some other 
1U1O? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<8) DON'r KNOW 
)15< INTERVIEWER: CHECK Q.7 FOR ~lARlTAL STATUS. 
The next few questions have to do with private health insurance 
or HMO memberships (SM/you) (and (his/her/your) spouse) may have 
had at the time you pined (AHP NAME). 
Did (SM/you) (and (his/her/your) spouse) have any private health 
insurance policies or belong to any health maintenance organiza-
tion just before you enrolled in (AUP NAHE)? 
PROBE IF NECESSARY: Did you have health insurance policies that were 
not Medicare or Medicaid or Veteran's benefits? 
<1) YES [goto 17 J 
<0) NO [goto 16J 
<8) DON'T KNOI, [goto 20 I 
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>16< People have different reasons for not having health insurance 
other than Medicare. "hat ,",ere (SH's/y ou r) reasons for not having 
any private health insurance? 
INTERVIEWER: IF INSURANCE COVERAGE 1S r·!ENTlONED, PROBE FOR TYPE. 
IF PRIVATE COVERAGE, CORRECT Q.15 ~ND GO TO Q.l7. 
(CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) 
(1) CAN -r AFFORD ANY 
(2) MEDICARE WAS ENOUGH 
0) IlAD MEDICAID 
(4) HAD VETERAN'S BENEFITS 
(5) COULDN -r FIND POLICY DESIRED 
(6) REFUSED/DENIED/CANCELLED BY INS. CO. 
(7) DISSATISFIED WITH PREVIOUS INSURANCE 
(8) COVERAGE ENDED WITH PREVo JOB/RETIREMENT 
(9) DIDN -r NEED INSURANCE 
<0) OTHER [specifyj: ______________________________________ __ 
(98) DON -r KNOW 
*** goto 20 *** 
>17( Ho,", many different private health insurance policies did (SM/you) 
have just before (he/she/you) enrolled in (AlIP NAME)? 
) 17 a< 
(IF MORE THAN 4, ASK 17a. IF LESS, GO TO 1R) 
(98) DON'T KNOW [goto 20 j 
(SM/you) had (# FROM 17) health insurance policies before enroll-
ing in (AHP NAHE), is that correct? 
(1) YES [go lo t17 a) 
<0> NO (CORRECT 17) 
11 5 
11 6 
) 15 < Vttldt (W dS t he ndme o( the potic),/ we re the Odmes o f the po li c ies) thdt ( SM) wds/.,ou wer e ) we r e co"e red 
b) Ju,t befo r e (he/she/you) enrolled I n (AHP NAME)? 
ItH ERVIE"ER : ~ITE POLICIES IlELOW . IF HORE THAN 4 POLI CIES, WHITE FIR S T 4 ONL Y. 
d. IF ONLY ONE POLICY MENTIONED : I'd llke t o . ,k , ome more dbout this poli c y. 
b . IF MORE THAN ONE POLlCY I£NTIONED: FIrs t , l e t" tolk dbout the POLlCY " po li cy . (Ne x t, l e t" 
tdl k dbo ut the (POLICY '2/' ) /64) po ll cy. ) 
) 18 d( Wd' t h is pollcy obtdlned 
through d group such dS dI1 
emplo)er, d union, or d 
senIor citizens' associa-
tlon, or did yOU obtdln 
this pollcy dIrectly fr"'" dI\ 
insurance ~ent or co.p.any? 
) 18b( Through whdt kInd of group 
Wd' this policy obtdined? 
(CIRCLE ONLY ONE) 
POLICY 11 
(1 ) CROUP (ASK 18b) 
(2) DIRECTLY FROM INSlJI-
ANCE AGENT OR COHP,t,NY 
[goto 18c) 
(8) DON'T KNOW [goto l8c) 
(1) SENIOR CITIZEN'S GROlJ' 
<2) SM'S EMPLOYER 
0) SM'S ~ION 
(4 ) SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER 
( 5 ) SPOUSE' S ~ION 
POLICY '2 
( 1) CROlJ' (,t,SK 18b ) 
(2 ) OIRECTL Y FROM INSlJI-
,l,NCE ,t,CENT OR COMP,t,NY 
[goto 18c) 
(8) DON'T KNOW [goto 18c) 
(1) SENIOR CITIZEN'S GROlJ' 
<2) SM'S EMPLOYER 
0 ) SM'S UNION 
( 4 ) SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER 
( 5 ) SPOUSE' S UNION 
(6) RELlCIOUS/FR,t,TERWoL GROUP ( 6 ) RELlCIOUS/FR,t,TERWoL GROlJ' 
(7) OTHER (SPECIFY: (7) OTHER (SPECIFY : 
-----------) ) 
( 8 ) DON'T KNOW 
) 18c< Wd' thl' hedlth Insurdnce ( 1) YES [goto 18e] 
po li c y ,pectrIcdily designed 
t o PdY fo r medico I e xpenses ( 0) NO 
no t Pd Id for by MedICdre? 
Th ese pollc1e s dre sometimes ( 8 ) DON'T KNOW 
cdl l ed "Medl c dre supplemental" 
or "Hed i e dre cumpl1men t dry. tI 
) 18d < We' d llke to know whether 
th is pollcy WdS d "major 
medi c al" pollc)" that 1$0, " 
he alth insurance pollc)' that 
pdld some per centdge of the 
medlcdi costs dfter «SM) 
pd ld (his/her/your) "",dIed! 
ex pe nses up to the dmount 
of the deductIble . WdS thIs 
d "mdJor medlcdl" po llc)'? 
>18e< INTERVIEWER: REFER TO Q.7 
FOR MNII T,t,L ST,t,TUS. 
Old (SH/y ou) (or (his/he r/ 
) our) spo use) p~r dny pdrt 
o f the premium for this 
poll c y? 
( 1) YES 
( 0 ) NO 
( 8 ) DON'T KNOW 
( 1) YES 
( 0 ) NO 
( d ) DOH' r KNOW 
(CO TO 180, 
POLlCY Il 
OR Q.19) 
( 8 ) DON ' T KNOW 
( 1) YES [ go t o l ~e ] 
( 0 ) NO 
( 8 ) DON ' T KHOW 
(1) YES 
( 0 ) NO 
<8) DOU' T KII OW 
< 1) YES 
(0) NO 
< ~ ) DOll ' T KIIOW 
(CO TO I R. , 
POLl CY IJ 
OH O. I ~I 
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POL I CY '3 POLlCY '4 
(I> IJ\OUP (ASK 18b) ( I> IJ\OUP (ASK 18b) 
(2) DIRECTLY FROH IHSUR- (2) DIRECTLY FROH INSUH-
AHCE AGENT OR CDHPAHY AHCE AGENT OR COHPAHY 
[goto 18c] [goto 18c] 
( 8) DON ' T KNOW [goto 18cl ( 8) DON ' T KNOW [goto 18c) 
(I> SENIOR CITIZEN'S GRO~ ( 1) SENIOR CI TlIEN' S GROUP 
( 2 ) SH'S Et'i'LOYER (2) SII'S EMPLOYER 
0) SII ' S UNION 0 ) SII'S UNION 
( 4 ) SPOUSE'S EHPLOYER ( 4 ) SPOUSE'S EHPLOYER 
( 5 ) SPOUSE'S UHION ( 5) SPOUSE'S UNION 
(6) RELIGIOUS/FRATERNAL GRO~ (6) RELIGIOUS/FAA TERNAl CROUP 
(7) OTHER (SPECIFY : ( 7 ) OTHER (SPECIFY: 
(8) DON'T KNOW ( 8) DON'T KNOW 
<1> YES [goto 18e] (1) YES [goto 18e) 
(0) I'IJ (0) I'IJ 
(~> DON ' r KNOW ( 8 ) DOH'T KNOW 
(1) YES (1) YES 
(0) 110 (0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW ( 8 ) DON'T KNOW 
<1> yES ( I> YES 
( U" ,~o <0> NO 
( 8;., DO N'r KNOW (8) DON'T KtKlW 
(CO TO l Sd , (CO TO Q. 19 ) 
POL ICY '4 
OH 0 .1 9 ) 
U 8 
>19 ( INTERVIEWER: CHECK ,I OF POLICIES FROH Q . 17 
Now I am going to read a list of items that are sometimes cove r ed 
by insurance policies. Please tell me which were cover e d by t he 
private insurance polic(y/ies) that we have been talking a bout. 
Dental? 
( 1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON "r KNOW 
>19 b ( Prescription drug? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
( 8 ) DON "r KNOW 
>19c( Private nursing or home health care? 
(1) YES 
(0 ) NO 
(8) DON "r KNOW 
>19d ( Ey eglasses? 
( 1) YES 
(0 ) NO 
(8) DON"r KNOW 
)20x( INTERV IEI<ER: CHECK CONTACT SIIEET: IF S lIE EQUALS ( 0 1) , 
CALIFORNIA , GO TO 20c. 
>20< Jus t before (SI1/you) pined (AHP NAHE), (was (he/she) / were you) 
covered by any of the following government health benefit plans ... 
)20c< 
)20b< 
>2 1 < 
Hedicaid? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<8) DON"1" !<NOW 
••• [goto 20b) ••• 
Just before (SM/you) pined (AHP NAME), (was (he/she)/were you) 
covered by any of the following government health benefit plans ••. 
Med iCal? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<8) DON"1" !<NOW 
Veteran's Administration or another military health plan, such 
as CHAMPUS or CHAMPVA? 
IF YES, ASK IF VA OR OTHER . 
<1> YES, VETERAN'S ADHINISTRATION 
(2) YES, OTHER 
0 ) YES, BOTH 
<0) NO 
<8) DON "1" !<NOW 
The next few questions are about the medical care (S:·I/you) 
received before enrolling in (AMP NN-IE). 
Before (SH/you) enrolled in (AHP NAlIE), was there a 
particular doctor's office, clinic, health center, or other place 
that (he/she/you) usually went to if «he/she) was/you were) sick 
or needed advice about (his/h"r/your) health? 
<1> YES [goto 23) 
<0) NO 
<!l> DON'T KNO\, (go to 36) 
11 9 
)22( People have different reasons f o r not having a usual place for 
medical care. In (SM's/your) case, what was (his/her/your) main 
reason for not having a usual place for medical care before 
(he/sh e /y ou) joined (AIlP NAME)? 
PROBE FOR ONE HAIN REASON. 
(1) RARELY OR NEVER GOT SICK 
(2) 01 ON "I' LIKE TO GO TO DOCTOR 
(3) WENT TO DIFFERENT PLACES/DOCTORS FOR DIFFERENT HEALTH PROBLEMS 
(4) REGULAR CARE COST TOO MUCH 
(5) DlDN"I' KNOW WHERE TO GO FOR CARE 
(6) DIDN"I' HAVE TIME TO GO FOR CARE 
(7) OTHER [speclly]: ____________________________________________ ___ 
(8) DON "I' KNOW 
••• [goto 36] ••• 
)23( What was the name of the place where (SH/you) went fo r health 
care? 
) t 24( INTERVIEWER CHECK: IF Q.4 IS (0), (I.E., SM CANCELLED, JOINED 
ANOTHER HMO). GO TO 24aa. 
)24( Was (NAHE FROM 23) the same place that (SH/you) currently (goes / 
go) to as a member of (AlIP NMlE)? 
(1) YES [goto 25] 
( 0 ) NO 
(8) DON "I' KNOW 
**. [go to 24a] *** 
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>2 4aa < Was (NAME FROM 2J) the same place that (S~I/you) went to as a 
member of (AMP NAME)? 
>24a< 
<1> YES [goto 25] 
<0> NO 
<8> DON'T KNOW 
(lihat type of place 1s/\~here did (SM/you) see) (NAME FROM 2J)? 
(Is /W as) it 
<1> a doctor's office, including group practice and doctor's clinic, 
<2> a hospital outpatient clinic, 
<J> a hospital emergency room, 
<4> a pu blic health department clinic or neighborhood health center, 
<5> a company or industry clinic, 
<6> (his/her/your) home, 
<7> some other type of place [specify]: 
<8> 0 r an HMO or oth er prepaid health plan? 
>25< Was there a particular medical person whom (SH/you) usually saw 
when (he/she/you) went to (NAME FROH 2J)? 
<1> YES [goto 27] 
<0> NO 
<8> DON'T KNOW 
>26< Would (SM/you) have preferred to see the same (doctor/person) on 
(his/her/your) visits there, or didn't it matter? 
(1) WOULD HAVE PREFERRED SAl'IE PERSON 
<0> [) I DN 'T ~IATTER 
<3> DON'r KNOW 
,.,.,. (goto t27 J ,.,.,. 
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)2 7( How important was it to (SM/you) to usually see the same (doctor / 
person) there, as opposed to seeing different (doctors/people)? 
Would you say it was 
)t27 ( 
<1> Very important, 
(2) somewhat important, 
<3) or not important at all? 
(8) DON'l' KNOW 
INTERVIEWER CHECK: IF Q.24a IS <6>, OR IF SAMPLE MEMBER SEES 
A OOCTOR IN A NURSING HOME, GO TO Q.34. 
)28( When (SM/you) went to (NAME FROM 23), how did (he/she/you) 
usually get there? 
(1) WALK 
(2) PUBLIC BUS 
0) DRIVE SELF 
<4) TAXI 
<5) TRANSPORTATION PROVIDED BY CLINIC (BUS, VAN, ETC.) 
<6) RIDE W ITil FRIEND OR RELATIVE 
<7) OTHER (specifyj:, ________________________________________________ _ 
<8) DON'l' KNOW 
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)29 ( 
) 29 a( 
Abo u t how long did it usually take (him / her/you) to get th e re? 
INTERVIEWER : ROUND TO NEAREST MINUTE 
----------------------------------------
1/4 HOUR 
- 15 MINUTES 
1/2 HOUR 
- 30 MINUTES 
3/4 HOUR 
- 45 MINUTES 
1 IlOUR 
- 60 MINUTES 
1-1/4 HOURS- 75 MINUTES 
1-1/2 HOURS- 90 MINUTES 
1-3/4 HOURS- 105 MINUTES 
2 IDURS 
- 120 MINUTES 
2-1/2 HOURS- 150 MINUTES 
3 IDURS 
- 180 MINUTES 
MINUTES (IF MORE TIIAN 120, ASK 29a. IF NOT, 
GOTO 30) 
(998 ) DON'T KNOW [goto 30] 
It usually takes two hours or more to get to (NAME FROM 23), ~ 
that correct? 
(I ) YES [goto 30] 
( 0 ) NO (CORRECT 29) 
>30( Did (S H/you) usually have an appointment ahead of time wh e n 
(he/she/you) went there or did (he/she/you) jJst walk in? 
( 1) APPOINTMENT 
( 2) WALK IN [goto 33] 
0 ) SO~IETH!ES APPOINTMENT, SOMETIMES WALK IN 
( 8 ) DON'T KNOW[goto 33) 
>32 ( No t counting emergencies, how ma ny d a ys did (SM/you) usually 
hav e t o wait be tween the time (he/ s he/you) wanted an appoint ment 
at (NANE FROM 23) and the day of (his /her/your) appointment ? 
(00) SAl'IE DAY 
DAYS (IF ~!ORE THAN 30, AS K J2a. IF NOT, GOTO 33) 
(98) DON'T KNOW (go to 3J I 
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)32a< ( He / She/You) usually had to wait a month or more betwe en the t ime 
(h e/ sh e / you) wanted an appointment and the day of (his/her/ you r) 
a ppo intmen t . Is that correct? 
<1) YE S [goto 33] 
<0 ) NO (CORRECT 32) 
)33 < After (SM/you) arrived at (NAME FROM 23), how long did (he/she/ 
you) usually wait (past (his/ht<r/you) scheduled appointment time) 
to see th e (doctor/medical person)? 
)33a< 
1/4 HOUR - 15 MINUTES 
1/2 HOUR - 30 MINUTES 
3/4 !lOUR - 45 MINUTES 
1 lDUR - 60 HlNUTES 
1-1/4 HOURS- 75 MINUTES 
1-1/2 HOURS- 90 MINUTES 
1-3/4 HOURS- 105 MINUTES 
2 OOURS - 120 MINUTES 
2-1/2 HOURS- 150 MINUTES 
3 lDURS - 180 MINUTES 
(IF MORE THAN 120, AS K 33a. IF NOT, GOTO 34) 
<998) DON'T KNOW [goto 34] 
( He /S he/You) usually waited more than 2 hours to see th e (d oc tor / 
medica l person ) at (NAME FROM 23), is th a t correc t? 
<1) YES [goto 34J 
<0 ) NO (correct 33) 
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)34( Now 1 would like to know how you would rate various aspects of the 
care (S~t/you) received at (NAME FRON 23) befllre (he/she/you) Fin ed 
(AllP NAME) . 1 am going to read you a list of factors 
)34a ( 
)34 b( 
and for each one 1 'd like you to tell me whether you think that 
place was excellent, good, fair, or poor with respect to that 
factor. 
First, how would you rate the professional competence of the 
physicians and other medical persons who work there? Would you 
say it was excellent, good, fair, or poor? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(5) NO OPINION 
What about the willingness of doctors to discuss and explain 
(his/her/your) medical problems? Would you rate it as excellent, 
good, fair or poor? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
<2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
( 4) POOR 
<5) NO OPINION 
Wha t about courtesy and consideration of staff? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(5) NO OPINION 
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) 34c( 
)34d( 
)34e( 
Availability of care in an emergency? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(5) NEVER HAD EMERGENCY 
(6) NO OPINION 
The next questions are about how convenient it was for (SM/you) 
to get an appointment and travel to the doctor's office? 
First, how convenient was it for (SM/you) to get to (NAME FROM 
23) from where (he/she/you) lived? Was it • 
(1) very convenient, 
(2) somewhat convenient, 
(3) somewhat inconvenient, or 
(4) very inconvenient? 
(5) NO OPINION 
How convenient were the appointmtonts (SM was/you were) given? 
Were they 
(1) very convenient, 
(2) somewhat convenient, 
(3) somewhat inconvenient, or 
(4) very inconvenient? 
(5) NO OPINION 
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>34ea ( Nex t, thin k a bo ut the am ount o f tim e s pent waitin g t o see a 
med ic al pe r so n af te r (he/she/you) arri ved a t th e offic e. Wa s th is 
a mo u n t o f tim e . .• 
(1) v e r y r e asona ble, 
(2) somewhat reasonable, 
0) somewhat unreasonable, or 
( 4) very unreasonable? 
(5) NO OPINION 
) 34 f ( Nex t, think ab out fiUng claims. Did (SM/ you) complete the 
paperwork to file claims, did the (doc tor's/medical) office do it 
for (him/he r /you), or did someone else help (him/her/you) file the 
c I a im s? 
( i ) DID BY SELF 
(2) DOCTOR'S OFFICE DID [goto 34g] 
( 3) SOMEO NE ELSE DID [goto 34g] 
( 4) NO EXPERIENCE FILING CLAIMS [go t o 34 g ] 
) 34 f a( Did ( SH / you) find filing c laims t o be 
(1) v e ry e a s y . 
( 2 ) s ome wha t easy , 
0) s o me wh a t d if f icult, or 
(4) v e r y dif f icult? 
(5) NO OPI NION 
127 
) 34 g( ~o w. think about the costs (SM/you) incurred when «he/she) wa s t 
you were) at (NAt·IE FROM 23) before (he/she/you) joined (AHP 
NAME). 
Were these costs ••• 
( 1 ) ver y reasonable, 
( 2 ) s o mewhat reasonable, 
( 3 ) somewhat unreasonable, 
( 4) very unreasonable, or 
( 5) did (SM/name) not incur any costs? 
(6) NO OPINION 
) 35 ( Still thinking about where (SM/name) got care before joining 
(AHP NAME) on (ENROLLMENT DATE), how satisfied (was (he/she)/w e re 
you) with that care? Would you say. 
( i ) Very satisfied, 
(2) somewhat sat isfied, 
(3) somewhat dissatisfied, 
( 4 ) or very dissatisfied? 
(8) DON"r KNOW 
» ) (,( The next questio ns are about Medicare. Be fore (SM/you) enroll-
ed in ( AHP NAME), did (he/she/you) have a n y problems or 
dis a pp ointments with Medicare? 
( 1) YES 
(0 ) NO [goto 40] 
(3) NO PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH ~ffiDICARE [goto 40 ] 
(8) DON'T KNO\I [goto 40] 
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)3 7( What were those problems? 
(CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) 
(1) OUT OF POCKET COSTS TOO HIGH 
(2) DELAYS IN GETTING A MEDICARE CARD 
0) PAPERIJ ORK ASSOCIATED IJ /FILING CLAH!S 
<4> DELAYS IN RECEIVING PAYMENTS 
<5) DESIRED SERVICES NOT COVERED (ASK 38) 
<6) UNCERTAIN ABOUT SERVICES COVERED 
<7> DIFFICULTIES GETTING INFORMATION 
<0> OTHER [specUy): ____________________________________ __ 
<8> DON'T KNOW [goto 40) 
IN TERV IEWER CHECK: IF <5> CIRCLED, ASK 38. 
IF <7> CIRCLED, ASK 39. 
IF NOT, GO TO 40. 
)38( What type of service or treatment were not covered? 
(CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) 
(1) PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
(2) VISION CARE 
0) DENTAL CARE 
(4) ROUTINE FOOT CARE 
(5) SERVICES OF A CHIROPRACTOR 
( 6) SERVICES OF A PSYCHIATRIST/PSYCHOLOGIST/OTHER MENTAL HEALTH PROF. 
(7) PRIVATE DUTY NURSING 
(8) NURS ING HOtlE CARE 
(9) HOMEMAKER SERV ICES 
<0) OTHER [s pec ify J: ___________________ _ 
<98) DON'T KNOIJ [goto 39J 
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)39 ( What did (SI·I/you) not get enough information on? 
(CIRCLE ALL TIlAT APPLY) 
( 1) PREMIUM COSTS 
(2) OUT-Of-POCKET COSTS 
(3) CONDITIONS COVERED/SERVICES PROVIDED 
(4) CHOICE Of PROVIDERS 
(5) OTHER (specify]: __________________________________ ___ 
(8) DON'T !(NOW (goto 40) 
)40( INTERVIEWER: CHECK Q.7 fOR HARITAL STATUS: 
)40aa( 
Before you joined (AHP NAllE) had (he/she/you) (or (his/her/your) 
spouse) ever belonged to another HMO or other prepaid health plan ? 
PROBE If NECESSARY: Remember, an HMO or other prepaid health pla n 
provides certain medical services to its members as needed, in 
exchang e for fixed premium payments. 
( 1) YES 
(0) NO (goto 40) 
(8) DON'T !(NOW (goto 40) 
What was th e name of this HMO (or prepaid health plan)? 
(8 ) DON'T !(NOW [goto 40b) 
INTERVIEWER, CHECK CONTACT SHEET: 
if plan is 011, go to oxOl if plan is 071, goto ox09 
if plan is 012, goto ox02 if plan is 072, goto oxl0 
if plan is 021, goto ox03 if plan is 061, goto oxll 
if plan is 022, goto ox04 if plan is 062, gO[O ox12 
if plan is 023, goto oxOS if pla n is 091, goto o x13 
if plan is 024, goto ox06 if plan is 021 , goto ox l4 
if plan is 102, goto ox07 if plan is 041, goto oxlS 
if plan is lU3, goto ox08 if plan is 03l, go t o ox16 
if pla n is 08 1, goto ox l l 
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>oxOl( (1) TIlE GOlDEN AGE PLAN AT UNITED HEALTH PLAN OR WATTS FOUNDATI Or. 
(0) OTHER [specify]:, ____________________________________ ___ 
••• [goto 40b] ••• 
>ox02( (1) TIlE SENIOR PLAN AT FHP 
(0) OTHER [specliy]: __________________________________ ___ 
••• [gOto 40b] ••• 
>ox03( (1) THE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAM AT AV-MED HEALTH PLAN. INC. 
(2) MEDICARE PLUS AT COMPREHENSIVE AMERICAN CARE OR CAC 
(3) THE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAM AT HEALTH AMERICA 
(4) TIlE GOLD PLUS PLAN AT INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OR IMC 
(5) SOUTH FLORIDA GROUP HEALTH 
(0) OTHE R [s p ec liy] : ____________________________________ ___ 
••• [goto 40b] ••• 
>ox04( (1) TIlE SPECIAL NEDICARE PROGRAM AT AV-HED llEALTH PLAN. INC . 
( 2 ) THE SPECIAL t1EDICARE PROGRAM AT HEALTH AMERICA 
0 ) TIlE GOLD PLUS PLAN AT INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OR HIC 
(4) SOUTH FLORIDA GROUP HEALTH 
(0) OT HER [s pee liy ) : ____________________________________ ___ 
••• [goto 40b] ... 
>ox05 ( ( 1) TIlE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAM AT AV-MED HEALTH PLAN. INC. 
(2) MEDICARE PLUS AT CONPREHENSIVE AHERICAN CARE OR CAC 
(3) TIlE GOLD PLUS PLAN AT INTERNATIO NAL ~1El) ICAL CENTER Ot{ I~IC 
(4) SOUTH FLORIDA GROUP HEALTH 
(0) OT HER [s p ee if y ) : ____________________________________ ___ 
•• * [goto 40b] *** 
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)ox06< (1) TIlE SPECIAL HEDICARE PROGRAH AT AV-NED HEALTIl PLAN, I NCo 
<2> MEDICARE PLUS AT COHPREHENSIVE ANERICAN CARE OR CAC 
0 ) TIlE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAN AT HEALTH AN ERI CA 
( 4 ) SOUTH FLORIDA GROUP HEALTH 
(0 ) OTHER [s pecify J : _________________ _ 
*** [goto 40b] *** 
) ox07 ( (1) GROUP HEALorn PLAN OF SE MICHIGAN 
(2) SENIOR PLUS OFFERED THROUGH PREFERRED HEALTH PLAN/ 
HENTRY FORD HEALTH CARE CORPORATION 
(0) OTHER [specify J : _________________ _ 
*** [goto 40b] *** 
) oxOS( (1) GROUP HEALTH PLAN OF SE MICHIGAN 
(2) HEALTII CARE NETWORK'S MEDICARE PLUS PROGRAH 
(0) OTHER [specifyj:o __________________ _ 
*** [goto 40b] *** 
)ox09< <1) FALLON COMMUNITY HEALTH PLAN'S SENIOR CARE 
<0) OTHER [specUy]: ________________________ ___ 
*** [goto 40b] *** 
)o xlO < <1> CENTRAL MASS HEALTH CARE'S STAY WELL PLUS PROGRAH 
<0 ) OTH E R [s p ecify] : ________________________ _ 
*** [goto 40b] *** 
)ox 1l < ( 1) TIlE ~IED[CAL EAST COlo\l1UNITY llEALTl1 PLAN SENI OR PLAN 
(0) 0 TilE R (s P <!c ify ] : ___________________________________ _ 
*** (goto 40 b] *** 
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>ox 12 < 
>o xlJ < 
>ox14< 
>oxlS < 
>ox16< 
>ox 17< 
>40 b< 
<1 > HEALTHWAY'S SENIOR PLAN 
<0> OTHER [s pecify]: 
*** [goto 40b] *** 
<0> OTHER [specify] : 
*** [goto 40b] *** 
<0> OTHER [specify] : 
*** [goto 40b] *** 
<0> OTHER [s pecify]: 
*** [goto 40 b] *** 
<0> OTHER [s pecify]: 
*** [goto 40b] *** 
<0> OTHER [specify]: 
(Was S~/Were you) involved in the decision to (join/enroll (SN) in) 
(AlIP NAME) in (ENROLLHENT DATE), or was the decision made en tir e l y 
by someone else? 
<1> SAMPLE MEMBER INVOLVED [goto 40e] 
<2> PROXY RESPONDENT INVOLVEU [goto 40e] 
<2> DECISION HADE BY OTHERS 
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)40d( 
)40e< 
)41a< 
Who was primarily responsible for the decision to enroll 
(SM/name) in (A1IP NA.'iE)? 
PROBE FOR RELATlONSlliP TO SAMPLE MEMBER. 
(CIRCLE ONLY ONE) 
<1) SPOUSE OF SAMPLE MEMBER 
<2) RELATIVE OF SAMPLE MEMBER 
<3) PAID CAREGIVER 
<4) MEDICAL PERSON 
<5) SOCIAL WORKER 
<6) OTHER [specily): ______________________________________ _ 
<8) DON'T KNOW 
*** [goto 51a) *** 
Since (SM was/you were) involved in the decision to (enroll 
in/ join) (AlIP NAME), please answer the following questions for 
(him/her/yourself). (If you don't know what (his/her) answer 
wou Id be, jus t let me know.) 
Was (SM 's/your) physician a member of (AHP NAl1E) when 
«he/she) was/you) enrolled? 
(1) YES 
<0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
)42( Now I'd like you to th ink of all the reasons (SM/you) considered 
when deciding to (enroll/enroll SM in/join) (AHP NAME). Of all the 
reasons (he/she/you) considered, what was the most important reason 
why «he/she) enrolled/(he/she) was enrolled/you decided too 
en roll) in (AHP NANE)? 
(1) MENTION OF LOW ER COST [guto 42a] 
(2) MENTION OF tlORE OR BETTER BENEFITS. SERVICES OR COV!::K,\CE [go lo 42b] 
0) OTHER [spec ify]: 
[g o l u 42cJ 
( 8) DON'T KNOI, [goto 45] 
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>42a< 
>42b< 
>42c< 
)4Zd< 
Could you please tell me specifically wh a t «he/she) was/you 
wer e) getting for less cost at (AHP NAME)? 
*** GO TO 4Zc *** 
Could you please tell me specifically what benefits/services/ 
coverages were better at (AHP NAME)? 
Were there any other reasons why «he/she) decided to enroll 
in/(he/she) was enrolled m/you pined) (AHP NAHE)? 
(CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) 
<1) MENTION OF LOWER COST [goto 42d) 
<2) MENTION OF MORE OR BETTER BENEFITS, SERVICES OR COVERAGE [goto 42e] 
0> OTHER [s p ecity] : ___________________ _ 
<0) NO [go to 45] 
Could you please tell me specifically what «he/she) was/you 
we re) getting for less cost at (AHP NA1-IE)? 
[goto 42f] 
_________________________________________________________ [goto 42f) 
Could you pleas e tell me specifically what benefits/services/ 
co verages we re better at (AlIP NAME)? 
___________________________ [ go t o 42f ) 
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) 42f < 
)42g< 
) 42h( 
Were there any other reasons why «he/she) decided to enroll 
in/the/she) was enrolled in/you pined) (AHP NAHE)? 
(CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) 
(1) MENTION OF LOWER COST {goto 42g] 
(2) MENTION OF MORE OR BETTER BENEFITS, SERVICES OR COVERAGE (gOtO 42h] 
0) OTHER {specify] : ___________________ _ 
(0) NO (goto 45] 
Could you please tell me specifically what «(he/she) was/you 
were) getting for less cost at (AHP NAME)? 
{goto 45] 
____________________________________________ {goto 45] 
Could you please tell me specifically what benefits/services/ 
coverages were better at (AHP NAME)? 
__________________________________________________ {goto 451 
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CURRENT ENROLUIENT 
(NO Q's 43-44 THIS VERSION) 
)45( When (SM/you) joined (AHP NAME), did (he/she/you) expec c (his/ 
her/your) overall cost for health care to be more than, l ess chan, 
or about the same as costs would have been if (he/she /you) had not 
joined (AHP NAME)? 
(1) HORE 
(2) ABOUT TUE SAME 
() LESS 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
)46 ( When (SM/name) joined (AHP NAME), did (he/she/you) expect that the 
quality of medical care (he/she/you) would receive there would be 
better, worse, or about the same as the medical care (he/she/you) 
had been getting? 
(1) BETTER 
(2) ABOUT THE SAME 
() WORSE 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
)47( lie are very interested in knowing how (h e /she/you) learned about 
(AIIP NAME) before (SM/you) joined in (ENROLLMENT DATE). I am 
going to read a list of possible informatlon sources and I'd Uke 
you to tell me, for each one, whether or not (he/she/you) learned 
about the program in this way before (SM/you) joined. 
Did a friend or relative tell (SM/you) about the progr a m? 
( 1) YES 
(0) NO [goto 47 b] 
(8) DON'T KNOW [goto 47b) 
)47 a< Is this friend or relative a memb e r of (AHP NAME)? 
0) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOll 
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)47 b< 
)47 c< 
Did (SH/you) hear about it from a doctor, nurse, pharmacist or 
other medical person? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
(8) DON 'I' KNOW 
Did (he/she/you) hear about the program from literature sent to 
(him/her/you) through the mail which (he/she/you) did not request? 
<1> YES 
(0) NO [goto 47d) 
( 8) DON'T KNOW [goto 47 d] 
)43< Do you recall who sent (St1/you) the literature? 
)4 7 d < 
)47 e< 
<1) YES, (AHP NAME) 
(2) YES, MEDICARE, SOCIAL SECURITY, OR OTHER FEDERAL AGENCY 
0) YES, OTHER [specify]: _______________ _ 
<4) DON'I' RECALL 
(Did (SM/you) hear about (AHP NAME) from a speaker at a me e ting of 
a church, club, or community organization? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<8) DOtl'I' KNOW 
Did (SM/you) hear about it through a newspaper advertisement? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<Ii) DON 'I' KNO\, 
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)47 f < 
)47 g< 
)47h( 
)47 i< 
)47 j < 
) 47 k ( 
through a newspaper story? 
<1> YES 
<0 ) NO 
<8) DON >r KNOW 
Through a radio commercial? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
(8) DON >r KNOW 
Through radio news or a radio program? 
(1) YES 
<0) NO 
<8) DON >r KNo\~ 
Through a TV commercial? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<8) 0011 >r KNOW 
Through TV news or a TV program? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
(8) DON >r KNOW 
In deciding to (enroll SH in/ join) (AlIP NAME) , did you call. o r 
write (AHP N,\ME) to request information? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<8) DON'T KNOW 
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)47 kb( In decid ing t o (enroll SM in/ join) (AHP NAl1E) did you attend an 
open house there? 
)471( 
)47 oo( 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON"1' KNOI, 
Did (SH/you) visit (AHP NAME) to talk with a staff member about 
joining, other than at a group meeting? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON"1' KNOW 
Did a representative of (AHP NAltE) visit (him/her/you) in 
(his/her/your) home? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON"1' KNOW 
)49( Which of the sources you mentioned, influenced (SM/ you) th e most 
in deciding t o (enroll SH in/join) (AlIP NAME)? 
(CIRCLE ONLY ONE) 
( I) FRIEND OR RELATIVE (7) RADIO COMMERCIAL 
(2) HEDICAL PERSON (8) RADIO NEWS/PROGRAM 
0) LITERATURE ( 9) TV COMMERCIAL 
(4) SPEAKER (10) TV NEWS/PROCRAJI 
( 5 ) NEWSPAPER AD ( 11 ) OPEN IlOUSE 
(6) NEWSPAPER STORY (911) DON"1' KNOW 
I NTE IlV IEWER: CIlE CK PREY 10US SER IES TO r-tAI:E SURE THE ITHI CIRC LED 
WAS MENTLONEl) ABOVE. 
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)50( Before (SH/you) decided t o (enroll SH in/join) (AHP NAME), 
did (he /she/you) hear about or get information on any other Hl10s 
or other prepaid health plans? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO [goto 51aJ 
(B) DON'T KNOW [goto 51aJ 
)50a( Which HMOs or prepaid health plans did (he/she/you) hear of or get 
information about? 
(B) DON'T KNOW [goto 50bJ 
INTERV lEW ER: CHECK CONTACT SHEET: 
if plan is 011, goto oyOl if plan is 071, goto oy09 
if plan is 012, goto oy02 if plan is 072, goto oylO 
if plan is 021, goto oy03 if plan is 061, goto oyll 
if plan is 022, goto oy04 if plan is 062, goto oy12 
if plan 1s 023, go to oy05 if plan is 091 , goto oy13 
if plan is 024, go to oy06 if plan is 021, goto oy14 
if plan is 102, go t o oy07 if plan is 041 , goto oy15 
if plan is 103, goto oyOB if plan is 031, goto oy16 
if plan is OB1, goto oy17 
)oyO l ( (1) TIiE GOLDEN AGE PLAN AT UNITED HEALTH PLAN OR WATTS FOUNDATI ON 
(0) OTHER [spec i f y J: ____________________________________ _ 
*** [goto 50bJ *** 
)oy02 ( (1) THE SENIOR PLAN AT FlIP 
(0) OTHER [specify]: __________________________________ _ 
*** [got o SOb) .. * 
)oy03( (1) TIlE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAM AT AY-MED HEALTH PLAN, INC. 
(2) MEDICARE PLUS AT COMPREHENSIYE AMERICAN CARE OR CAC 
(3) THE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAM AT HEALTH AMERICA 
(4) TIlE GOLD PLUS PLAN AT INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OR HIC 
(5) SOUTH FLORIDA GROUP HEALTH 
(0) OTHER [specuy]: __________________________________ _ 
*** [goto SOb) *** 
)oy04( (1) THE SPECIAL ~lEDICARE PROGRAM AT AY-MED HEALTH PLAN, I NC. 
(2) THE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAM AT HEALTH AMERICA 
0) TME GOLD PLUS PLAN AT INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER OR INC 
(4) SOUTH FLORIDA GROUP HEALTH 
(0) OTll E R [s p ec Uy ): _______________________________ _ 
*** [goto SOb) *** 
)oyOS( (1) THE SPECIAL HEDICARE PROGRAM AT AY-MED HEALTH PLAN, lNC. 
(2) MEDICARE PLUS AT CONPREHENSIYE Al'IERICAN CARE OR CAC 
0) TIlE GOLD PLUS PLAN AT INTERNATIONAL tlEDICAL CENTER OR INC 
(4) SOUTH FLORIDA GROUP HEALTH 
(0) OT II ER [s p ec ify I: ___________________________ _ 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
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)oy06< 0 ) ruE SPECIAL NEDICARE PROGRAM AT AV-MED Ht:ALTH PLAN, INC. 
(2 ) MEDICARE PLUS AT COMPREHENSIVE AMERICAN CARE OR CAC 
0 ) THE SPECIAL MEDICARE PROGRAM AT HEALTH AHERICA 
<4) SOUTH FLORIDA GROUP HEALTH 
( 0 ) OTHt:R [specliy]: __________________________________ _ 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
) oy07< ( 1) GROUP HEALTH PLAN OF SE MICHIGAN 
(2) SENIOR PLUS OFFEIlliD THROUGH PREFERRED HEALTH PLAN / 
HENTRY FORD HEALTH CARE CORPORATION 
( 0 ) OTHER [specliy]: __________________________________ _ 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
)oy08< ( 1 ) GROUP HEALTH PLAN OF SE MICHIGAN 
(2 ) HEALTH CARE NETWORK'S HEDICARE PLUS PROGRAM 
( 0 ) OTHER [specify]: __________________________________ _ 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
)uy09< <1> FALLON COMMUNITY llEALTH PLAN'S SE NIOR CARE 
(0 ) OTllE R [s p ec ify ] : ________________________________ _ 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
)oy l O< <1> CENTRAL HASS HEALTH CARE'S STAY \.I E: LL PLUS PROGRAM 
<0 ) OTHER [spec ify]: _____________________ ___ 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
)oy ll < <1> TILE HElJICAL EAST COMMUNITY HEALTH PLAN SENIOR PLAN 
(0) OTHE R [s pecliy]: ___________________ _ 
*** [go to SOb] *** 
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)"y12( 
) oy13 ( 
)oy14 < 
)oy lS < 
)oy 16< 
)oy17( 
)SO b( 
( 1) HEALTHWAY'S SENIOR PLAN 
(0) OTHER [specify]: 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
(a) OTHER [specify]: 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
<0) OTHER [specify 1: 
*** [goto SOb 1 *** 
<0) OTHER [specify]: 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
<0) OTHER [s pecify]: 
*** [goto SOb] *** 
<0) OTHER [specify] : 
Before (SH/you) joined (AHP NAME), did (he/she/you) compare (AHP 
NAt·IE) with any other plans by discussing those plans with a 
friend, relative, or doctor, requesting information, visiting, or 
read ing and comparing information about any another plans? 
( 1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
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)5 1a( 
)S1b( 
)Slc( 
) 51d ( 
) 52a( 
Now I am going to read some statements. Please tell me 
whether they are true or false for (SH/you). 
(He/She/ I) worr(ies/y) about (his/her/my) health mo re th an other 
people (his/her/my) age worry about their health. 
(1) TRUE 
(2) FALSE 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
(He/She/I) will do Fst about anythin8 to avoid going to the 
doctor. 
(1) TRUE 
(2) FALSE 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
When (SM is/I am) sick, (he/she/I) tr(ies/y) to keep it to 
(h !m/h er /my)self. 
(1) TRUE 
(2) FALSE 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
(SH/I) usually (goes/go) to the doctor as soon as (he/she/I) 
start(s) t o f e el bac!. 
(1) TRUE 
(2) FALSE 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
The next questions are about health problems (Sa/you) may have 
had or been bothered with in the last six months. In the last six 
months (has S~l/have you) had or been both e r e d by chest pain 
with exercise or exertion? 
( 1) '( ES 
(0) NO 
(3) DON "1' KNOW 
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)52 b< 
) 52c< 
)52 d < 
)52 e< 
)52 f< 
In th e las t six months, (has SrI/have you) had 
or been bothered with a cough with out f eve r which lasted at 
least three weeks? 
<1> YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOIJ 
In the last six months, (has (he/she)/have you) 
had or been bothered with a severe loss of eyesight? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
(In the last six months, (has (he/she)/have you) 
had or been bothered with) stiffness, pain or swelling 
of joints lasting more than two weeks? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
(In the last six months, (has (he/she)/have you) 
had or been both e red with) bad stomach cramps or pain? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
(In the last six months, (has (he/she)/have you) 
had or been bothered with) loose bowels (diarrhea)? 
( 1) YES 
(0) NO 
(I:l) DON'T KNOW 
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>52 g< 
>52h< 
>52i< 
)5lj< 
In the last six months, (has (he/she)/have you) 
had or b e en bothered with any, loss of consciousness, 
fainting spells, or pa ssing out? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<8) DON"r KNOW 
(In the last six months. (has (he/she)/have you) 
had or been bothered with) any problems with bleeding, 
other than nose bleed, not caused by an accident or injJry? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<8) DON"r KNOW 
(In the last six months, (has (he/she)/have you) 
had or been bothered with) shortness of breath with 
ligh t exercise or Ugh t work? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<3) DON"r KNOW 
(In the last six months, (has (he/she)/h a ve you) 
had or been bothered with) a weight loss of more 
than ten pounds unl"ss «he/she) was/you were) die ting? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO 
<8) DON"r KNOW 
)5J< When (SM/you) joined (AlIP NAME), (was (he/she)/were you) a wa r e of 
any health pr o blem for whic h (he/sh e /you) ex pect e d to ne ed ca r e ? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO [goto 57 J 
<3) DON 'T KNOW [goto 57 J 
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)54( Did (he/sh e/yo u ) think this problem might r equire a stay in the 
h osp it al? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO [go to 57] 
(3) DON'T KNOIJ [goto 57] 
) 55 ( Had (he/she/you) been putting off going into the hospital for this 
problem? 
(1) YES 
(0 ) NO [goto 57] 
(8) DON'T KNOW [go to 57] 
) 56( Why? 
(CIRCLE ONLY ONE) 
( I) WOULD COST TOO MUCH 
(2) AFRAID OF TREATMENT 
0) OTHER [specify]:, _________________ _ 
(4) EXPECTED TO GET BETTER CARE AT (AlIP NAME) 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
)57( The next few questions refer to th e past two weeks, 
that is, from (DATE 2 WEEKS AGO) through yesterday. 
During the past two weeks, were th ere any days when (SM/you) 
stayed in bed all or most of the day because of any illness or 
injury? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO [goto t59 ] 
(8) DON 'T KNOW [goto t59] 
)51l( During th" last two w""ks, h o w ma ny day s did (SN/you) sta y in bed 
a ll o r mos t of th e day? 
DAYS --- ) IF 14, GO TO 61. 
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)59( (Not counting the days in bed,) Were there any (other) days dUring 
the past two weeks that (SM/you) cut down on things that (he/she/ 
you) usually (does/do) because of illness or inj.HY? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO [goto 61] 
(8) DON'T [(NOW [goto 61] 
)60< (Again, not counting the days in bed) During the last two 
)t60< 
)60a< 
weeks, how many (other) days did (SN/you) cut down for as much as 
a day? 
DAYS 
INTERVIEWER CHECK: AMOUNT FROH Q. 58 -
AMOUNT FROM Q.60 -
TOTAL -
IF TOTAL IS ~~RE THAN 14, READ 60a. 
IF 14 OR LESS, GO TO 61. 
You said that (SM/you) spent (Al10UNT FRON 58) days in bed and 
(AMOUNT FROM 60) days that (S~I/you) cut down during the last two 
weeks. That adds to (TOTAL FROM t60). 
INTERVIEW ER: CORRECT ANSW ER TO Q. 58 TO CORRECT DAYS W BED. 
CORltECr ANS\JER TO Q.60 TO CORRECT DAYS CUT DOWN. 
WHEN CORRECTElJ, TOTAL FROtl t60 NU~T READ 14 OR LESS. 
)61< During the past 12 months, about how many days did illness or 
injury keep (SM/you) in bed all or most of the day? 
(Include the days in the past 2 weeks.) 
(Include the days while a p:ltient in a hospital.) 
DAYS [guto Tx60] 
(0-36 5) 
(998) DON'T KNOW (READ 61a) 
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>61a ( Wou ld you say 
(0) none, 
<1> 1-7 days, 
(2) 8-30 days, 
0) one to six months, (31-180 days) , o r 
<4) more than 6 months? 
<8> DON'l' KNOW 
*** [goto 62) *** 
)Tx60< INTERV IEWER CHECK: (A) TOTAL FROM t60 -
(B) ANOUNT FROM 61 -
IF (B) IS LESS THAN (A) READ A60a. 
IF THE SAME OR MORE, GO TO 62. 
>.\60a( You said that (SM/you) spent (TOTAL OF 60 AND 61) days in b ed 
during the past year; but before you said that (SM/you) h a d spent 
(AMOUNT FROM 53) days in bed du ring the pas t 2 weeks. 
the last two weeks, 
b ed during the last year? 
INT~RVIEWER: CORRECT Q.61 FOR TOTAL DAYS FOR YEAR. 
WilEN CORRECT, Q .61 MUST BE THE SAME OR HORE THAN Q . t60. 
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)62( The questions 1'111 going to ask now have to do with how (Sft/you) 
manage(s) with several routine daily actlvitit!s. For the purposes 
of this research study, we need to ask these questio ns for all 
respondents, regardless of how well they manage. When .. nswering 
these next few questions, please think about what (SH is/you 
>62 b( 
)62c( 
)62d( 
are) physically able to do, not necessarily what «he/she) does/ 
you do) do. 
First, can (SU/you) get to places out of walking distance without 
help, that is, can (he/she/you) travel atone on buses or taxis, or 
drive (his/her/your) own car? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON 'I' KNOW 
Assuming (SH has/you have) transportation. can (he/she/you) go 
shopping for groceries or clothes without help? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON 'I' KNOW 
(Is SH/Are you) physically able to prepare (his/her/your) OWIl 
meals (him/her/your)self? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DOIl'I' KNOW 
Can (he/she/you) do housework such as scrubbing the floor 
without help? 
(1) YES 
(0 ) NO 
(8) DON 'I' KNOW 
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>62 e ( 
)62f( 
If (he/she/you) had medicine to take, could (he/she/you) 
take it without h e lp, in the right dose at th e right t1me ? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
<8> DON" KNOW 
Can (he/she/you) handle (his/her/your) own money, such as 
writing checks and paying bills, without help? 
<1> YES 
<0> NO 
<8> DON" KNOW 
> tadd< INTERVIEWER CHECK : COUNT NUMBER OF <D's CIRCLED IN Qs.62-62F. 
>6Ja< 
>6Jb< 
IF LESS TItAN 5 <1>'s CIRCLED, ASK 63a. 
IF 5 OR MORE CIRCLED, GO TO 64. 
Can (SM/you) do the following without any help ••• 
a . dress and undress? 
PROBE: (c a n (he/she/you) put out clothes , dress and 
undress (hlm/her/your)self)? 
<1> YES 
<0> NO 
<8> DON" KNOW 
take care of (his/her/your) own appearance such 
as combing (h is/her/your) own hair (and sha ving)? 
(1) YES 
<0> NO 
(8) DON" KN OW 
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>6Jc ( 
>6Jd( 
>63e( 
>63 f ( 
feed (h im/ h er /you r )seU with no help? 
PROBE: eat? 
<1 > YES 
( 0 ) NO 
(8) DON "r KNOW 
get in and out of bed? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON "r KNOW 
take a tub bath or shower? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON "r KNOW 
(Does (he/she)/Do you) have trouble getting to the bathroom on 
time? 
YES 
NO 
(8) DO N"r KI<O\, 
>64( Before (SM/you) joined (AIlP NAME), when was the last time (he/ 
s:le/you) had a regu lar physical examination even though «he/ s he) 
wa s /you were) feeling all right and had no symptoms to chec k out ? 
READ CATEGORIES IF NECESSARY 
( 0 ) NEVER 
( 1) MOItE TIlAN 10 YEARS AGO 
( 2 ) BETW EEN 5 AND to YEARS AGO 
0 > BETW I:: EN AlJD 5 YEARS AGO 
(I, > LESS TItAN YEAI~ A~O 
(8) DON"r KN OW 
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>65( In general, would you say (SM's/your) health is excellent, good, 
fair or poor? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
(3) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
)66( Comparing (SH's/your) general health to other people (his/her/ 
your) own age, would you say (his/her/your) health is much 
better, better, about the same, worse, or much worse? 
(1) MUCH BETTER 
(2) BETTER 
(3) SAME 
(4) WORSE 
(5) HUCH WORSE 
(8) DON 'T KNo\~ 
>67( In the 12 months before (SM/you) j:>in.ed (AHP NAME), how mu ch did 
(he/she/you) spend for health care, counting doctor and hospital 
bills, dental care, and prescription drugs, but not counting what 
any insurance has paid or will pay and not counting insurance 
premiums--would you say ••• 
(0) noth ing. 
(1) less than 100 dollars, 
(2) from 100 to 500 dollars, 
( 3) or more than 500 dollars? 
(3) DON'T KNOW 
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)68 ( Now for a few general questions ••• 
At the time (SM/you) joined (AHP NAME) in (ENROLLMENT Dt.TE). (was 
(he/she)/were you) working at a 'pb for pay? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO [goto 70J 
(8) DON'T KNOW [goto 701 
)69( (Was (he/she)/Were you) working full-time or part-time? 
(1) FULL-TIME 
(2) PART-TIME 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
)70( Hhat is the highest grade or year of regular school that 
(SM/you) completed? 
GRADE 
(12) HIGH SCHOOL 
(14) SOI1£ COLLEGE. NO DEGREE 
(16) COLLEGE DEGREE 
(98) DON or KNOW 
)71( INTERVIEWER. CHECK Q.7 FOR MARITAL STATUS: 
(Does SH/Do you) (or (his/her/your) spouse) own (his/her/your/ 
their) own home? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DON'T KNOW 
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)72( What is (SM's/your) racial or ethnic b<lckground? 
READ CATEGORIES IF NECESSARY: 
( 1) White, 
( 2) Black, 
() American Indian or Alaskan native, [goto 74100] 
(4) or Asian or Pacific Islander? [goto 74100] 
<5) OTHER (specify]: _______________ _ 
<8) DON or KNOW 
<9) REFUSED 
)73( (Is SM/Are you) of Spanish origin or descent? 
PROBE: (Is (he/she)/Are you) Mexican, Mexican-American, Chicano, 
Puerto Rican, Cuban or from another Hispanic group? 
(1) YES 
(0) NO 
(8) DO N or KNOW 
(9) REFUSED 
)74mo( What is (Sf!'s/your) binhdate--when (was (he/she)/w ere you) born? 
(98) DON or KNOW 
)76( Wh a t is the monthly income that (SM/you) (or (his/her/ your ) 
spouse) receive? Include all sources such as wages, salaries, 
s ocia l security, pensions, net r en tal and so forth. 
$ (IF fl0RE TIIAN $6 , 000 , ASK 76tt. IF NOT, 
CO TO 77) 
(99':J':J98> DON ' T KNOW [goto a76) 
(99999 7 > REF USED [go to <176) 
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)76 tt ( You said (SH's/your) (and (his/her/your) spouse's) 
monthly income was (AMOUNT FROH 76), is th a t correct? 
) a76 < 
(1) YES[goto t77J 
(0) NO (CORRECT 76) 
If you (cannot/will not) tell me the exac t amount, can you give 
me an estimate? Is your monthly income .•• 
<1) under $500 a month? 
<2) between $500 and $1000 a month, or 
<3) more than $1000 a month? 
<8) DON'T KNOW [goto 79 J 
<7) REFUSED [goto 79J 
)77 ( (Does SM/Do you) (and (his/her/your) spou se ) receive any other 
income on a regular basis, such as interest or dividends, which 
you do not receive monthly that you have not already told me 
about? 
<1> YES 
<0) NO [goto 79J 
(8) DON'T KNOW [goto 79 J 
<9) REFUSED [goto 79J 
)78( Not counting what you have already told me about, how much o th e r 
income (does (he/she)/do you) receive, per quarter or per year? 
$ ____ _ PER (1) QUARTER 
<2> YEAR 
(3) OTHER [spec ifyJ : 
(99998) DON'T KNOW [go to 79 J 
(99999) REFU SED [goto 79J 
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)79( \Ie may want to get in touch with (SM/you) again in about one year. 
In case we cannot reach (him/her/you) at this address, ma y I have 
the name and address of someone else who would know (his/her/your) 
address one year from now? 
This information would be helpful even if you don't 
expect to be moving in the next 1 year. 
NAME: 
)80< STREET ADDRESS: 
)8 1< CITY: 
)82< STATE: 
)83< ZIP: 
)84< PHONE: ( ____ _ 
That is all the questions I have. Thank you for your time. 
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APPENDIX B 
APPENDIX B 
AHP ~OLLEE QUESTIONNAIRE - FOLLOW-UP 
) A( Hello, ma y I speak to (NAME OF SAMPLE PERSON)? 
(I) Sfu~LE PERSON ANSWERS [goto IJ 
( 2) SAMPLE PERSON UNAVAILABLE 
(3) S AMPLE PERSON DECEASED [TERMINATE J 
(4) S~~LE PERSON INCAPACITATED [goto EJ 
--- ) 
) B( Can usually reach (NAME) at this number? 
(I) YES [goto DJ 
(2) NO 
---) 
)C( \olh ere can I reach (NAME)? 
IF PERSON HESITANT TO GIVE INFORMATION: 
My name is and I am calling from Mathemat ica Policy 
Re search in Princeton, New Jersey. We are doing a follow-up 
to the study we did two years ago for the federal government 
concerning Medicare health benefits. At that time we interviewed 
«!'AME/(PROXY about (NAME» and we would like to speak with 
(SA!'1E ) (OR PROXY) again. I would appreciate it if you could 
tell me how to reach (NAME). 
(1) CALLBACK [goto cbJ 
( 2) PR OXY NEEDED [goto EJ 
)D( When can I call back to reach (NAME)? 
(1) CALLBACK CAN BE ARRANGED [goto cbJ 
(2) Sfu~LE !'1E!'1BER CANNOT BE INTERVIEWED 
) E( Th is is and I'm calling from Mathematica Policy 
Resear c h in Princeton, NJ. We are do ing a follow-up to the study 
we did two years ago for the federal government concerning 
!'led icare health benefits. A letter describing the study was 
sent to (NAME) at this address. I'm calling now to do the 
interview over the telephone, and perhaps there is someone els e 
who c an answer the questions on behalf of (NAME). Is there 
s om eone I can speak to who helps care for (him/her) and is 
know ledgeable about the health care (he/she) receives? 
( I ) NO PROXY POSSIBLE [TERMI NATE] 
( 2 ) CALLBACK FOR PROXY [goto cb J 
( 3 ) PRESE NT RESPONDENT CAN BE PROXY [goto GJ 
(4) PROXY COMES TO PHONE 
._=) 
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)F( This is and I'm calling from Matl)ematica Policy 
)G( 
Research in Princet on, NJ. We are doing a study for the fed e ral 
government concerning Medicare health benefits, which is a 
follow -u p to a study in which (N,AME) was interviewed two years 
a go , A let ter describing the stud y was sent to (NAME). I'm 
calling now to do the interview over the telephone, and I 
understand that you help care for (him/her) and would be 
kn o wledgeable about the health care (he/she) receives. Ma y we 
begin the interview now? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto cb} 
__ a ) 
!-la y we begin the interview now? 
(1) YES [goto 1 
(2) 1'0 [goto cb} 
~=-. ) 
) fi ( Before we begin, let me remind you that participation in this 
survey is voluntary and all responses will be held in 
confidence. Most of the questions ask for information abou t 
(N A~E), so you should pst answer to the best of your knowledge. 
If yo u don't know the answer or don't feel qualified to resp o nd 
to a subjective item, pst let me know. 
TYPE (g) TO BEGI~ INTERVIEW _2_ ) [goto I} 
)1( !lello , th is is (INTERVIEWER NAME) and I'm ca lling from Mathematica 
Policy Research in Princeton, New Jersey. Several days ago we 
sent .yo u a letter about the study we are doing for the fed eral 
government concerning Medicare benefits. We interviewed you a bout 
two ye ars ago for this study, and we're now calling back some o f 
th e people we tall<ed to then, to learn more about their ex-
periences with the special Medicare program at (AHP NAME). 
May we begin the interview now? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [GO TO CALLBACK ROUTINE} 
Bef o re we begin, let me remind you that participation in this 
survey is voluntary and all responses will be held in confid e nce. 
) ! ( Ou r re cor ds show that you had enrolled in the program for Medicare 
beneficiaries at (AHP NAME) on (ENROLLMENT DATE). Are you still 
enro ll e d at (AHP NAHE)? 
(I ) YES [g o to 7} 
( 2 ) NO 
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)2( .... 'hen did you c an c el your membership? 
(1 -123184 ) 
(d k> DON'T KNOW 
---> 
>3( What loIere your reasons for cancelling your membership in 
(AHP NA.'1E)? 
(1) COST ~ORE TIlAN EXPECTED 
(2) FOUND BETTER PLAN 
(J) 1'00 LONG 101 AlT FOR APPTS 
(4) 1'00 LONG WAIT AFTER ARRIVAL 
<5) INSUFFICIENT TREATMENT 
<&) OTHER UNSATISFACTORY CARE 
<7> REGl~AR PROVIDER NO LONGER ASSOCIATED WITH PLAN 
( 8 ) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
<dk> DON'T KNOW 
[program repeat) 
[ progra m test for n of reasons) 
[pr ogram test for fills from 3) 
>3 a ( IF H:lRE TIlAN ON E REASON: Which of the se 1oI0uld you sa y loIa s t h e 
mo st impo rtant reason for cancelling your membership? 
(LIST REASONS GI VEN I N Q.3) 
>J ~ ( IF 3 - 5, ASK: Have you received sufficient treatment fr o m 
another source of care since cancelling your membership at ( ... .HP 
NA~E )' 
<1> YES 
<2> NO 
( dk> DON'T KNOW 
... ) 
>4( Have you enrolled in another HMO or o ther prepaid health plan' 
EXPLAI N IF NECESSARY: These are he a lth plans that guarantee 
med ical serv ice s to the i r members in 
exchange for fbced premium payments. 
(1) YES 
(2) NO . [go to 7J 
<dk ) DON 'T KN OW [goto 7J 
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» ).' ',,1drh prep~id he~lth plan did you Fin? 
( RE GI n SAL LIST TO BE IN SERTED) 
-- - ) 
)f,( \..nat "' ere th e re asons ", hy you decided to enroll 
In CAHP NA-'1E fR OH Q . 5)? 
>6a < 
(I) 
( 2 ) 
0 > 
(4) 
0> 
(6) 
<7> 
(8) 
<9 ) 
<d k ) 
~ •• > 
ASK 
you 
YOL'R PHYSICIA-N \.;AS A MEMJlER Of PLA-N 
YOU R fA-HILY OR FRIENDS RECOHHENDED IT 
YOV IJ(X:U> ALIJAYS HAVE A PLACE IJHERE A DR IJAS AVAILABLE 
THERE IJOULD BE NO MEDI CA-RE f ORMS TO fILL OUT 
COST REASONS 
YOU THOUGHT CAHP NAME) IJOULD OffER BETTER QUALITY Of CA-RE 
PROX I~ITY Of MEDICAL CENTERS, HOSPITALS 
CARP NAHE) HAD BETTER BE~EfITS THAN MEDICARE OR OTHER PL A.>';S 
OT HER (SPECIfY) 
DON " KNOIJ 
IF "I" NOT CODED IN 6: IJas the physic ian you had before 
enr o lled a member of (AHP NAME FROM Q. 5) when you e nrolled ? 
<1> YES 
( 2 ) SO 
<dk > DON " KN OIJ 
.=~ > 
{c r os ~~:: rc ? eat] 
)f.t>< ASK IF ~OR ~ THA." OKE: REASO S GIVEN IN Q . 6: Of the r easons you 've 
t old roe, ",hich of these would you say is the most importa n t 
reason ",hy you enrolled in (ARP NAME fR OM Q . 5)? 
( fILL IJITH A-"SIJERS FROM 6, PLVS (I) if 6a • I) 
<1 > YOLTR PHY SIC I A-N IJ AS A ~1EMJlER OF PLA-" 
( 2 ) YOV R fA-HILY OR FRIENDS RECOHHE~DED IT 
0) YOU IJWL!) ALIJAYS HAVE A PLACE IJHERE A DR IJAS AVArLABL~ 
(4) THERE IJOULD BE NO MEDICA-RE FORMS TO FILL OUT 
<5) COST REASONS 
(6) YOl' THOUGHT (AHP NA."IE) IJ OULD OffER BETTER QUALl TY OF CARE 
(7 ) PR OX IMITY OF MEDICAL CENTERS, HOSP ITALS 
<8> CAHP ~A-"!E) HAD BETTER BENEfITS THAN ME DI CA-RE OR OTHER PLA-';S 
<9 ) OTHE R (SPECIfY ) 
<dl<.> DOK" KN OIJ 
... ) 
l ed 
) 7< The (first / next) q'Jestions are about your current living sHua-
t ion. 
I.'hat is your current marital status--are you now married, 
wid o wed, d ivor c ed, separated, or have you never been married ? 
<1) ~"'RRI ED 
( 2) WIDOWED 
0> DIVORCED 
<4> SEPARATED 
(5) NEVER !1ARRIED 
)P.< The next question is about the pLJce where you live. Do you 
live in a private home or apartment, a nursing hOme or other long-
term care institution, or something else? 
(l> PRIVATE HOME OR APARTMENT [goto 91 
<2> t-'L'RSING HOME OR OTHER LONG-TERI1 CARE INSTITUTION 
0 ) OTHER (SPECIFY) [goto 9] 
==~ ) 
)R a < \./hat is t h e name of the pLJce where you live? 
~=~) [goto 12] 
>9< IF 7 CODED 1 (MARRIED), GO TO 11. 
)10< Do you now live alone or with other people? 
<1> ALONE [goto 12] 
(2 ) OTHERS 
) i 1< Ho w many o th!"r people do you live with? 
<0-15> 
< d k) DON -r KNOW 
») ~ < OK, now 1 'd like to ask about any private health insuranc e 
po licies you may have, other than (ARP NAME). 
INTERVIEW ER , TYPE <g> T,O CONTINUE _8=) 
>l ~a< (TEST FR OM BASELINE) 
IF arnER PRIVATE INSURANCE POLICIES LISTED ON BASELINE, GO TO Q.1 3 
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)12 b( IF NO OTHER INSURANCE ON BASELINE, ASK: Do you now have any 
private health insurance policies other than (AHP NAME)? 
(1) YES [goto 16 J 
( 2) NO [goto 21 J 
( dk) DON'T KNOW [goto 21J 
__ a> 
) 13( When we interviewed you before, you said you had (NUMBER OF 
POLICIES) in addition to (ARP NAME); that is, (NAME POLICIES). 
Do you still have a policy with (POLICY II)? 
(I) YES [goto 15] 
(2) NO 
(dk) DON"l' KNOW 
__ a> 
) 14 ( Why do you no longer have this policy? 
(READ ONLY IF NECESSARY) 
(1) IT WAS TOO EXPENSIVE 
(2) DIDN"l' COVER WHAT I EXPECTED OR NEEDED 
0) FELT THAT CARP NAME) COVERAGE WAS ENOUGH, I DIDN"l' NEED HORE 
(4) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
( dk) DON"l' KNOW 
---) 
[program repeat for each policy] 
)15 ( Do you now have any other policies besides (POLICIES WITH YES 
IN 13) and (AHP NAME)? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 21J 
( dk) DON'T KNOW [goto 21) 
_._) 
) 16 < How many other private health insurance pol1cies do you now 
have, not counting (ARP NAME) (AND POLICIES WITH YES IN Q.13)? 
<1-10) 
(dk) DON"l' KNOW 
__ a> 
) 17 ( What (is the name of this other policy/are the names of these 
other policies) that you have now? 
__ a> 
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>18a< 
)18b< 
>18c< 
>18d < 
I'd like to ask some more about (this policy/each of these 
policies). (First, let's talk about the (pOLICY NAME) policy.) 
Was this policy obtained through a group such as an employer, 
a union, or a senior citizen's association, or did you purchase 
th is policy directly from an insurance agent or company? 
<1> GROUP 
<2> DIRECTLY FROM INSURANCE AGENT OR COMPANY [goto 18c] 
<dk> DON" KNOW 
---> 
Through what kind of group was this policy obtained? 
(1) SENIOR CITIZEN'S GROUP 
(2) R'S EMPLOYER 
0) R'S UNION 
(4) SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER 
(5) SPOUSE'S UNION 
(6) RELIGIOUS/FATERNAL GROUP 
(7) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
(dk) DON" KNOW . 
__ a) 
Was this health insurance policy specifically designed to pay 
for medical expenses not paid for by Medicare? These policies 
are somet imes called "Medicare supplemental" or "Medicare 
complementary. " 
(1) YES [goto l8e] 
(2) NO 
( dk> DON" KNOW 
-=-- ) 
We'd like to know whether this policy was a "major medical" 
policy, that is, a health insurance policy that pays some 
percentage of your medical costs after you pay your medical 
expenses up to the amount of the deductible. Major medical 
policies are not limited to a fixed amount per day of illness 
or to a specific disease. Was this a "major medical " policy? 
<1> YES 
(2) NO 
<dk> DON" KNOW 
---) 
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)18e( Do you (or your husband/wife pay any part of the premium for 
th is policy? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk) DON" KNOW 
---) 
[program repeat) 
[program test for any more policies) 
[program repeat 18a-e for each policy) 
)19 ( 
)19a( 
)19b( 
) 19 c( 
)19d( 
Which of the following types of coverage are provided by this 
private insurance other than with (AHP NAME)? 
Den tal? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
( dk) DON" KNOW 
__ a) 
Prescription drug? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk) DON" KNOW 
---) 
Private nursing or home health care? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk) DON" KNOW 
---) 
Eye glasses? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk) DON" KNOW 
__ a> 
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)20 ( What are your reasons for continuing coverage on other health 
insurance, while you are enrolled in (AHP NAME)? 
(READ ONLY IF NECESSARY) 
(1) THE EXPENSE FOR THE EXTRA PROTECTION SEEMS REASONABLE 
(2) IT'S FREE 
(3) THE SECURITY OF HAVING EXTRA COVERAGE · 
(4) THE PLAN COVERS SERVICES I NEED OR EXPECT TO NEED 
(5) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
(6) HA VEN"r THOUGHT ABOUT IT 
(7) HASN"r COME UP FOR RENEWAL SINCE JOINING AMP 
(dk) DON"r KNOW 
---> 
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)21( Now I have some questions about your experiences at (AMP NAME). 
Since joining the Hed icare program at (AHP NAME), thinking of 
what you (and your husband/wife) have had "to payout of your 
own pocket, do you think your overall cost for health care has 
increased, decreased, or remained about the same? 
(1) INCREASED 
(2 ) REMAINED ABOUT THE SAME 
0 ) DECREASED 
(dk) DON or KNOW 
__ a> 
)22( Do you think that the quality of the medical care you have 
received at (AHP NAME) has been better than, worse than, or about 
the same as the medical care you had been getting before you 
jo ined? 
(1) BETTER 
(2) ABOUT THE SAME 
0) WORSE 
(nc) NO CARE RECEIVED 
(dk) DON or KNOW 
__ a> 
)23( Now, th inking about your experience at (AHP NAME), 
)2 3a( 
have there been any things that were better than you expected? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 241 
(dk) DON or KNOW 
---> 
\./hat kinds of things that were better than you expected? 
__ a> 
)24( Are there any things about membership in (AHP NAME) 
that you feel you didn't get enough information on before 
you decided to join? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 25) 
(dk) DON'T KNOW [goto 25 J 
__ a> 
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)24a( \Jhat did you not get enough information on? 
(1) PREMIUM COSTS 
(2) OUT OF POCKET COSTS 
(3) CONDITIONS COVERED OR SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE PLAN 
(4) CHOICE OF PROVIDERS WITHIN THE PLAN 
(5) GETTING CARE OUTSIDE GEOGRAPHIC AREA SERVED BY THE PLAN 
(6) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
(dk) DON" KNOW 
__ a> 
(program repeat) 
)25( The next questions are about your visits to (AMP NAME). 
)25a( 
Have you visited a physiCian or clinic whose services were 
covered by (AHP NAME) since joining on (ENROLLMENT DATE)? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO (goto 35~) 
(dk) DON'T KNOW (goto 35a) 
__ a> 
Do you usually go to the (AMP NAME) clinic or do you go to the 
office of a doctor whose services are covered by the plan? 
(1) CLINIC 
(2) PLAN 
(dk) DON" KNOW 
---> 
)26( How do you usually get to this doctor's office or clinic? 
(1) WALK 
(2) PUBLIC BUS 
0) DRIVE SELF 
(4) TAXI 
(5) TRANSPORTATION PROVIDED BY AHP (BUS, VAN, ETC.) 
(6) RIDE WITH FRIEND OR RELATIVE 
(7) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
(dk) DON'T KNOW (goto 28) 
__ a> 
)27( About how long does it usually take you to get there? 
(1-300) MINUTES 
(dk) DON" KNOW 
__ a> 
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>28 ( Do you usually have an appointment ahead of time when 
you go there, or do you j.lst walk in? 
(1) APPOINTMENT 
( 2) W ALI( IN (goto 31) 
0> SOMETIMES APPOINTMENT, SOMETIMES WALK IN 
( dk> DON'T KNOW (goto 31) 
---) 
>29( Not counting etDergencies, can you usually get an appointment 
to see a medical person at (ARP NAME/your doctor's office) 
when you want to see this person, or do you usually have to wait? 
(1) CAN USUALLY GET APPOINTMENT [goto 31) 
(2) USUALLY RAVE TO WAIT 
(dk> DON"r KNOW 
---> 
>30 ( Not counting etDergencies, how many days do you usually 
have to wait between the time you want to see a medical 
person and the time you actually see a medical person 
at (ARP NAME/your doctor's office)? 
<1-90> DAYS 
(dk> DON"r KNOW 
---> 
>31 ( After arriving at the (clink/office), about how long do you 
usually have to wait (past your scheduled appointment time) 
t o see a medical person? 
( 0-300> MINUTES 
( dk> DON"r KNOW 
---> 
>32 ( Is there a particular medical person whom you usually see 
at the (office/clinic)? 
( 1) 
(2) 
( dk > 
---> 
YES (goto 34) 
NO 
DON"r KNOW 
>33( Would you prefer to see the same medical person on your 
visits to the (clinic/office) or doesn't it matter? 
(1) PREFER TO SEE THE SAME PERSON 
(2 ) DOESN'T MATTER (goto 35) 
---> 
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)34 ( How important is it to you to usually see the same 
medical person there, as opposed to seeing different 
persons. Would you say it is .. . -
)35a( 
)35b( 
(1) very important, 
( 2) somewhat important, 
( 3) or not important at all? 
(dk ) DON or KNOW 
__ a) 
Have you ever wanted a service or treatment that was not provided 
or covered by CARP NAME)? 
<1) YES 
<2) NO [goto 36) 
(dk) DON'T KNOW [goto 36) 
__ a> 
What type of servu:es or treatment were they? 
<1) PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
<2) VISION CARE 
(3) DENTAL CARE 
(4 ) ROUTINE FOOT CARE 
(5) SERVICES OF A CHIROPRACTOR 
(6) SERVICES OF A PSYCHIATRIST/PSYCHOLOGIST/OTHER MENTAL HEALTH 
PROF. 
(7) PRIVATE DUTY NURSING 
(8) NURSING HOME CARE 
(9) HOMEMAKER SERVICES 
<0 ) OTHER 
__ a> 
) 36( Since you joined the special Medicare program at CARP NAME), 
have you ever wanted to see a particular doctor or other 
medical person, not including dentists, who was not a member 
of (AHP NAME) even though those services would be provided by 
th at plan? 
( 1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk) DON or KNOW 
---) 
) 37 ( While enrolled in the special Medicare program at CARP NAME), hav e 
you used the services of a non-CARP NAME) medical person? Do not 
count emergencies, referrals from (ARP NAME), dental services, or 
services received because you were travelling outside the service 
area for (ARP NAME). 
(1) 
(2) 
( dk) 
__ a> 
YES 
NO [goto 42) 
DON'T KNOW [goto 4i) " 
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>38( How many times have you gone to a non-(AHP NAME) lIedical person 
dnce you joined (AHP NAME)? 
(1-99) TIMES 
(dk> DON"l' ICNOW 
__ a> 
>39( Why weren't (AHP NAME) medical people seen for these services? 
(I> AMP DID NOT COVER R~ CONDITION 
(2) COULD NOT GET SERVICES QUICKLY ENOUGH AT AHP 
0> AHP TOO FAR AWAY FROM WHERE R LIVES 
(4) R WAS ooT OF AHP SERVICE AREA WHEN SERVICES NEEDED 
(5) WANTED TO USE PRE-AHP PROVIDER 
(6) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
<dk> DON"l' mow 
--> 
[program repeat] 
>40< Who paid, or w ill pay. for the med 1cal bills for (these visits/ 
th is vis it)7 
<1> SELF-PAY 
<2> MEDICARE [goto 42] 
0) (AHP NAME) [goto 42] 
<4) . OTHER PRIVATE INSURANCE [goto 42] 
<5> NO FEE [goto 42] 
<6> OTHER (SPECIFY) [goto 42] 
<dk> DON"l' mow 
__ a> 
[program repeat] 
>"41< How much did or will you (or your spouse) payout of pocket for these 
services, not counting anything that has been or will be 
reimbursed by any insurance? 
$<0-99999> 
(dk> DON"l' mow 
__ a> 
>42< Have you had any problems at (AHP NAME) that have caused 
you concern or inconvenience? 
<1> YES 
<2> NO [goto 45] 
(dk> DON'T mow [goto 45] 
__ a> 
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) 4) ( Ha v e you ever discussed these problems with a staff member 
at (AHP NAME)? 
( 1) YES 
( 2) NO (goto 45) 
( dk ) DON'T KNOW (goto 45) 
__ a ) 
) 44 ( Were you generally satisfied with the outcome of 
th ese discussions? 
(1) YES 
( 2 ) NO 
(dk) DON -r KNOW 
__ a> 
IF Q.1 - 2 GO TO Q.4Sa 
)4S ( ASK IF Q2S-NO. H~ve you ever received any treatment or services 
) 4 6 a < 
that were covered by (AHP NAME) since your enrollment in (ENROLLMENT DATE)? 
(1) 
(2) 
(dk) 
__ a) 
YES (goto 468) 
NO (goto 46kJ 
DON'T KNOW (goto 46k) 
Did you ever receive any treatment or services that were covered 
by (AHP NAME) while you were enrolled? 
( 1) YES 
( 2 ) NO (goto 4B) 
<dk ) DON'T KNOW (goto 4B) 
__ a ) 
Now 1 would like to know how you would evaluate the services 
you have received ·at (AHP NAME) since you enrolled in the 
special Medicare program. I am going to read you a list of 
factors and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you 
think (AHP NAME) is · excellent, good, fair, or poor with respect 
to that factor. 
First, how would you rate the professional competence of 
th e ph ysic !.ans and other med ical persons who work there? 
Would you say it has been excellent, good, fair, or poor? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
( 2) GOOD 
() FAIR 
( 4) POOR 
<5) NO OPINION 
__ a ) 
>46b ( 
)46c ( 
) 46d ( 
) 46e ( 
Next, how would you rate the willingness of the medical 
staff to discuss and explain your health problems? 
(Would you say it has been excellent, good, fair, or poor?) 
(1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(5) NO OPINION 
__ a> 
What abou t the cou rtesy and consideration of staff? 
<1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0 ) FAIR 
<4) POOR 
(5) NO OPINION 
---> 
Availability of care in an emergency? 
<I ) EXCELLENT 
(2 ) GOOD 
0 ) FAIR 
<4) POOR 
<5) NO OPINION 
__ a> 
Th e med ic al resu Its of the treatment you have had? 
<1> EXCELLENT 
(2 ) GOOD 
0 ) FAIR 
( 4) POOR 
<5 ) NO OPINION 
---) 
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)46f( 
)46g( 
)46h( 
)461( 
)46 j( 
The amount of time spent waiting to see a medical person after you 
arrive at the facility? 
(l) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
0) NO OPINION 
__ a> 
What about the ease of getting convenient appointments? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(5) NO OPINION 
__ a> 
How about the ease of getting to (AHP NAME) from where you live? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(5) NO OPINION 
__ a> 
Next. how would you rate the freedom to choose among 
medical staff at (AHP NAME)? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(5) NO OPINION 
__ a) 
The amount of paperwork related to f11ing claims? 
(1) EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(5) NO OPINION 
---) 
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) 46 k( Finally, how would you rate the monthly premiums and special 
service fees at CARP NAME)? (Would you lI~y it has been excellent, 
good, fair, or poor?) 
( 1) EXCELLENT 
(2 ) GOOD 
0 ) FAIR 
(4) POOR 
(5) NO OPINION 
__ a> 
[IF 45 - 2 OR 45a - 2 GO TO 48) 
) 47 ( How satisfied would you say you are, overall, with the 
medical care you have received at CARP NAME) since you 
enrolled in the special Medicare program? Are you 
very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, neutral , somewhat dissatisfied 
or very dissatisfied? 
( 1 ) VERY SATISFIEP 
(2) SOMEWHAT SATISFIED 
0 ) NEUTRAL 
(4 ) SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED 
(5) VERY DISSATISFIED 
<dk) DON "I' KNOW 
---) 
177 
)48a( 
)48b( 
)48c( 
)48d( 
)49 a( 
)49b( 
Now I would like to ask you some questions about your health. In 
the last 6 months, that is since (DATE 6 MONTHS AGO), have you had 
or been bothered with pain in or around your heart or chest? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 49a) 
(dk) DON"r KNOW [goto 49aJ 
__ a> 
Did you seek care from (AHP NAME) for this problem? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 48dJ 
(dk) DON"r KNOW [go to 49aJ 
__ a) 
Did you actually see someone at (AHP NAME) about th is pain? 
(1) YES [goto 49aoJ 
(2) NO 
(dk) DON"r KNOW [goto 49aJ 
__ a) 
Why not? 
(1) COULDN"r GET APPOINTMENT 
(2) PROBLEM WENT AWAY/NOT IMPORTANT 
(3) TALKED WITH CAREGIVER OVER PHONE 
(4) CHRONIC PROBLEM, NO FURTHER CONTACT NECESSARY 
(5) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
( d k ) DON"r KNOW 
__ a> 
In the last six months have you had or been bothered with a 
persistent cough? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 50aJ 
(dk) DON"r KNOW [goto 50a) 
__ a> 
Did you seek care from (AHP NAME) for this problem? 
(1) 
(2) 
(dk) 
__ a> 
YES 
NO [goto 49d) 
DON"r KNOW [goto 50a) 
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) 49c ( 
)49d( 
)50a( 
)50b( 
) 50c( 
) 50d( 
Did you actually see someone at (AHP NAME) about this cough? 
(1) YES [goto 50aJ 
(2) NO 
( dk) DON"I' KNOW [goto 50aJ 
__ a) 
Why .. not? 
(1) COULDN"I' GET APPOINTMENT 
(2) PROBLEM WENT AW AY INOT IMPORTANT 
(3) TALKED WITH CAREGIVER OVER PHONE 
(4) CHRONIC PROBLEM, NO FURTHER CONTACT NECESSARY 
(5) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
(dk) DON "I' KNOW 
---> 
In the last six months have you been bothered with a severe 
loss of eyesight? . 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 51aJ 
(dk> DON"I' KNOW [go to 51aJ 
__ a> 
Did you seek care form (ARP NAME) for this problem? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 50dJ 
( dk ) DON"I' KNOW [goto 51aJ 
... -> 
Did you actually see someone at (AHP NAME) about your sight? 
(I> YES [goto 51aJ 
(2) NO 
(dk> DON "I' KNOW (goto 51aJ 
__ a) 
Why not? 
(1) COULON "I' GET APPOINTMENT 
(2) PROBLEM WENT AW AY INOT IMPORTANT 
<3> TALKED WITH CAREGIVER OVER PHONE 
(4) CHRONIC PROBLEM, NO FURTHER CONTACT NECESSARY 
(5) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
(dk> DON "I' KNOW 
---> 
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)51 a ( 
)51b( 
)Slc( 
)51d( 
)52a( 
)S2b( 
In the ust six months have you had or been bothered with 
swollen or painful joints? 
0) YES 
(2) NO [goto 52a) 
(dk) DON or KNOW [goto 52a) 
---) 
Did you seek care from (ARP NAME) for this problem? 
<1> YES 
<2> NO [goto 52a) 
---> 
Did you actually see someone at (ARP NAME) about your joint 
problem? 
<1> YES [goto 52a) 
<2> NO 
(dk) DON or KNOW [goto 52a) 
---) 
Why not? 
<1> COULON or GET APPOINTMENT 
<2) PROBLEM WENT AWAY INOT IMPORTANT 
0) TALKED WITH CAREGIVER OVER PHONE 
(4) OiRONIC PROBLEM, NO FURTHER CONTACT NECESSARY 
0) OTHER (SPEICFY) 
(dk) DON or KNOW 
---> 
In the ust six months have you had or been bothered with bad 
stomach cramps or pain? 
<1> YES 
(2) NO [goto 53a) 
<dk) DON or KNOW [goto 53a) 
---) 
Did you seek care from (ARP NAME) for this problem? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 52d) 
<dk) DON or KNOW [goto 53a) 
__ a> 
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) S2c( Did you actually see someone at (AHP NAME) about these cramps 
or pain? 
(1) YES [goto 53a) 
(2) NO 
(dk ) DON" KNOW [goto 53a) 
---> 
)52d( Why not? 
)53a( 
)53b( 
)53c ( 
)S3d ( 
(1) COULDN" GET APPOINTMENT 
(2) PROBLEM WENT AWAY/NOT IMPORTANT 
(3) TALKED WITH CAREGIVER OVER PHONE 
(4) CHRONIC PROBLEM, NO FURTHER CONTACT NECESSARY 
(5) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
(dk) DON" KNOW 
---> 
In the last six months have you had or been bothered with loose 
bowels? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 54a) 
(dk> DON" KNOW [goto 54a) 
---> 
Did you seek care from (AHP NAME) for this problem? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 53d) 
(dk) DON" KNOW [goto 54a) 
---> 
Did you actually see someone at (AHP NAME) about your loose 
bowels? 
(I) YES [goto 54a) 
(2) NO 
(dk) DON" KNOW [goto 54a) 
---> 
Why not? 
(1) COULON" GET APPOINTMENT 
(2) PROBLEM WENT AWAY/NOT IMPORTANT 
(3) TALKED WITH CAREGIVER OVER PHONE 
(4) CHRONIC PROBLEM, NO FURTHER CONTACT NECESSARY 
(5) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
( dk) DON"r KNOW 
---> 
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) 54 a ( 
>S4b( 
-
>S4c( 
>S4d ( 
)S5a( 
)S5b( 
In the last six months have you harl any fainting spells 
or blackouts? 
(1) YES 
<2> N.O [goto 54d) 
<dk> D.ONT' KN.OW [goto SSa) 
---) 
Did you seek care from (ARP NAME) for this problem? 
<1> YES 
<2> N.O [goto 54d) 
<dk> D.ON"!' KN.OW [goto SSa) 
__ a> 
Did you actually see someone at (ARP NAME) about your fainting 
spells or blackouts? 
(1) YES (goto SSa) 
<2> N.O 
<dk> D.ON"!' KN.OW (goto SSa) 
__ a> 
Why not? 
<1> C.OULDN"!' GET APP.OINTMENT 
<2> PR.OBLEM WENT AWAY IN.OT IMP.ORTANT 
0> TALKED WITH CAREGIVER .OVER PH.ONE 
<4> CHR.ONIC PR.OBLEM, NO C.ONTACT NECESSARY 
(5) 
.OTHER (SPEI CIT) 
<dk> DON"!' KN.OW 
__ a> 
In the last six months have you had or been bothered with any 
problems with your heart beating hard or acting funny? 
<1> YES 
<2> N.O [goto S6a) 
<dk) D.ON'T KN.OW [goto S6a) 
____ > 
Did you seek care from (ARP NAME) for this problem? 
<1> YES 
<2> N.O (goto 55d) 
<dk> D.ON'T KN.OW [goto S6a) 
__ a> 
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>55c < Did you actually see someone at (AHP NAME) about your heart 
problem? 
(I> YES [goto 56a) 
(2 ) NO 
(dk> DON'T KNOW [goto 56a) 
---) 
>55d< Why not? 
>56a( 
<1 > COULDN -r GET APPOINTMENT 
(2) PROBLEM WENT AWAY/NOT IMPORTANT 
(3) TALKED WITH CAREGIVER OVER PHONE 
(4) CHRONIC PROBLEM, NO FURTHER CONTACT NECESSARY 
(5( OTHER (SPECIFY) 
(dk> DON -r KNOW 
---> 
In the last six months have you had or been bothered with 
shortness of breath when you climb the stairs? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 57aJ 
(dk> DON'T KNOW [goto 57aJ 
.--> 
>~6b( Did you seek care from (AHP NAME) for this problem? 
>56c< 
(1) YES 
(2 ) NO [goto S6d) 
<dk > DON'T KNOW [goto 57a) 
.--> 
Did you actually see someone at (ARP NAME) about your shortness 
of breath? 
(1) YES [goto 57a) 
<2> NO 
(dk> DON'T KNOW [goto 57a) 
---> 
>S6d< Why not? 
<1 > COULDN -r GET APPOINTMENT 
(2) PROBLEM WENT AWAY/NOT IMPORTANT 
( 3) TALKED WITH CAREGIVER OVER PHONE 
(4 ) CHRONIC PROBLEM, NO FURTHER CONTACT NECESSARY 
(5< OTHER (SPECIFY) 
<dk > DON -r KNOW 
---> 
183 
)57a( 
)57 b( 
>S7c( 
>S7d( 
In the last six months have you had any problems with dizziness? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO (goto S8aJ 
( dk) DON'T KNOW (goto 58aJ 
---) 
Did you seek care from (AHP NAME) for this problem? 
(1) ITS 
(2) NO (goto S7dJ 
(dk) DON'T KNOW [goto 58a] 
---> 
Did you ac tually see someone at (AHP NAME) about your dizziness? 
(1) YES [goto S8aJ 
(2) NO 
(dk> DON'T KNOW [goto 58a] 
---> 
Why not? 
(1) COULDN>r GET APPOINTMENT 
. (2) PROBLEM WENT AWAY INOT IMPORTANT 
(3) TALKED WITH CAREGIVER OVER PHONE 
(4) CHRONIC PROBLEM, NO FURTHER CONTACT NECESSARY 
(S( OTHER (SPECIFY) 
(dk> DON"r KNOW 
---> 
>58( The next few questions refer to the past two weeks, that is, 
from (DATE 2 WEEKS AGO) through yesterday. 
During the past two weeks, did you stay in bed because of any 
illness or inj.lry? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [goto 60J 
(dk> DON'T KSOW [goto 60) 
---> 
>59( During the Lut two weeks, how many days did you stay in bed 
all or most of the day? 
(1-14> DAYS 
---> 
1114 
) 6Jc( 
)6Jd( 
)63e( 
) 6Jf ( 
Are you physically able to prepare your own meals yourself? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
( dk) OON'T KNOW 
---) 
Can you do housework such as scrubbing the floor without help? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk) OON'T KNOW 
__ a> 
If you had !1Iedicine to take, could youu take it without help, 
in the right dose at the right time? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk) OON'T KNOW 
__ a) 
Can you handle your own money, such as writing checks and paying 
bills, without help? 
(1) YES 
(2 ) NO 
( dk ) OONT' ~OW 
__ a> 
) 64 ( IF AT LEAST 51's IN 63 a-f, GO TO Q.65. 
Can you do the following without any help. 
a . dress and undress (can you put out clothes, dress and undress 
you rs elf)? 
(1) YES 
(2 ) NO 
(dk ) OON'T KNOW 
__ a) 
b. take care of your own appearance such as combing your own 
hair (and shaving)? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
( dk) OON'T KNOW 
__ a ) 
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)60( (Not counting the days in bed), Were there any (other) days 
during the past two weeks that you cut down on things that you 
usually do because of illness or inFry? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO [go to 62) 
(dk) DON'T KNOW [goto 62) 
---> 
)61( Again, not counting the days in bed, during the last two weeks, 
how many (other) days did you cut down for as much as a day? 
<1-14) DAYS 
---> 
)62 ( During the past 12 months, that is, since this day one year ago, 
about how many days did illness or inFry keep you in bed all 
>63a ( 
>63b( 
or most of the day? 
(Include the days in the past 2 weeks). 
(Include the days while a patient in a hospital). 
READ CATEGORIES IF NECESSARY. 
(0) 
(1) 
(2 ) 
0) 
(4) 
( dk) 
---) 
NONE 
1-7 DAYS 
8-30 DAYS 
31-180 DAYS (1-6 MONTHS) 
181 + DAYS (OVER 6 MONTHS) 
DON" KNOW 
Th e qu es qons I'ln going to ask you now have to do with how you 
manage with several routine daily activ.ties. For the purposes 
of this research study, we need to ask these questions of all 
respondents, regardless of how well they manage. When anslolering 
these next few questions, please think about what you are 
physically able to do, not necessarily what you do do. 
First, can you get to places out of walking distance without 
help, that is, can you travel alone on buses or taxis , or drive 
yoor ololn ca r ? 
(1) 
<2 > 
( dk) 
---> 
YES 
NO 
DON" KNOW 
Assuming you have transportation, can you go shopping for 
groceries or clothes without help? 
(1) 
( 2 ) 
( dk> 
---) 
YES 
NO 
DON" KNOW 
1 86 
c. eat (th at is, feed yourself with no 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk> OON -r KNOW 
---> 
d. get in and out of bed? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk> OON-r KNOW 
---) 
e. take a tub bath or shower? 
(1) YES 
<2> NO 
(dk) OON -r KNOW 
---> 
help )? 
f. Do you have trouble getting to the bathroom on time? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk> OON -r KNOW 
---> 
>65( When was the last time you had a regular physical examination 
even though you were feeling all right and had no s)'lDptoms 
to check out? 
(0) NEVER 
(1) MORE THAN 10 YEARS AGO 
(2) BETWEEN 5 AND 10 YEARS AGO 
0> BETWEEN 1 AND 5 YEARS AGO 
(4) LESS THAN 1 YEAR AGO 
(dk> DON -r KNOW 
---) 
>66( In general, would you say your health is excellent, good, 
fair or poor? 
(I> EXCELLENT 
(2) GOOD 
0> FAIR 
(4) POOR 
---> 
187 
) 67 < Comparing your general health to other people your age, 
would you say your health is much better, better, about 
the same, worse, or much worse? 
<1> HUCH BETTER 
(2) BETTER 
0) SAME 
<4) WORSE 
(5) IfJCH WORSE 
(dk) DON'T KNOW 
---> 
)68( In 1985, how much did you spend for health care, counting doctor 
and hospital bills, dental care, and prescription drugs but 
not counting what any insurance has paid or will pay, and not 
cou n t ing insu rance premiums--would you say. • • 
(1) nothing, 
(2) less than $100, 
(3) from $100 to $500, 
(4) or more than ' S500? 
(dk) DON'T KNOW 
---) 
)69( Now, for a few general questions • 
What are you doing at the present time: working, looking for 
work, retired,keeping house, or something else? 
(1) WORKING 
(2) LOOKING FOR WORK 
0) RETIRED 
(4) KEEPING HOUSE 
(5) OTHER UNEMPLOYED 
---> 
)70( ASK IF 69 - 1: Ar:e you working full time or part time? 
(1) FULL TIME 
(2) PART TIME 
(dk) DON'T KNOW 
---> 
)7 1< ASK IF 8 • 1: Do you (or your spouse) own your own home? 
(1) YES 
(2) NO 
(dk) DON'T KNOW 
---> 
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)72( What is the monthly income that you (and your spouse) receive? 
Include 811 sources, such 8S wages, salaries, social se curity, 
pensio ns, net rental and 80 forth. 
(1) UNDER $ 100 
(2) 100-299 
0) 300-499 
(4) 500-699 
(5) 700-899 
<6) 900-1,199 
0) 1,200-1,599 
(8) 1,600-1,999 
(9) 2,000-3,999 
(10) 4,000 OR MORE 
<dk) DON'T KNOW [goto 76) 
< rf ) REFUSED [goto 76) 
)73< Do you (or your husband/wife) receive any other income on a regular 
basis, such as interest or dividends, which you weren't counting 
in you r monthly income? 
<1> YES 
(2) NO [goto 76) 
(dk) DON'T KNOW [goto 76) 
)7 4 ( Not counting what you have already told me about, how much other 
in come do you receive, per quarter or per year? 
$<1-99999 9) 
< d k) DON" KNOW 
s=s ) 
)75( [no erase] 
(1) PER QUARTER 
(2) PER YEAR 
0) OTHER (SPECIFY) 
( dk ) DON" KNOW 
< rD REFUSED 
--- ) 
)76( That's the last question I have. Thank you very much f o r your 
t me. INTERVIEW ER, TYPE <g> TO EXIT INTERVIEW ---) 
189 
190 
VITA 
191 
VITA 
192 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
198 
